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Abstract 
This study is about the impact of decentralization in metropolitan areas. Studies of fiscal 
decentralization have largely centered on the formal tiers of government, without looking 
at the effects of this process on the recipient jurisdictions in metropolitan areas. This is an 
important omission, considering that more than 50 percent of the world's population lives 
in urban areas that often extend beyond formal jurisdictional boundaries. As a response, 
in this study I incorporate the metropolitan dimension into the study of fiscal 
decentralization. 
After integrating a database with information on the public finances of the Metropolitan 
Zone of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM), I test the hypothesis that the policies of fiscal 
decentralization in Mexico have exacerbated the level of fiscal disparity in this 
metropolitan area. My results show that fiscal disparity in the ZMVM increased during 
the 1990s. Fiscal decentralization had two different and opposite effects on fiscal 
disparities in the ZMVM. On one hand, fiscal decentralization mitigated fiscal disparities 
through the use of a system of redistributive transfers. On the other, and in contrast to this 
equalizing effect, decentralization has exacerbated the level of fiscal disparity by 
accentuating the differences of the jurisdictions' expenditure needs and their capacity to 
collect local taxes. 
In particular, this research shows that despite state intervention through a system of - 
redistributive transfers, the increase in fiscal disparities was due to three primary factors: 
the indirect effect of transfers on local fiscal effort, the uneven distribution of services 
and infrastructure in the metropolitan space, and differing governance structures in the 
ZMVM's jurisdictions. Due to the negative effects of fiscal disparities on urban 
segregation and poverty, I recommend two policy alternatives to mitigate fiscal 
fragmentation in the ZMVM: the creation of a metropolitan b d  and the formation of a 
special authority for the transportation sector. 
Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis 
Title: Professor of Political Sociology 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is about the impact of decentralization in metropolitan areas. Studies on fiscal 
decentralization have largely centered on the formal tiers of government, without looking 
at the effects of this process on the recipient jurisdictions of metropolitan areas. This is an 
important omission, considering that more than 50 percent of the world's population lives 
in urban areas, which often extend beyond formal jurisdictional boundaries. As a 
response, in this research I add a metropolitan dimension to the study of decentralization. 
I do so by first integrating a database with the public finances of the Metropolitan Zone 
of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM). Subsequently, I hypothesize that the policies of fiscal 
decentralization in Mexico have exacerbated the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 
Finally, I suggest two mechanisms to reduce fiscal disparities in the ZMVM. 
Definition of the problem 
In the 1980s developing countries embraced decentralization with the hope of improving 
their public sectors. Ever since then, Mexico has followed a series of decentralization 
policies in fundamental sectors like health, education, and infrastructure. Originally, the 
decentralization discourse was solely motivated by a number of normative political and 
economic considerations that sought to make governments more efficient and 
accountable. Now, after two decades of decentralization reforms, scholars have started to 
ask the following questions. What has been accomplished? What have been the 
conditions that lead to such results? Is everything going as planned, or are some things 
still missing? 
tn the last few years, students of public finance have identified a series of shortcomings 
in the theories of decentralization, especially when it comes to developing countries. 
Inrnan (1999), in a review of the evolution of fiscal decentralization in the last forty 
years, argues that most of the lessons learned in the field assume a U.S. model of 
economic and political institutions that is commonly missing in developing countries. Out 
of all the problems associated with decentralization (for a discussion of these, see 
Prud'homme 1995 and Tanzi 2001) this study focuses on the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on fiscal disparity. According to fiscal decentralization theory, because 
decentralization may give rich jurisdictions larger tax bases and lower tax rates than 
poorer jurisdictions, the income gap between jurisdictions may increase. This is 
particularly problematic in metropolitan areas that are formed by a series of jurisdictions 
with economic and social interrelationships, but with significantly different patterns of 
public resources and demands (Sacks & Callahan 1973). Communities with similar 
public service needs have to exert different levels of tax effort to provide a standard 
package of services, or provide fewer services at a uniform tax effort (Bahl et al. 1992). 
The process of decentralization may increase fiscal disparities in this context of 
jurisdictional unevenness in fiscal resources and service needs. 
High levels of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas are problematic because they 
detonate a process of urban segregation in which households of similar income levels 
cluster together. This clustering generates a number of social and economic problems, 
such as the continuation and reproduction of poverty in that part of the metropolitan area 
that has high concentrations of poor households. This process of poverty reproduction 
results fi-om a number of factors, such as unemployment, expansion of informal markets, 
lack of good infrastructure to access labor markets, etc. In addition to this economic 
factor, urban segregation has a critical impact on social integration. At the micro level, 
urban segregation has meant the social alienation of groups and communities, which 
results from the lack of spaces for social interaction. Such alienation consolidates and 
expands social pathologies like violence and criminal activity, and overall, has a negative 
impact on the quality of life (Rojas 2002). 
Despite the economic and social problems associated with fiscal disparities and the 
vulnerability of metropolitan areas to increasing levels of fiscal disparity, in developing 
countries neither scholars fiom the public finance nor the urban development fields have 
started to explore the impact that decentralization has had on fiscal disparities. On the 
fiscal decentralization front, a significant problem lies in the design of federal 
decentralization policies, which have largely ignored the differences among the recipient 
jurisdictions. According to Burki et al. (1 995: 25) decentralization policies have largely 
been designed in a uniform way, and "a structure that fails to distinguish between major 
metropolitan areas and small villages makes it difficult to clearly define the functional 
responsibilities of local governments." Similarly, Bird and Slack (2004: 22) argue that 
"the standard economic theory of local government does not distinguish among large 
metropolitan areas, intermediate-size cities, or towns and villages." To put it more 
broadly, I argue that, overall, the process of fiscal decentralization has not taken into 
account the spatial or territorial realities of the recipient jurisdictions that, although 
difficult to capture for analytical purposes, are important determining factors of the 
success or failure of the decentralization process. 
Analysts of urban and metropolitan formations have not been more responsive to this 
situation. In Latin America, for example, the scarcity of human and financial resources 
created a strategy of development and industrialization that was spatially concentrated in 
a few urban centers that rapidly became metropolitan areas. This process of urbanization 
was so fast that the number of cities with more than 1 million people increased from 2 1 in 
1985 to 47 in 2000. Many of these cities are true metropolitan formations that are linked 
together by a common labor market but that often span a number of jurisdictions that go 
beyond local and even provincial boundaries. Despite this situation, studies on 
metropolitan areas in Latin America are still scarce, especially with respect to their public 
finances. One element that accounts for the scarcity of studies on metropolitan finances is 
a lack of data. A recent study by Bird and Slack (2004) reminds us of the striking absence 
of studies of urban finances in Latin America and underscores the necessity of serious 
fieldwork to produce databases at the metropolitan level. This absence of data has 
impeded metropolitan areas to become independent units of analysis upon which 
meaningful studies can be conducted. 
The current situation in Mexico, like that of many other Latin American countries such as 
Argentina, is a direct consequence of a deeper problem that relates to a lack of formal 
recognition of the metropolitan phenomenon altogether (See Pirez n.d. for the case of 
Argentina). In a nutshell, there is currently a mismatch between the de facto existence of 
most metropolitan areas in Latin America, and their de jure recognition. Legal systems 
have not been able to keep up with the rapid urbanization process that in many cases has 
gone beyond formal territorial divisions. Jurisdictional boundaries are in place for 
political, legal, and administrative reasons, but they become invisible when it comes to 
the functional operation of urban concentrations. This is evident in their failure to seal off 
problems of pollution, solid waste disposal, water, crime, and transportation (Pierce 
1993). Despite this lack of legal recognition of the wider metropolitan phenomenon, their 
functional operation argues for a better understanding of their public finances, even if, for 
the time being, these areas exist only as statistical constructs, rather than as independent 
taxing and spending authorities. 
The lack of studies on the public finances of metropolitan areas is particularly 
problematic in the case of capital cities in Latin America. The long history of 
centralization in Latin America, as in many late-industrializing countries, resulted in the 
formation in each country of one or two primate cities with high concentrations of 
investment, economic activities, and revenue generation. When such developments 
occurred in the capital city, the centralization process intensified because of the capital's 
concentration of political power. This centralizing historical past laid the foundation 
(perhaps paradoxically) for the metropolitan sprawl and patterns of economic 
development currently observed in many capital cities. In Latin America, core capital 
cities (with a few exceptions such as in Brazil) function as poles of political and 
economic power, surrounded by less well-off suburbs, which-unlike the United States- 
enjoy lower levels of services and infrastructure. As a result, such capitals have high 
levels of inequality as households of similar incomes tend to cluster together. Inequality 
in Latin America is so high that the World Bank considers it the region with the highest 
level of inequality in the world (Rojas 2002). 
Despite this process of urban segregation, little still is known about the role that public 
finances play in this process and, more generally, about the fiscal condition of capital 
cities. It is only very recently that researchers have started to analyze certain public 
finance aspects of several Latin American capitals like Santiago (Glaeser & Meyer eds. 
2002), Buenos Aires (Prud'homme et al. 2004), Lima (Linder 2004) and Mexico City 
(PUEC 2004). In this study, I add to this recent literature by examining the public 
finances of the Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM). The ZMVM is 
currently the most populated and economically vibrant metropolitan area in Mexico. In 
terms of population, it is also the largest metropolitan area in Latin America and the 
second largest in the world (after Tokyo). In the year 2000, this area had 18 million 
people and produced about one-third of the country's national product. The ZMVM is 
formed by the Federal District (DF), which is the capital of the nation, together with its 
16 administrative subdivisions or delegations, as well as 58 municipalities of the 
neighboring State of Mexico and the municipality of Tizayuca in the State of Hidalgo 
(POZMVM 2000). 
The state and local jurisdictions that comprise the ZMVM interact with each other 
through a variety of services and activities of metropolitan scope that run the gamut fiom 
air pollution and water provision to transportation and public security. For example, in 
terms of metropolitan mobility alone, Gakenheimer et al. (2002) calculate that about 7.5 
million vehicle trips take place every day between the DF and the metropolitan 
municipalities of the State of Mexico. This flow of people across multiple jurisdictions 
generates a variety of externalities (positive and negative) that affect both the single 
jurisdictions themselves and the metropolitan area as whole. It is in this sense that 
analysts need to conceive of-and eventually recognize-the ZMVM as a functional entity, 
because despite its multi-jurisdictional composition, the characteristics (fiscal, social, 
economic, etc.) of each unit can only be explained as a "function" of the whole 
metropolitan structure. In other words, whatever happens in one single jurisdiction of the 
ZMVM (either the DF, the metropolitan zone of the State of Mexico, or any individual 
municipality or delegation) affects and is affected by the condition of the other 
jurisdictions and of the metropolitan area as a whole. 
Despite this functional operation of the ZMVM, Mexico's governance structure is highly 
dominated by its federalist structure, which does not recognize the legal existence of 
~netropolitan or any other type of intermediate tiers of government (i.e., cities, regions). 
This lack of legal recognition has been both the source of the metropolitan problem and 
the obstacle to achieving viable solutions. It has been the source of the problem because it 
has caused analysts and politicians to conceive of the ZMVM as a group of individual 
jurisdictions rather than as an integrated administrative or political entity. In turn, this has 
actually prevented reaching any viable solutions of metropolitan scope, as the legal 
options for coordination are limited and have proven incapable of making the state and 
local jurisdictions work together in an efficient and positive manner both for themselves 
and for the metropolitan area as whole. However, even if the lack of legal recognition has 
prevented policymakers from recognizing and rationalizing these multi-jurisdictional 
interactions formally, individually local jurisdictions make decisions about their own 
territories with knowledge of what is happening in the contiguous jurisdictions. 
The individual state and local jurisdictions that form the ZMVM have very different 
levels of wealth, fiscal structures, and institutional designs. Moreover, they have 
contrasting levels of fiscal resources and service needs, a situation that leads them to 
exert different levels of tax effort to produce a similar package of public services. 
Overall-with the exception of a few municipalities adjacent to the DF-the ZMVM is 
divided into a rich pole in the DF and a poorer pole in the State of Mexico. Their wealth 
differential is so enormous that in the year 2002, these two entities respectively presented 
the highest and the lowest levels of total spending per capita in the country. There are 
several historical, political, social, and economic factors that account for these 
differences, all arising from the fact that the DF has always represented the epicenter of 
power and the axis of development in the country. 
According to public finance theory, the existence of jurisdictions with different mixes of 
tax and spending levels, like in the case of the ZMVM, is not in itself problematic. 
Actually, it is one of the conditions for enhancing efficiency, as citizens can settle in the 
jurisdictions that better match their preferences for taxes and services. The problem is 
that in metropolitan areas, the taxlservice differences among jurisdictions are not always 
determined by individual tastes, but are actually imposed or created by the metropolitan 
community itself (Sacks & Callahan 1973). In other words, jurisdictions, by forming part 
of a metropolitan area, are exposed to a series of spillovers that have an effect on their 
access to revenue sources and levels of expenditure needs. These differentials result in a 
spatial misallocation of resources as the rich households and firms move away from the 
poorer ones in order to avoid inferior public services or, in theory, higher taxes (Oakland 
1979). 
In the case of the ZMVM, inter-jurisdictional spillovers and spatial misallocation of 
resources are present both in the public and in the private domains. In addition to the 
public misallocation of resources that results from the combination of high service needs 
and low revenue capacity, the ZMVM is also affected by the decisions made by private 
investors, who for strategic, market-driven purposes may choose to expand construction 
to areas with relatively cheap prices, thereby increasing the demand for services in areas 
with already low levels of infrastructure. In the case of the ZMVM this dynamic is 
accentuating the already marked wealth differences and is further increasing the 
segregation in this area. 
Overall, the process of urban segregation is driven by the operation of real estate markets 
that increase the prices of the best-located parcels, and exclude low income groups from 
enjoying quality services and infrastructure. In the ZMVM this has resulted in a 
concentration of high-income households and commercial services in the DF, and a 
concentration of low- and middle-income households in the metropolitan municipalities. 
Because an enormous number of people who work in the DF cannot afford the high 
property prices of the DF, they have to settle in the metropolitan municipalities which 
offer more affordable housing, but substantively less services and infrastructure. This 
process accentuates the spatial misallocation of resources and increases the taxlservice 
differentials between the DF and the State of Mexico. As a result, metropolitan 
municipalities bear high fiscal pressures, as they have to meet an increasing number of 
demands, while having a low revenue-generating capacity. 
Research objective and contribution of study 
It is in the previously described context that the current study emerges. For the last few 
decades, developing countries have experienced a rapid urbanization process whose 
consequences have not been fully taken into account by policies of fiscal 
decentralization. In this study, I add the metropolitan dimension to the study of 
decentralization, by analyzing the extent to which the policies of fiscal decentralization in 
Mexico have exacerbated or mitigated the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 
As already mentioned, fiscal decentralization may increase the fiscal disparities among 
the local jurisdictions within a metropolitan area by giving them access to different tax 
bases. In the case of Mexico, this prevailing theory about the impact of decentralization 
on fiscal disparities cannot be directly tested because Mexico's decentralization process 
has largely been characterized by an increase in the transfers that subnational 
governments receive from the central government, rather than by the devolution of tax 
bases. However, this relationship can be indirectly tested by assessing the impact- 
redistributive or otherwise-that the system of intergovernmental transfers has had in the 
level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. In addition, because decentralization is 
fundamentally a political decision, the study recognizes that fiscal disparities may also be 
increasing or decreasing for reasons other than those of pure economic efficiency or 
equity. Thus, I also explore the general conditions-both behavioral and structural-that 
may be causing an effect on the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 
In order to conduct this exercise, I start by integrating a database of the public finance 
statistics of the ZMVM. Because metropolitan areas are not legally recognized in 
Mexico, this information is not yet available from any single source. For this exercise, I 
gathered, systematized, and integrated existing data from different sources into a single 
database that contains the most relevant public finance data of the constituent 
jurisdictions of the ZMVM. The ZMVM is composed of five different fiscal regimes, and 
the database includes relevant information on revenue and expenditure accounts in all of 
them. The dataset covers the period from 1989 to 2000, which are the years for which 
reliable information is available. I also include data for other years whenever they were 
available. The fact that there is complete financial data for the 1990s is a fortunate 
situation, because during this decade a number of important decentralization policies took 
place in Mexico. 
After discussing the database on the public finances of the ZMVM, I explore the main 
objective of the study, which is to examine the effect of the process of decentralization on 
the fiscal disparities of the ZMVM. I do so in two ways. First, I explore how State 
intervention, through the system of transfers, has fiscally affected the ZMVM in respect 
to the rest of the country and other metropolitan areas. Second, I adapt a basic 
methodology developed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(1973) to measure the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM-defined as the ratio of the 
total spending per capita in the DF to that of the metropolitan municipalities. The focus of 
the analysis is to determine the extent to which the observed level of fiscal disparity is 
being generated by the intervention of the State through the system of transfers. 
Because fiscal disparities in the ZMVM are not only generated by the system of transfers, 
I also explore other determinants of such disparities. These determinants include: the 
system of property taxes; private-sector decisions about investment; the proximity 
between the DF and the State of Mexico; and the different governance structures of the 
ZMVM jurisdictions. This last point is particularly important because while the State of 
Mexico and its municipalities have a decentralized structure-with tax functions assigned 
to the state and local jurisdictions-the DF operates in a centralized way. Thus, the fact 
that municipalities and delegations that lay side-by-side face similar problems and service 
demands, but are equipped with different institutional characteristics (autonomous 
decentralized jurisdictions vs. centralized administrative departments), represents a semi- 
natural experiment to test the effect of institutional differences on fiscal disparities in the 
ZMVM. 
By exploring all the previous factors, I contribute to an understanding of the conditions 
under which decentralization mitigates or exacerbates fiscal disparities. More generally, I 
make a series of contributions to the literature on fiscal decentralization, including: (1) 
establishing a database of public finances on a metropolitan scale; (2) providing a basic, 
yet innovative, methodology to assess the changes in fiscal disparities and their 
determinants at different points in time from an interdisciplinary perspective; and (3) 
underlining the complexities and dangers of decentralizing functions and responsibilities 
to jurisdictions with different tax capacities and spending needs. 
In addition to these contributions, I also provide decision-makers with empirical evidence 
to aid in the design of more efficient and equitable metropolitan-wide policies. Beyond 
the specific factors that determine the level of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas 
whenever present, governments have several policy tools at hand to ameliorate this 
condition by pushing jurisdictions to provide standard packages of services at similar tax 
rates. Due to the proliferation of metropolitan areas everywhere in the world, there are 
already a variety of policy alternatives available to improve the governance of these 
areas. Mexico itself has a long, yet incomplete, history of intergovernmental structures. 
Thus, I also investigate some of the most technically viable and politically feasible policy 
alternatives to improve the level of fiscal equity in the ZMVM. Particularly, I explore the 
creation of a special district for the provision of metropolitan transportation services, and 
the design of a fund for the financing of services and infrastructure of metropolitan scope. 
Because of the complexity of analyzing the impact of fiscal decentralization in 
metropolitan areas, my study only focuses on the single case of the ZMVM. However, 
the contribution of this study aims to go beyond the case of the ZMVM and provide a 
framework, which may help researchers to study other metropolitan areas in Latin 
America. Although this study will not make reference to other metropolitan areas in Latin 
America, I would like to stress that the ZMVM shares a great number of similarities with 
areas like the Grand Santiago, the Greater Buenos Aires, and Metropolitan Lima (See 
Klink 2002). All of these areas not only share a common past characterized by strong 
national governments and processes of urban development concentrated in a few primary 
cities, but also have a similar territorial distribution of wealth. Like the ZMVM, areas 
such as the Greater Buenos Aires, for example, are comprised by a rich central city 
(Buenos Aires City) surrounded by a much poorer metropolitan area (Province of Buenos 
Aires) that has a proportion of poor households three times higher than that of the City of 
Buenos Aires (www.indec.gov.ag, 2005). Thus, since all of these areas share similar 
characteristics, I hope this study will provide new ways to think about the fiscal condition 
of other Latin American metropolises. 
Methods and fieldwork 
In order to conduct the previously described research, I use a case-study approach with an 
extensive reliance on three methodologies: data collection, interviews, and statistical 
analysis. The process of quantitative data collection was far from a straightforward 
exercise. As public finance specialists know, in developing countries local data are 
commonly scant, incomplete, and often plagued with inconsistencies, and I could not 
avoid dealing with these problems. Due to the nature of this research, I did not generate 
any hard data myself, but gathered, systematized, and integrated a number of revenue and 
expenditure data that already existed in a variety of forms and places. 
Because the ZMVM is composed of five different fiscal regimes (Federal, State of 
Mexico, Municipal, DF, and Delegations), I relied on a number of data sources. The 
quantitative data came fiom more than a dozen different sources, of which three were 
particularly relevant. The first is the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and 
Informatics (INEGI) that generates a series of statistics on subnational finances. This 
source provided general revenue and expenditure data on the federal, DF, and State of 
Mexico levels. It also provided detailed data at the municipal level for the State of 
Mexico. The second is a database with general revenue and expenditure information put 
together by the Legislative Assembly of the DF (ALDF), based on an extensive review of 
the DF's annual public accounts. The third source is the DF's Ministry of Finance, where 
most of the detailed data on the revenue sources of the DF and the Delegations come 
from. Particularly, the DF's Treasury provided me with detailed information on the 
property tax and debt appropriations by delegation, which are data not commonly 
available to the public. 
Aside from these data sources, I obtained a vast amount of financial information fiom 
fiscal codes, public accounts, annual revenue laws, spending budgets, and a number of 
other sources, including the National Institute of Federalism (INAFED), the National 
Council of Population (CONAPO), the Ministry of Finance of Nuevo Leon, the Institute 
for the Technical Development of Public Finances (INDETEC), the National Banking 
and Assets Commission (CNVB), Federal Congress, the Center of Research for 
Development (CIDAC), the World Bank, and the web pages of various subnational 
governments that form part of the ZMVM. 
In addition to integrating a vast number of quantitative financial data into a single 
database, I conducted a series of interviews to get an understanding not only of the 
quality of the data itself, but also, more generally, of the effect that the process of fiscal 
decentralization is having on the public finances of the ZMVM. For that purpose, I made 
four field trips to Mexico in January and June of 2003 and in March and September of 
2004. In total, I conducted 34 interviews with local, state, and federal officials in both the 
executive and legislative branches of government. I also spoke with academics, real- 
estate developers, and with some of the statisticians responsible for assembling the 
databases. These interviews included: a former Federal Minister of Finance; a former 
Mayor of the DF; a former Minister of Finance of the DF, as well as the current one; 
different officials in the Metropolitan Commissions in both the DF and the State of 
Mexico; and several former delegates and local congressmen. In particular, I had a series 
of regular meetings with various officials at the DF's Treasury, mainly in the departments 
of Fiscal Policy, Public Credit, and Cadastre. As a follow-up to many of these in situ 
interviews, I conducted e-mail and phone communications in the subsequent months. 
Outline of the study 
This study is comprised of six chapters. Chapter 1 presents a general overview of both the 
main theories of decentralization and of Mexico's experience in the decentralization 
process. There I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the systems of local taxation as 
well as the basic rationale for the use of transfers and their potential impact on tax 
behavior. I also explain why metropolitan areas are particularly vulnerable to fiscal 
disparities and propose the use of a simple measurement of fiscal disparities in 
developing countries, according to the ratio of the total spending per capita of the central 
area to that of the periphery. In addition, I briefly discuss Mexico's policies of fiscal 
decentralization and present the main characteristics of the country's fiscal structure. 
In Chapter 2, I define the ZMVM as a unit of analysis, and defend the necessity of 
envisioning this area as a functional unit. I also discuss some of the complexities of this 
region, mostly those deriving from the fact that it is composed by two entities with 
different endowments, fiscal capacities, and governance structures. I analyze some of the 
determinants of such differences, particularly the causes that led the DF to become the 
axis of Mexico's economic development. Also, I study the political reforms that the DF 
has gone through in the last fifteen years as well as the dramatic change in the political 
landscape since the beginning of its democratization process in the 1990s. The first and 
second chapters can be consulted for general reference, or skipped by the reader 
interested in the analysis of the public finances of the ZMVM, which begins in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 3 presents the fiscal picture of the ZMVM. Here, I discuss the revenue sources 
and spending responsibilities of both the DF and the State of Mexico. I analyze data at 
the state and local levels and underscore the differences and similarities among all the 
fiscal regimes that operate in the ZMVM. This chapter serves as a general reference on 
the public finances of this metropolitan area and as the basis for the analysis of the study, 
which is carried out in the next two chapters. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the analytical contribution of the study. In Chapter 4, I explore 
how State intervention, through the system of transfers has contributed to the fiscal 
fragmentation of the ZMVM. To do so, I determine the overall position of this region in 
the federal fiscal system by analyzing the evolution of conditional and unconditional 
transfers in the DF, the State of Mexico, and the ZMVM. In addition, I measure the level 
of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM and assess the extent to which transfers account for the 
observed level of fiscal disparity. 
Because the fiscal fragmentation of the ZMVM is a complex and multi-causal 
phenomenon, in Chapter 5 I assess the extent to which a number of fiscal, administrative, 
political, and institutional determinants have mitigated or exacerbated fiscal disparities in 
the ZMVM. Lastly, in Chapter 6 I discuss a series of considerations related to the 
improvement of the fiscal condition of this metropolitan area. This analysis focuses on 
the discussion of two of the most technically viable and politically feasible governance 
alternatives for the ZMVM, namely the formation of a special transportation district, and 
the consolidation of a metropolitan fund. 
CHAPTER 1 
DECENTRALIZATION AT CROSSROADS: WHERE WE STAND 
1.1. Introduction 
The 1980s was a decade of public-sector reforms in many developing countries, resulting 
from the economic and political crises of those years. The stated purpose of these reforms 
was to make governments more efficient and equitable service providers, and to open 
new spaces for the democratic participation of society (Bangura 2000, Smoke 2001, and 
Tanzi 2001). One of the preferred policies that governments followed to achieve these 
results was the decentralization of functions, resources, and responsibilities from the 
central to the subnational units of government. 
The decentralization policies of the 1980s and 1990s were largely driven by a series of 
normative economic and political principles. Economically, analysts maintained that 
decentralization closes the gap between suppliers of public services and local consumers, 
increasing efficiency and reducing costs. Efficiency in resource allocation improves in 
the face of different local preferences for local public goods. Politically, analysts 
advocated that decentralization promotes attributes such as participation, responsiveness, 
autonomy, and accountability (Shah 1998). These normative economic and political 
claims in support of decentralization were so persuasive that, according to Ebel and 
Vaillancourt (:2001), by 1994, of the 75 developing and transitional economies listed by 
the World Bank, all but 12 claimed to have embarked on some form of transfer of power 
from central to local units of government. Despite this widespread implementation of 
decentralization policies, by the end of the 1990s analysts realized that countries often 
prized decentralization on normative grounds regardless of the results achieved (Bird & 
Vaillancourt 1998). In reaction, a new wave of more empirically driven literature has 
been emerging to demonstrate that despite strong belief in the virtues of decentralization, 
the actual evidence is either conflicting or nonexistent (Litvack et al. 1998 and Smoke 
200 I). 
This most recent empirical literature underscores a variety of potential problems 
associated with decentralization, that range from complications in determining the 
optimal size of jurisdictions, to miscalculations in the capacities of the recipient 
jurisdictions to perform certain policy functions. From all the alleged shortcomings of 
decentralization (see Prud'homme 1995 and Tanzi 2001), one that is particularly 
important for this study is the potential impact that the policies of fiscal decentralization 
have on exacerbating fiscal disparities. According to fiscal theory (Prud'homme 1995), 
because decentralization gives rich jurisdictions a larger tax base and lower tax rates than 
to less rich jurisdictions, the income gap between jurisdictions tends to increase. Despite 
the potential of decentralization to enhance fiscal disparities, fiscal decentralization 
analysts have not yet studied how this process takes place in developing countries. 
This situation arises from a more general and important problem with decentralization 
that has to do with analysts virtually overlooking the spatial dimension of the areas 
affected by decentralization, particularly the fact that territorial spaces do not have an 
homogenous composition in terms of the size and general composition of their 
comprising jurisdictions. In fact, central governments often decentralize functions, 
resources, and responsibilities to their subnational governments as if they were totally 
independent units of government, without factoring into this process those differences 
that directly affect their ability to fulfill their new obligations. For example, in Mexico 
the legal framework does not differentiate municipalities by any criteria such as size, 
urban composition or income level, regardless of the reality that these differences have an 
effect on municipalities' revenue generation and, consequently, on their capacity to 
provide local goods and services. 
This problem is particularly critical in the case of metropolitan areas, which are spatially 
unique in the sense that they are comprised of a set of territorially contiguous and 
functionally dependent subnational units, but which have very different levels of fiscal 
resources and service needs. In these cases, because the jurisdictions form part of a single 
metropolitan area, they often require a similar provision of public services throughout the 
whole metropolitan area, but they have very different tax capacities to provide these 
services. In addition, because of these differences in tax and spending levels, jurisdictions 
may impose significant externalities on each other which, unless curbed-through some 
sort of redistributive mechanism-can further increase the level of fiscal disparity in the 
metropolitan area. This is because to provide a specific level of public goods or services, 
jurisdictions must increase spending as a response to externalities such as pollution or 
crime, in order to cope with the additional costs that the externalities have imposed. 
Just as decentralization theorists have ignored this spatial dimension, so do the policy- 
makers who design decentralization policies. For the last three decades, policy-makers in 
Mexico have been implementing a series of decentralization policies, largely relying on 
the country's federalist nature, thereby neglecting the legal existence of any type of 
intermediate government. A good case in point is the Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of 
Mexico (ZMVM) which still lacks any legal recognition despite its de facto existence. 
This situation is problematic because in the absence of such recognition, decentralization 
policies target the state and local jurisdictions that comprise this metropolitan area, with 
complete disregard for the fact that the actual levels of tax collection and service 
provision of one jurisdiction depend, to some extent, on the fiscal and spending behavior 
of the other jurisdictions. 
In this context, the particular question that I seek to investigate in this study is: how does 
the decentralization process impact fiscal disparity across ZMVM jurisdictions? This is 
an important question because it directly relates to the fact that decentralization may be 
affecting the mix of revenue means and expenditure needs at the local level. Despite its 
importance, decentralization analysts have ignored the spatial dimension not least 
because of the complexity of capturing the various ways in which fiscal decentralization 
can affect the level of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas. In the absence of a single 
model to explain the causes of variation in fiscal disparity levels, I rely on a variety of 
theories from the fields of fiscal decentralization, local public finance, and metropolitan 
governance, to explore the conditions under which the fiscal decentralization process 
mitigates or exacerbates fiscal disparities in the ZMVM. 
In this chapter, first I present the theoretical foundations of this study, starting with a 
general introduction to fiscal decentralization theory and some of its general criticisms. 
Second, I discuss in more detail the advantages and disadvantages of having a 
decentralized system of local taxation and also present a more general discussion of the 
use of transfers and their potential implications for affecting the level of fiscal disparity. 
Third, I discuss a basic methodology that the U.S . Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR 1973 and 1984) developed to study the variation in 
fiscal disparities in the metropolitan areas in the United States, and I make a case for 
applying this methodology to the study of the ZMVM. Finally, because Mexico already 
has significant experience with decentralization, I present a brief description of the 
country's fiscal decentralization process and highlight some of the reasons that led the 
country to embark upon the decentralization process. 
1.2. Fiscal decentralization in theory 
Why decentralization? This process of transferring spending responsibilities and revenue 
sources from central to subnational units of government has been normatively justified on 
both political and economic grounds. Politically, given the fact that decentralization aims 
to bring the government closer to the people, analysts have identified this process with a 
series of democratic attributes such as the promotion of participation and the 
enhancement of the responsibility and the accountability of governments (Shah 1998). 
Economically, the basic rationale for decentralization is to attain allocative efficiency in 
the face of different local preferences for local public goods (Litvack et al. 1998). 
The economic rationale of decentralization has been evolving for more than half a 
century and largely relies on the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), and 
Oates (1972). Tiebout developed the "voting with the feet" model to provide a market- 
analogue solution to the provision of local collective goods, by forcing consumer/voters 
in a spatial economy to settle in one community rather than another, thereby 
automatically revealing their preferences for the mix of taxes and services. According to 
Musgrave, local governments should mainly be in charge of the allocation function, 
which is concerned with how resources should be used and what goods and services 
should be produced. Oates developed a "decentralization theorem," which claims that 
because local governments have better information than the central government about 
local preferences, they will more efficiently provide public goods. Finally, along these 
lines of economic thought, more recently Weingast (1 995) developed a model of "Market 
Preserving Federalism," which contends that if states are able to make credible 
commitments to preserve markets, then a decentralized arrangement will stimulate 
competition, and therefore efficiency. 
For a number of decades, decentralization discourse was largely rooted in this set of 
normative economic and political claims. During the 1990s, academics began to 
underscore a series of both theoretical and empirical weaknesses associated with the 
normative claims in support of decentralization. Theoretically, the main criticisms came 
from a series of flaws associated with the assumptions of the theory of decentralization, 
which include the following specific elements: (1) the fact that jurisdictions are not 
optimally designed to attain allocative efficiency, but instead are culturally, legally, and 
historically grounded (Oates 1999; Ter-Minassian 1997); (2) the theory's lack of political 
foundations (Rodden & Rose-Ackerman 1997); (3) its incapacity to generate the 
necessary competitive framework, mostly because costs (for accessing information, 
coordination, and the like) are lower in the upper than in the lower tiers of government 
(Breton 20001, (4) the limitations of local taxes as sources of revenues (Inman and 
Rubinfeld 1996); and (5) simply because the challenges of local governments in 
developing countries are not to reveal the fine differences in preferences between 
jurisdictions, but mostly to satisfy basic needs (Prud7homme 1995). 
The other important criticism of normative theories of decentralization is that the 
evidence regarding their alleged virtues is still scant and mixed. Since the 1990s there 
have been a growing number of empirical analysts who look for associations between 
decentralization and the series of its alleged virtues. Some of the associations they have 
tested include measurements of economic growth (Davoodi & Zou 1998), good 
governance (De Mello & Barenstein 2001), corruption (Fisman & Gatti 2000); 
government size (Stein 1999, Rodden 2003, and Ebel & Yilmaz 1999), and participation 
(Peterson 1997; Smoke 2001). Overall, the results of these studies are not conclusive and 
they largely depend on the data and methodology used. Other more qualitative studies 
have also found that decentralization has not delivered the expected results. For example 
Burki et al. (1999) find that it is not clear how decentralization affects the provision of 
public services. Similarly, Tendler (1 997) shows that decentralization in Brazil does not 
automatically result in more participation, but instead is the result of a complex process 
where paradoxically the central government plays a hndamental role. Because of this 
situation, Rodden (2002) argues that we are at the crossroads of the optimistic theoretical 
literature and the growing pessimistic empirical literature of decentralization. 
1.2.1. Decentralization and local taxation 
Despite the lack of empirical support, analysts who have supported the normative 
political and economic principles in favor of decentralization have made a compelling 
case in favor of having a system of local taxation. Their overall argument is essentially 
that local governments must raise their own revenues, because "if they do not, the whole 
rationale for improved economic efficiency and enhanced governance is in jeopardy" 
(IADB 1994: 180). Jones and Stuart (1983: 94) summarize a long-time claim in favor of 
local taxation in the following way: 
To achieve genuine local accountability, the local government financial system should ensure that 
local authorities draw the buck of their income from their own local taxpayers and voters, and that 
the latter are aware that they are paying their taxes to support local government services 
The idea is simple. If local governments are to be responsible and accountable, then they 
should tax and spend independently (Brennan & Buchanan 1980). Bahl and Schroeder 
(1 983: 1 16) argue that accountability blurs when "separating the pleasure of expenditure 
benefits from the pain of taxation." According to their argument, governments will be 
more solicitous in spending their budgets if they have taxation powers. The question is 
then, how do local governments remain accountable, especially in the context of 
developing countries, where the local tax bases are weak and they largely rely on other 
intergovernmental sources of revenue? 
The problem of local accountability in developing countries-where local governments 
largely rely on transfers-is not yet solved, but theorists have made at least two important 
observations that must be taken into account. The first has to do with the way in which 
the decentralization process is designed, especially with the way transfers flow from the 
upper to the lower tiers of government. Here the idea is to devise a way that does not kill 
all the incentives for local taxation, and thus accountability. In particular, the theory of 
fiscal decentralization suggests that transfers should be delivered to local governments 
only after they have tried to raise their own revenues. If not, transfers could discourage 
local tax effort, because local governments will have few incentives to search for new 
sources of revenue or to efficiently collect taxes from their existing bases (Bahl & Linn 
1 992). 
A second suggestion that Bird and Villancourt (1998) developed has to do with what they 
called "accountability at the margin." According to this principle, it is perfectly possible 
for a local government to be highly dependent on transfers and still be fully accountable, 
as long as they are given control over their own revenues. Concretely, the idea is to give 
them control to affect the volume of their own revenues at the margin, through their own 
policy choices, in particular by choosing the tax rates. That is, "if subnational 
governments are expected to act responsively, such governments must be able to increase 
or decrease their revenues by means that make them publicly responsible for the 
consequences of their actions" (Bird & Villancourt 1998: 13). 
Now the question becomes, over which sources of revenue should local governments be 
given control? Public finance theorists and policymakers have solved this tax-assignment 
question by looking both at the efficiency in tax administration and at the degree to which 
revenue capacity matches expenditure needs. Although the assignment of revenue 
sources across tiers of government varies from country to country (very much in direct 
relationship to the level of development of the subnational governments), local 
governments in developing countries rely on property taxes as their primary own-source 
revenue, and also, importantly, on fees from the provision of services (Shah 1994). 
The arguments in favor of the local administration of property taxes are varied. Among 
the most important are: (1) there is no difficulty in attributing the yield; (2) evasion is 
extremely difficult; (3) the cost of maintaining the rating is low in proportion to the yield; 
(4) the tax is relatively simple and understandable; and (5) identifying the property to be 
taxed is fairly easy (Foster et al. 1980; Peters 199 1). 
Despite these strengths, property taxes also have severe economic and political 
limitations, some of the most important being: (1) its high visibility, that arises from its 
direct payment out of taxable income, as opposed to other taxes that are deducted at the 
source (McCluskey 1991); (2) the need for continuous reassessment of properties, which 
not only requires a skilled staff to do it properly, but is also one of the most corrupt of 
urban functions (Paul 1975); (3) the lack of a necessary correspondence between the 
value of property and residents' ability to pay (Oates 2001); (4) problems with technical 
aspects that have to do with the various types of tax relief available, and its high income- 
inelasticity (income grows faster than the tax); (5) and, most importantly, its inability 
to easily provide sufficient resources to finance a significant expansion of local public 
services (Bird 2000a). In regard to this last point, Bahl(2001) argues that in terms of its 
yield, the property tax is not a very significant revenue source, as it only represents 0.4% 
of gross domestic product (GDP). Its importance as a revenue source, measured as a 
share of GDP, has not changed in the last three decades, but as a percentage of total 
subnational taxes, its importance has declined by about 5 percentage points, from 45 to 
40%. Because of all these shortcomings, Bird and Slack (1983: 15) argue that "it takes a 
good deal of sweat, tears and political blood to raise property taxes sufficiently to keep up 
with the pace of expenditure growth needed to maintain service levels." 
In addition to these shortcomings, there is another problem in the property tax system that 
is of particular concern for this study. Although the decentralization of tax powers 
enhances accountability, this process introduces a tendency to increase fiscal disparities. 
The argument is that because decentralization will give richer jurisdictions a large tax 
base and lower tax rates than poorer jurisdictions, regional disparities will increase as 
these tax and base differentials force businesses and households to settle in localities with 
lower tax rates (or similar rates but better services). This will enlarge the tax base in rich 
jurisdictions and increase the income gap between regions, a situation that led 
Prud'homme to argue that "decentralization can be the mother of segregation" (1 995: 
203). 
Although the economic rationale of the previous claim is correct, two additional 
considerations must be taken into account. First, there is scant empirical evidence that 
decentralization causes deepened inequality. Second, governments have certain policy 
tools at hand to curb the inequalities that decentralization may bring. Concerning the first 
factor, Smoke (2001) argues that the way in which decentralization affects inter-area 
inequalities within local government jurisdictions in developing countries is still unclear, 
and that there is no empirical evidence on the matter. In this sense, my study will not only 
be an empirical contribution, but it will also shed light on the way in which 
decentralization mitigates or exacerbates fiscal disparities. In terms of the second factor, 
governments have ways to compensate for potential inequalities without losing the 
benefits of decentralization. There are two main ways to do so, one through 
intergovernmental transfers, and the other by designing alternative governance structures 
that cover the whole metropolitan area, including both rich and poor jurisdictions. 
Despite the existence of these tools, there is no sound theory to explain the conditions 
under which governrnents decide to use them. Certainly, they may choose to use them in 
a pure economic spirit to try to counter-balance the fiscal disparities wrought by 
decentralization, but they may also be used as instruments to win political struggles in 
and over space. In the next section, I further elaborate on the logic of the transfer systems 
and in Chapter 6, I discuss the design of alternative governance structures. 
1.2.2. Transfers, redistribution, and local fiscal behavior 
In the presence of fiscal disparities, upper tiers of governments may take advantage of 
their redistributive capacity and use the transfer system to ameliorate disparities. In fact, 
one of the two most robust economic rationales for the use of transfers is the principle of 
"fiscal equity" (Shah 1994). This principle is related to the assumption that jurisdictions 
should provide some "average" level of public services by exerting an "average" fiscal 
effort, usually measured as its tax rate. However, for various reasons (different tax bases, 
different costs of providing public services, or differences in the demands for public 
services), local jurisdictions cannot provide an "average" level of public services, so 
higher tiers of government commonly use transfers to reduce the fiscal inequalities 
among jurisdictions. 
Beyond their equalizing nature, in general transfers are widely used in virtually all 
decentralized systems because the limited taxing powers available to subnational 
governments are not sufficient to fully finance their wide range of expenditure 
responsibilities (Bird & Villancourt 1998 and Willis et al. 1999). Actually, in developing 
countries, intergovernmental transfers are not only inevitably required to close the fiscal 
gaps between local revenues and expenditures, but they also represent the main source of 
revenue of subnational governments (Litvack et al. 1998 and Spahn 1999). 
Despite the widespread use of transfers, both economists and political scientists 
commonly recognize that there is a series of complexities associated with their use, and 
that designing them properly is one of the more complex aspects of fiscal federalism 
(Shah 1994 and Ter-Minassian 1997). From all the disadvantages associated with the use 
of transfers, for the purpose of this study, I focus on only two. The first has to do with the 
aforementioned principle of accountability, and the other with the potential effect of 
transfers on the fiscal behavior of subnational governments. 
Concerning the first disadvantage, the rationale is simple: transfers make local 
governments less accountable for their fiscal decisions by weakening the link between tax 
and expenditure decisions. According to the principles of (local) taxation, if a 
(local) government is to make the right fiscal decisions, it must weigh the benefits of the 
proposed public measures against their costs. However, as Oates (2001 : 26) argues "if 
financing comes from elsewhere, this link is broken and the choice of public programs 
will no longer be based on their true cost, but they will rather be the result of political 
negotiations between local and higher-level authorities." Along the same lines, Rodden 
(2002) argues that when this link is weak, politicians may face incentives to act 
opportunistic~ally, mainly by viewing public sector revenue as a common pool that 
politicians may try to "over-fish." 
In terrns of the second disadvantage, the rationale is also simple: a high reliance on 
transfers may negatively affect local tax behavior and discourage tax effort (Bahl & Linn, 
1992). Despite the important association that the concept of tax effort establishes between 
transfers and taxes, analysts have not clearly defined or measured this concept. In 
general, public finance theorists provide two alternative theories to explain the impacts of 
transfers on local tax effort. 
The first theory, which I refer to as the "rational" or "fiscal laziness" model, proposes 
that an increase in transfers results in a decline in local tax effort. According to this 
model, transfers generate a disincentive to collect taxes because local governments 
"prefer 'free' central transfers to the politically costly course of raising own-source 
revenues" (Peterson 1997: 10). The second explanation, generally referred to as the 
"flypaper effect," suggests that "money sticks where it hits" (Hines & Thaler 1995). 
According to this explanation, an increase in transfers does not reduce tax collection, and 
transfers increase total expenditures by approximately the same amount as the transfers, 
because transfers are indeed used for the purpose for which they were given. According 
to the "flypaper effect," the particular ways in which local governments spend their 
resources not only depend on the design of the grants themselves, but also on the source 
from which the money originates. Thus, the "flypaper effect" runs contrary to the 
common argument raised by economists about the fungibility of money, in the sense that 
it assumes that the local government's spending decisions are bounded by the source of 
their revenues. 
Empirical studies on the impact of intergovernmental grants on tax effort usually support 
either the "rational" or the "flypaper" models. However, the evidence generated by 
studies of developing countries is far from robust (Bahl & Linn 1992 and Litvack et al. 
1998). One of the reasons for this situation is the scarcity of studies that seek to assess the 
impact of grants on tax effort. To the best of my knowledge, Colombia (Bird 1984, 
Garzon 1 997, Jimknez 1 996, and Melo 2002), the Philippines (Bahl & Schroeder 1983), 
Brazil (Dillinger 1994; Prud'homme 1998), and Mexico (Sobarzo 2003; Sour 2004) are 
some of the few developing countries that have been studied. According to various 
specialists in public finance (e.g., Bird 1984; Gramlich 1977), the studies on fiscal effort 
will not be conclusive until a proper formal theoretical model of the expected local fiscal 
response to grants is provided and tested against an appropriate body of data. Despite the 
fact that there are conceptual shortcomings and a lack of empirical support on the impact 
of transfers on tax effort, Schroeder (1988) argues that it is clear that if an objective of a 
grant program is to increase local government spending, this objective cannot be 
achieved if the recipient government diminishes its own tax effort. 
1.3. Decentralization and fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas 
Continuing with the discussion about the series of considerations that surround 
decentralization, I now deal with the additional problem of decentralization's failure to 
consider the spatial dimension, and its potential to increase fiscal disparities. In general, 
fiscal decentralization theorists have focused their analyses on the formal tiers of 
government, ignoring the metropolitan phenomenon altogether. As I will explain in the 
next chapter, by "metropolitan area" I refer to a territorial continuum that spreads over a 
series of local jurisdictions. In the United States, these are commonly referred as "urban 
areas" (see Chapter 2 Footnote 4). This limited focus on formal tiers of government exists 
largely because the recipients of the decentralized functions, resources, and 
responsibilities are almost always formal tiers of government (i.e., states and 
municipalities), which are the only units of government with political autonomy and 
fiscal powers. In developing countries, it is not uncommon to find that metropolitan areas 
or any other kind of multi-jurisdictional formations are not recognized as formal units of 
power, with rights to elect their own authorities and to tax and spend independently. This 
situation uncovers a more general and fundamental problem with decentralization 
discourse, which is a complete neglect of the spatial dimension. Overall, decentralization 
policy-makers conceive of subnational governments as totally independent units without 
taking into consideration the impact of their size and general characteristics as well as 
their spatial territorial location (i.e., contiguous vs. separated jurisdictions) on the level 
and quality of the local goods and services provided. 
One consequence of this failure to recognize the metropolitan phenomenon is a tendency 
to design standard decentralization policies that ignore the scale and general 
characteristics of the recipient jurisdictions. According to Burki et al. (1 995: 25) "overall, 
decentralization policies have been uniformly designed, and a structure that fails to 
distinguish between major metropolitan areas and small villages makes it difficult to 
clearly define the functional responsibilities of local governments." Similarly, Bird and 
Slack (2004) argue that on the theoretical front, fiscal decentralization analysts have also 
failed to distinguish between large metropolitan areas, cities, and small towns. This lack 
of recognition of the scale and general characteristics of the recipient jurisdictions is 
particularly problematic in the case of metropolitan areas, which are comprised of a series 
of distinct but territorially adjacent jurisdictions. The situation is problematic because 
despite the fact that these areas are comprised of jurisdictions with important economic, 
labor, and social interrelations, they have significantly different patterns of public 
resources and demands. 
As urban economists (e.g., Oakland 1979) recognized a long time ago, jurisdictions that 
form part of a metropolitan area, or any other type of urban continuum for that matter, do 
not only have different tax and spending levels, but also impose significant costs and 
benefits on each other. The difference among jurisdictions' tax and spending levels arises 
from a general misallocation of resources that largely results from locational choice. In 
fact, as Oakland argues, to the extent that upper-income groups and businesses 
concentrate in one part of the metropolitan area, and lower-income groups in the other, 
both tax and spending resources become spatially misallocated. This spatial misallocation 
reinforces the uneven distribution of resources by increasing the spending needs of the 
jurisdictions with the lowest revenue-raising capacity. In addition, there are other factors 
that contribute to this uneven distribution of resources, such as the particular history and 
political relevance of the jurisdictions, and differences in the composition of their tax 
bases, their costs of producing public services, the age of their current infrastructure, and 
so on. The overall result of this uneven distribution of tax revenues and spending needs is 
an increase in the level of fiscal disparity, which is illustrated by the fact that 
communities with similar public service needs have to exert different levels of tax effort 
to attain these common needs. 
In metropolitan areas, which usually are spread out over a set of spatially contiguous 
jurisdictions with different income levels, fiscal resources, and public service 
requirements, the process of decentralization poses additional threats, because these areas 
are particularly vulnerable to high levels of fiscal disparities. Indeed, the spatial 
misallocation of resources often seen in metropolitan areas reinforces this uneven 
distribution by increasing the spending needs of the jurisdictions with the lowest revenue- 
raising capacity. As already mentioned, fiscal decentralization may polarize jurisdictions 
by giving them control over different tax bases. It is in this context that I review here the 
standard economic rationale in favor of decentralization. 
Economic theorists (e.g., Tiebout 1956) argue that decentralization enhances efficiency 
by allowing for the existence of jurisdictions with different mixes of tax and spending 
levels, which citizens can establish according to their local preferences for service 
provision and tax rates. However, in metropolitan areas, this is problematic because, as 
Sacks and Callahan (1973) argue, not all public-expenditure differentials appear to be 
caused by differences in tastes, but some are actually imposed on or created by the 
communities themselves. Examples of this sort include commuters who fail to internalize 
their mobility costs (e.g., environment and congestion), and out-of-state users of social 
services (e.g., education and health) who do not fully contribute to the financing of these 
services. In these cases in which "expenditure and tax differentials are not of a voluntary 
nature, they become non-neutral in character" (Sacks & Callahan 1973: 92). 
In addition, jurisdictional mobility in developing countries is commonly restricted by 
several factors that impede people from moving across jurisdictions to satisfy their 
preferences for local services. Despite the expectation of the Tiebout (1956) model that 
people will move in reaction to low taxes and better services, individuals' mobility is 
restricted by economic considerations and by what Donahue (1997) calls "citizen's 
surplus." Concerning the first factor, people in developing countries commonly lack 
access to "exit mechanisms" like real-estate credit markets, so that they are often forced 
to stay in communities that may not match their preferences. In terns of the idea of 
"citizen's surplus," this refers to the series of cultural affinities, friends and family ties, 
and economic connections that prevent people from moving across jurisdictions. 
Aside from these efficiency-based arguments, the current metropolitan reality also forces 
the revision of the decentralization discourse on equity grounds. According to Oakland 
(1 979: 334), actually "the principal source of dissatisfaction with present central-city 
fiscal conditions may not be related to economic efficiency but rather to considerations of 
equity." The basic equity factor has to do with built-in mechanisms in decentralization 
policies which segregate jurisdictions that would otherwise be more economically and 
socially integrated. This problem arises because when urban areas are divided into a 
number of fiscally independent local governments, each local government has the 
incentive to exclude individuals who require extra expenditures in excess of their 
marginal contributions to locally raised revenue (Chemik & Reschovsky 2001). This 
situation results in the segregation of rich and poor people in the metropolitan area, which 
is generally not the product of a deliberate policy of social exclusion, but rather the 
indirect consequence of a system of housing-market discrimination. This polarization 
creates a series of problems especially in poor areas that see their fiscal capacity 
weakening, while their average costs of providing public services continue to increase. In 
such a context, poor jurisdictions have little alternative but to increase their tax rates or 
reduce their spending levels, and because of their weak tax bases, they often opt for the 
latter. Needless to say, this results in a lower provision of public services, which in turn, 
reinforces the unequal distribution of resources in the metropolitan area. 
1.3.1. In search of a measurement offiscal disparities in metropolitan areas 
The process of segregation that I previously described is accentuated as urbanization 
progresses and more metropolitan areas are formed. The world has just crossed the point 
at which 50% of humanity lives in urban areas-in Latin America the rate is already 75%- 
and it is estimated that by 2020 half of the population in the developing world will be 
urban (Sachs 2003). Despite this reality, academics have not yet developed an acceptable 
methodological framework to study the concrete ways in which the decentralization 
process affects the level of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas. Because the 
urbanization process is unlikely to stop and decentralization will inevitably remain on the 
development agenda, I believe it is crucial to develop an innovative, albeit incomplete, 
methodological framework to understand and rigorously test the impacts of fiscal 
decentralization in metropolitan areas. 
In reaction to this current situation, I turned to the 1970s literature on city-suburban fiscal 
disparities in the United States to look for a way to study the impact of the 
decentralization process on fiscal disparity levels in the ZMVM. At that time, and all the 
way up to the 1980s, the financial problems of U.S. cities and metropolitan areas held 
the attention of academics and policymakers who began to study the problem of fiscal 
disparities and look for reforms. Particularly, the now disbanded Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) made strong efforts to measure the level of fiscal 
disparity in the largest metropolitan areas in the Unites States (ACIR 1973 and 1984). 
Later on, other long-time students of public finance also continued with the 
measurements of fiscal disparities in U.S. cities and made new contributions to improving 
our understanding of the problem of fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas (Bahl et al. 
1992 and Bahl2000). Overall, however, the basic theory and measurement of fiscal 
disparities in metropolitan areas has remained unchanged for the last thirty years. In the 
rest of this section, I present the main conceptual definition and measurement method for 
fiscal disparities in metropolitan formations in the United States, and I argue for the use 
of this framework to improve the understanding and increase the rigor of analysis of the 
current fiscal condition of the ZMVM. 
According to economic theory, the concept of fiscal disparity refers to the idea that fiscal 
disadvantages can arise either because some jurisdictions have to exert a higher tax effort 
to provide a standard package of services or, conversely, provide fewer services at a 
uniform tax effort (Bahl et al. 1992). A precise measurement of this concept requires 
estimation of the cost of providing a standard package of services and a clear definition 
of tax effort. Since both these things are commonly difficult to measure, analysts have 
chosen to look at the ex-post level of fiscal disparity, as measured by the relative 
differences in per capita expenditure, taxes, and aid-without accounting for differences in 
need or in levels of tax effort. In that same tradition, I examine the differences in per 
capita expenditures as a basic measure of fiscal disparity. 
With regard to metropolitan areas, the measurement of the concept of fiscal disparity 
goes back to the pioneering work of Sacks and Callahan (1973), who calculate a central 
city (CC)-to-outside central city (OCC) ratio (CC-OCC). This is a simple ratio in which 
the numerator is the per capita expenditures (or alternatively transfers and taxes) of all the 
local governments of the central city area, and the denominator is the per capita spending 
of all the local governments of the outside city area. Notice that this ratio measures the 
disparity between the fiscal activity of all local governments in the central city and of all 
local governments in the outside central city area, and not only of those jurisdictions that 
are territorially contiguous. 
Although this indicator was developed and used in the United States to capture the 
specific city-suburb problems that metropolitan areas have in this country, it is of great 
usefulness to measure fiscal disparities in other metropolitan areas outside the United 
States that are comprised of two significantly different sets of jurisdictions. In this sense, 
such a concept fits the reality of the ZMVM, as this area can readily be seen as 
comprising a central city (DF) and an outside central city (metropolitan municipalities). 
However, I do not wish to stress this comparison any further as there are substantial 
differences between the reality and legal definitions of the US and ZMVM metropolitan 
areas.' With this in mind, I argue that the CC-OCC indicator represents an acceptable 
' Some of the most important differences between the city-suburban reality in the United States and the 
current relationship between the DF and the metropolitan municipalities of the State of Mexico have to do 
with the fact that, in general, the central cities in the United States have lower levels of wealth and weaker 
public-service provisions than the suburbs (ACIR 1973; ACIR 1984). In contrast, in the ZMVM, the central 
city (DF) has higher income levels and better public services than the outside central city (metropolitan 
~nunicipalities). 
way to study the evolution in the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. Needless to say, 
analysts could improve this indicator, as well as the overall measurement of fiscal 
disparity; however, its use allows me to shed some light on the current fiscal condition of 
the ZMVM. 
1.4. Fiscal decentralization in practice-The Mexican case 
The policies of decentralization that Mexico has adopted since the 1980s have been based 
on the theoretical arguments that I previously discussed. The causes that have given way 
to decentralization in Mexico are various, including both a general dissatisfaction with a 
centrally driven public sector, and most notably, the dramatic political changes that the 
country has undergone in the last two decades. The decentralization process began in 
Mexico at the start of the 1980s, when two important reforms took place: the creation of 
the National System of Fiscal Coordination (SNCF) in 1980 and the municipal reform of 
1983. 
The first important reform of the 1980s was the creation of the SNCF, which is the 
cornerstone of the federal fiscal pact, and which-with some revisions-is still valid to this 
day. The creation of the SNCF arose from the necessity to review the intergovernmental 
fiscal arrangement that had been in place for various decades without any substantive 
revision. Its objective was fundamentally to increase the total revenue of the federal 
government and to improve the regional distribution of resources. In principle, the 
creation of the SNCF was not driven by a decentralization agenda, but its operation is 
central to the decentralization process in Mexico. By assigning tax sources among 
different tiers of government and by consolidating the operation of a revenue-sharing 
system, the SNCF created a federal fiscal arrangement through which the entire fiscal 
decentralization process has been conducted since its creation. 
In fact, since its origin, the SNCF has been at the center of the fiscal decentralization 
process in Mexico. During the 1980s the system mostly dealt with revenue, but by the 
1990s, it had also incorporated the decentralization of spending functions and also of 
subnational borrowing. In terms of revenue, the fiscal decentralization process has largely 
consisted of the operation of a system of unconditional revenue shares or participaciones 
(described in Appendix 1). The way the system works is that the federal government 
maintains control over the most important tax sources, which it further distributes to the 
subnational governments, according to a set of parameters that include population, 
taxable capacity, and fiscal effort. Because the SNCF does not provide any measure for 
devolving tax bases to the subnational governments, the extent to which this has been a 
real decentralization is questionable, as states and municipalities have actually increased 
their fiscal dependence on the federal government. There is one important exception to 
this process of (de)centralizing revenue sources, and that has to do with the second 
crucial reform that took place during the 1980s, which is the 1983 municipal reform. 
An analysis of the 1983 municipal reform takes us directly to the origin of the 
decentralization process in Mexico that started with the election of President de la Madrid 
in 1982. At that time, the country was in the midst of one of its most critical economic 
crises, occasioned by the fall in oil prices and a severe currency devaluation. This 
economic crisis, together with the declining legitimacy of the political system brought 
about by the crisis, led the de la Madrid administration to put in place a program coined 
"the decentralization of national life." Through this program, President de la Madrid 
sought to pursue a policy of national decentralization, consisting of three main 
components: strengthening of federalism, support of municipal life, and promotion of 
regional development. The axis of this program was the reform of article 1 15 of the 
Constitution that recognized municipalities as the basis of the territorial division and the 
political representation of the country. This reform sought to strengthen the municipal tier 
of government by enlarging its financial presence in terms of both revenues and 
expenditures. In terms of revenue, the 1983 reform gave municipalities control over the 
administration of property taxeq2 and in terms of expenditures, it made them responsible 
for the provision of basic public services (see Section 3.4.3). 
The reform of 1983 did not give municipalities complete autonomy over the property taxation, as the 
approval of the tax rates remained under the control of state congresses. That right came almost twenty 
years after when a subsequent reform of article 1 15 in 1999 gave municipalities the right to propose their 
own cadastral values and tax rates. 
This decentralization reform was targeted at the municipal level so it left the fiscal and 
political status of the states and the DF virtually unchanged. According to Davis (1994), 
despite the de la Madrid efforts to reintroduce urban and administrative reforms to the 
DF, the actors that stood to lose fiom these changes (i.e., the PRI elites in the capital city) 
opposed them to the point that, unlike the municipal reforms that were indeed 
implemented, the democratic reform for Mexico City was rejected. This is an important 
observation, because it reflects the overall purpose of decentralization at that time, which 
was to give way to reforms, as long as they were politically harrnless to the hegemonic 
power of the official party PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party). In fact, nowadays, 
academics seem to agree that the rationale of the decentralization policies of the 1980s 
was to re-establish the legitimacy of the political system without having to embark on a 
deeper democratization reform that would have brought irreversible political changes 
(Rodriguez 1997 and Davis & Raich 2003). 
Aside from giving municipalities control over the administration of property taxes, most 
decentralization policies that took place during the 1980s and 1990s consisted of the 
devolution of spending responsibilities to states and municipalities mainly in the areas of 
education, health, and infrastructure. In terms of education, the decentralization process 
began in 1992 during the Salinas administration (1 988- 1994), when the federal education 
authorities, the governments of the 3 1 states, and the National Education Workers Union 
(SNTE) signed the National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education, that 
mandated a transfer of responsibility for the provision of basic education services to the 
state governments. In the case of health, the decentralization process began in the 1980s, 
but did not actually get underway until 1995, with the new federalism program of the 
Zedillo administration (1 994-2000). At that time, with the National Agreement for the 
Decentralization of Health Services, the federal health authorities transferred the 
responsibility for delivering first and second-level health services for the uninsured 
population to the  state^.^ Finally, in terms of infrastructure, unlike the education and 
3 States deliver health services to the uninsured population through "decentralized public organizations," 
which are semi-independent state organizations headed by the state governors. These organizations are also 
integrated by the federal ministry of health (SSA) and other state authorities, that include the state's Health 
Minister and representatives of universities, unions, and civil society. The state's Health Minister is at the 
health sectors where responsibilities were decentralized to the states, the provision of 
basic infiastructure was largely given to municipalities in 1997 through the creation of 
the Fund for Social Infrastructure. 
This whole process of decentralization of spending functions has largely been financed 
with federal transfers, because states, and to some extent also municipalities, have not 
been given access to more extensive tax sources. Before explaining the main 
characteristics of this federal financing mechanism, I stress that the main responsibility 
for the lack of devolution of tax bases lies not only with the federal government, but also 
with the state governments themselves. According to a former Minister of Finance, who 
was a key player during the 1990s decentralization reforms, "it is true that it is in the 
interest of the federal government to have access to taxes that can later be used to 
compensate for regional inequalities, but states, at least some of them, do not like to tax" 
(Interview A ) . ~  Indeed, judging by the position that states have commonly taken in the 
various discussions of the fiscal pact in the last fifteen years, they seemed to be pushing 
the federal government for more transfers, rather than for larger tax bases. Of course, 
there are some exceptions, primarily among those rich states that fare better financially 
by keeping control of their tax bases (mostly of the value added tax) than by being part of 
a fiscal system that pursues some redistributive objectives. In any case, without going 
into detail, what is important to note is that there is a reason, mostly political, concerning 
why the fiscal-decentralization process in Mexico has largely been federally funded. 
The consolidation of federal financing of decentralization policies has been an 
incremental process that began in the 1980s and that reached its peak in 1997 when the 
creation of a new budgetary item (Ramo 33) concentrated most of the decentralized 
federal spending into a single spending item. In the case of both education and health, 
when states received the responsibility for the provision of these services, they also 
received federal funding to cover the associated costs. In the case of infrastructure, 
- - - -- - - - - 
same time the executive director of these organizations and is in charge of coordinating all state health 
actions according to national policies in the health sector. 
The details of this interview and of all the interviews of this study are presented in Appendix 4. 
federal financing started during the administration of President Salinas when it was 
channeled through a program called Solidaridad. This program, which represented the 
cornerstone of the Salinas antipoverty strategy, was criticized on several grounds, which 
led to its further reform in the Zedillo administration. Academics criticized Solidaridad 
for being too centrally driven (Rodriguez 1997) and for being motivated by the electoral 
objectives of the federal government rather than by legitimate local demands (Molinar & 
Weldon in Cornelius et al. 1994). 
These criticisms, together with the commitment of the Zedillo administration to Mexico's 
democratic transition, moved the decentralization process in favor of states and 
municipalities. In 1996 Congress passed a reform law that included a public formula for 
the distribution of spending resources fiom the national government to the states? This 
reform, however, did not force the states to follow any specific criteria in the design of 
their formulae for distributing resources among their municipalities. The result of this 
reform was that states had great power to decide the fate of their municipalities, a 
situation that soon led the opposition parties to claim that the states' allocation of federal 
resources was politically biased, and caused them to push for further reform (Rodriguez 
2000). That reform came in 1997, the year the PRI lost the majority of the seats in 
Congress for the first time in history, and the opposition parties were able to pass another 
reform to the intergovernmental transfer system. The reform consisted of the creation of 
Ramo 33, a budgetary item that structured a variety of spending programs into a single 
system of conditional transfers. In the past the federal government largely decided on 
these spending programs according to its own investment priorities and transferred funds 
to the subnational governments in an unstructured way. According to Courchene and 
Diaz-Cayeros (in Giugale and Webb eds. 2000), with the creation of Ramo 33, earmarked 
transfers, which have existed in Mexico for at least thirty years, formally entered into the 
SNCF at this time. 
The Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) calculated this formula according to the proportion of 
"relative" state poverty to total national poverty. The relative poverty of each state was measured by both 
their lack of financial resources and an index of unmeet needs (Scott 2000: 24). Similarly, each state 
needed to calculate its own formula to distribute the resources among its municipalities. 
Since its creation in 1997, Ramo 33 has become the main financial channel for states and 
municipalities in the areas of education, health, and infrastructure. Ramo 33 is composed 
of seven funds, many of them formula driven, and the most important ones (health and 
education) are targeted at the state level. Municipalities only receive a fund for the 
strengthening of the municipalities (FORTAMUN) and a portion of the infrastructure 
fund (FAISM), that together account for 18% of the total Ramo 33. According to the 
National System of Fiscal Coordination, municipalities must use the FORTAMUN for 
public security-related expenditures, and the FAISM for basic local infrastructure such as 
water and sanitation, electric power in rural and poor areas, roads, housing 
improvements, and productive rural infrastructure (Appendix 1). 
Another important reform that the federal government put in place in the year 2000 to 
complement the decentralization process was a new system for subnational borrowing. 
Largely as a consequence of the massive 1996-97 bail-out process that followed the 
economic crisis of 1994-95, the administration of President Zedillo gave special attention 
to the restructuring of the credit system of states and municipalities in order to make it 
more market-~riented.~ From 1997 to 2000 the federal government introduced a series of 
new regulations that sought to create a true credit market for states and municipalities and 
to induce them to be fiscally disciplined. In short, the whole rationale of the reform was 
to create a market-like system of subnational borrowing. To do so, the new regulation 
sought to impose a hard budget constraint on subnational governments by eliminating the 
possibility of federal government intervention to bail them out in the case of a fiscal 
imbalance (aregional.com 2002). 
More concretely, with the introduced changes the federal government sought to avoid the 
process through which states reserved their revenue shares as collateral for credit, by 
giving way to a more market-like credit system. While in the previous framework the 
Ministry of Finance was directly involved in this process through a series of mandates, in 
the new system, states enter into contact directly with the creditors through a mutual 
  he 1994-95 financial crisis and the ensuing increase in interest rates resulted in a total subnational debt 
increase from $27 billion to $7 1 billion pesos from 1994 to 1998 (Giugale et al. in Giugale and Webb eds. 
2000). 
agreement or~ideicomiso.~ Another important characteristic of the new credit system was 
to build a system of capital risk for loans to subnational governments, and it 
accomplished that by establishing a system of credit ratings that made the pricing of bank 
loans a function of the underlying risk of repayment by the subnational borrower 
(Giugale et al. in Giugale and Webb eds. 2000). 
1.5. Conclusion 
The changes to the system of subnational borrowing together with the other series of 
reforms of revenue and expenditures leave very little doubt that decentralization has been 
part of Mexico's development strategy for the last twenty years. In various ways, the 
administrations of presidents de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo included a series of 
decentralization policies in their political agendas. Aside from the revenue structure, 
which has been largely unchanged since the creation of the SNCF, the systems of 
intergovernmental transfers, subnational spending, and local borrowing look 
substantively different today from the way they looked twenty years ago. 
Despite the importance of decentralization policies in Mexico, and the compelling 
normative argument in support of this process, the reader should not assume that 
Mexico's experience with decentralization has been a complete and a successful process. 
There is much more to say about Mexico's experience with the decentralization process 
than space allows, but I mention two important caveats: one related to the overall design 
of the policies of decentralization and the other to the assessment of their results. First, I 
note that those who designed the decentralization policies have been silent about another 
process that has also been present in the country for the last few decades, which is the 
rapid pace of urbanization and the continuous formation of metropolitan areas. As I will 
show in the next chapter, the decentralization process has been strictly bounded by 
Mexico's federalist nature, which has geared all the decentralization policies to the 
formal units of government, namely, states and municipalities. Despite the de facto 
' Ajdeicomiso is a provision in public law that is widely used in Mexico and that allows two parties to 
establish a legal commitment where each of the parties involved has specific rights and obligations. 
existence of metropolitan and other intermediate tiers of government (e.g., cities and 
regions), policy-makers who designed the decentralization policies did not take into 
account the territorial dimension. In part, this is a consequence of the limited mechanisms 
available for intergovernmental coordination, which do not provide easy ways to channel 
decentralized resources and responsibilities to metropolitan or multi-jurisdictional 
formations. There have been some attempts to do this, such as the program "100 cities" 
that was targeted at 100 mid-sized cities in the country, but in general, these efforts have 
been fairly limited (see, for example, Garza 2003 : 10 1 - 136). 
Concerning the second caveat, I believe that both academics and policy-makers have 
been too cavalier about the effects of decentralization. So far, the push towards 
decentralization has largely been normatively driven rather than empirically grounded. 
On the theoretical front, decentralization analysts are beginning to recognize that this is 
not an inherently optimal process, but one whose success is determined by the concrete 
conditions in which it operates. On the practical front, countries are also starting to 
understand that this process has not led to the efficient and equitable results originally 
expected, but that its success hinges upon the existence of the proper institutional context, 
which cannot be built overnight. Some of these institutional requirements include: local 
capacity to design and implement policies; appropriate rules, especially for auditing, 
control, and evaluation at all levels of government; and last, but not least, sufficient 
financial resources, flowing to the states and municipalities in such a way that they do not 
kill all incentives to collect taxes. 
In the case of Mexico, few analysts have sought to evaluate the specific impacts of 
decentralization, so it is difficult to make a definitive judgment of the country's 
experience in its decentralization process. However, I argue that the available evidence 
suggests that decentralization in Mexico has encountered a variety of political hurdles 
and technical shortcomings. The reasons for this situation are many, and most of them are 
sector specific. For example, the success of the decentralization of education services has 
been overly determined by the role of the teacher's union, which is a variable not always 
explicitly considered by decentralization analysts (see, for example, Ibarra 2003). In the 
case of fiscal decentralization, policy-makers have wrongly assumed that all levels of 
government have the institutional maturity to embark on this adventure, and specifically, 
that local governments have sufficient planning, budgeting, and auditing capacities to 
spend their resources efficiently and equitably. 
In summary, although much more empirical evidence is needed about the way 
decentralization has worked on the ground, I argue that so far Mexico's experience has 
been mixed at best. Inman (1999), in a recent review of the evolution of fiscal 
decentralization in the last forty years, provides a good explanation for why this has been 
so. According to him, most of the lessons learned in the field of fiscal federalism assume 
the presence of U.S.-style economic and political institutions, which are generally lacking 
in developing countries. "Voice" and "exit" mechanisms, for example, which discipline 
governments through inter-jurisdictional competition, are seldom found in developing 
countries (Donahue 1997). Undoubtedly, this is the case in Mexico, but analysts still must 
prove how the lack of these exit and voice mechanisms has affected the results of 
decentralization in the country. To a large extent, I intend to move beyond the normative 
arguments in support of decentralization, and develop an empirical contribution that 
would help to clarify how fiscal decentralization has worked on the ground, and 
especially how it has affected fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas. This is the spirit 
that motivates the rest of the chapters. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ZMVM: TOWARD DEFINING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
2.1. Introduction 
Metropolitan areas are comprised of a series of jurisdictional units, which exist for a 
number of political, legal, and administrative reasons, but whose territorial boundaries 
often become invisible when it comes to the functional operation of urban concentrations. 
According to Pierce (1993), metropolitan zones experience an infinite number of 
demographic, economic, and social interactions in complete disregard of the political and 
legal division of their comprising jurisdictions, which are incapable of sealing off their 
problems of pollution, solid waste disposal, water, or transportation. According to this 
conceptualization, metropolitan areas exist in their own right, even if they do not match 
the formal political and territorial structures of the units of government over which they 
expand. 
Despite the defacto existence of metropolitan areas, they commonly lack legal 
foundations, so they are seldom recognized as formal political entities that could become 
recipients of decentralized resources and responsibilities.' To a large extent, this explains 
why the formation of metropolitan and other non- formal jurisdictional conglomerates 
(cities, regions, etc.) has been left out from both the theory and the practice of 
decentralization. Generally, decentralization policies are targeted to formal units of 
government that have taxing and spending powers, and also some degree of political 
autonomy. This has been the case in Mexico where policymakers designed 
decentralization policies at the state and municipal levels, altogether ignoring the 
existence of metropolitan or any other kind of intermediate formations. This situation has 
had important consequences in areas like planning and the provision of services because 
jurisdictions have different capacities to deal with decentralized functions and 
responsibilities, and therefore services are often provided in an uncoordinated way. 
There are, however, some examples of metropolitan areas that are legally recognized, such as the Greater 
'Toronto Area in Canada. For a discussion of such areas, see Hobson and St-Hilaire 1997 and OECD 2001. 
The Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM) is an area that policymakers 
have disregarded-especially its metropolitan dimension-during the country's 
decentralization process. The area is currently comprised of 76 subnational governments 
with different legal regimes, fiscal capacities, and political representation. The 
functioning of the ZMVM is highly complex, among other reasons, because it 
encompasses the capital of the country, and because it is formed by two entities with very 
different resource endowments and funding allocations. Despite these differences, every 
day the ZMVM experiences innumerable social and economic interactions in a diversity 
of sectors such as transportation, water provision, air pollution, etc. that makes the area 
function as a single operational unit, and where the policies of each individual 
jurisdiction have an impact on the metropolitan area as a whole. 
Therefore, in this chapter I make the case that even if the ZMVM is legally conceived of 
as a group of individual jurisdictions, it must be understood as a single territorial unit. 
Some very recent publications (e.g., ALDF 2002 and PUEC 2004) have already departed 
from the narrow constitutional definition that equates Mexico City with the Federal 
District (DF), and have begun to conceive of it as a metropolitan and even a regional 
zone.2 In this chapter, I supplement these efforts and argue in favor of using an 
operational definition for the ZMVM that allows analysts to conduct studies on a 
metropolitan scale and not only for the DF. In order to perform this exercise, I first 
provide a brief account of the urbanization process in Mexico that led to the creation of 
the ZMVM. Then, I introduce a formal definition of the zone, as well as some of the main 
characteristics of its comprising jurisdictions. Unlike other metropolitan formations in the 
country, the ZMVM includes the federal capital, which has a different legal status and 
administrative structure than the rest of the states. For this reason, I devote an entire 
section to an explanation of the capital city's evolution and its current legal status. Next, I 
describe the ZMVM's transition from a PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) enclave 
to a politically plural metropolitan area. Finally, I make a case that despite the ZMVM's 
2 For regional planning purposes, the DF and the State of Mexico form part of the "central region" of the 
country (Presidencia de la Republica 2001). 
diverse jurisdictional composition, this territory should be envisioned as a single 
functional area. 
2.2. Mexico's process of urbanization and the formation of the ZMVM 
In general, Mexico's pattern of urbanization conforms to that of other Latin American 
countries. During the 2oth century, Latin American countries experienced a process of 
rapid growth driven by strong central governments that, in general, followed protectionist 
economic models of import substitutions. These development strategies detonated a rapid 
rural-urban transition, which resulted in very high concentrations of people in a few cities 
that soon became metropolitan regions (Klink 2002). In the case of Mexico, the country 
reached its urbanization peak from 1940 to 1980, during which time rapid economic 
growth changed the social and economic structure of the population. During that forty- 
year period the number of cities in Mexico with more than 15,000 inhabitants grew fiom 
55 to 227, and in 1980 the country's urban population represented, for the first time, more 
than half (55%) of the total population (Garza 2003).~ This process of urbanization has 
continued to the present day. In 2000, 70% of Mexico's 100 million people lived in 350 
cities. The other 30 % of the population lives in approximately 200,000 localities of less 
than 2,500 inhabitants each. Out of the urban population, 83% lives in 56 metropolitan 
areas4 with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and 32 million live in nine areas with more 
than one million people (OCDE, 2002). 
Mexico has no official definition for its different types of urban concentrations. The most widely accepted 
definition of a city comes fiom a pioneer study by Unikel, Ruiz, and Garza (1976) that considers a city to 
be a concentration of 15,000 or more inhabitants. 
Note that although there are no internationally agreed-upon definitions of metropolitan areas, the 
treatment that the term "metropolitan" receives in Mexico is different than the one in the United States. In 
Mexico, it is loosely defined as an urban agglomeration with certain common factors like socioeconomic 
structure, urban equipment, territorial continuity, natural resources, and human activities (Lopez PCrez 
2003). In addition, the widely agreed-upon definition establishes a minimum of 100,000 inhabitants in 
order to qualify as a metropolitan area (Garza 2003). Apparently, in the United States, this phenomenon is 
referred to as "urbanization," while the term "metropolitan" is mostly reserved for what the US census calls 
a "metropolitan statistical area (MSA)," which has between 50,000 and 100,000 residents (Stephens and 
Wikstrom 2000). Thus, in order to avoid misunderstandings, in this study I use the term "metropolitan" to 
refer to the US notion of "urban" or "urbanized" areas. 
Throughout this urbanization process, the ZMVM has always occupied a central role. In 
terms of population, it greatly expanded during the twentieth century, passing from a 
concentration of 2.5% of the total population of Mexico in 1900 to 18.2% in 2000. As in 
the rest of the country, the most dramatic population expansion began in the 1940s when 
the number of people living in the DF nearly doubled from 1.6 to 2.9 million people. The 
tendency continued during the 1950s, when an annual population growth of 5.7% resulted 
in an addition of 2.1 million people, 40% of whom were immigrants attracted by the 
city's buoyant economic activity. Continuing the trend, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
population expanded by 3.6 and 4.4 million people respectively (Garza 2003). This 
population expansion was largely linked to the economic centrality of the DF, which 
derived first from the country's development process during the "porfirian period" (1 876- 
191 O), based on the expansion of the electricity and transportation sectors, and later from 
the rapid process of industrialization structured around the capital city in the post- 
revolutionary period (1 940- 1970). 
The DF's population growth and economic expansion gained momentum after the 
revolution mostly because the capital city became the axis of the country's 
industrialization strategy. Starting in the 1940s, and through the late 1970s, Mexico 
followed an economic model of import substitution based on the promotion of the 
industrial sector, in which the DF played a dominant role. During this process, the DF 
undertook policies that protected the industrial sector, mostly by keeping wages low 
through a series of subsidies to urban services like transportation and housing. In 
addition, the DF adopted a fiscal regime that provided a number of subsidies and tax 
breaks for the industrial sector, and the national government invested an enormous 
amount of resources in big infrastructure projects in the capital city. All of these factors 
made the DF the cornerstone of the country's modernization strategy. According to Davis 
(1994), primary emphasis was given to the DF's industrial development because of 
technocratic considerations as much as of political objectives. On one hand, the city's 
agglomeration economies, its linkages to other regions through rail and communications, 
and the location of previous industrial infrastructure made the capital city an ideal 
enclave for the rapid industrial development of the country. On the other hand, those in 
power at the time were also aware of the DF's unchallenged centrality in national politics 
and the importance of capitalizing on this political support. 
The rapid industrial growth of the DF together with the major federal investments in the 
capital city continued until the 1980s when the DF experienced important changes in the 
growth and distribution of its population. During the 1980s the number of people living 
in the ZMVM continued to grow to almost 14 million, but for the first time, the 
population expansion that had already begun to take place in the neighboring State of 
Mexico in previous decades started to accelerate rapidly. This acceleration was 
accompanied by a decline in the rate of population growth in the DF, due in part to the 
earthquakes of 1985 that caused significant relocation of the population, and the overall 
slowdown of the economy brought about by the 1982 peso crisis. Another factor that 
contributed to the slowdown of population growth in the DF was a decline in 
employment resulting from the migration of industries to other parts of the country, and 
from the restrictions on building new potentially polluting industries in the DF. Still 
another factor was the high cost of living in the capital city, particularly the enormous 
differences in real estate values between the DF and the State of Mexico. The massive 
federal investments in the capital city together with four decades of industrialization and 
economic growth provided the DF with high infrastructure endowments that have had a 
positive impact on property prices. In reaction, people have been forced to move to 
neighboring states around the DF, in search of lower-priced real estate markets, as in the 
State of Mexico, where infrastructure levels are notably lower than in the DF. This 
process of population expansion into the periphery, however, has also occurred within the 
DF itself. While in the 1950s almost 80% of the population lived in the five central 
delegations of Cuauthtmoc, Venustiano Carranza, Gustavo A. Madero, Benito Juarez, 
and Miguel Hidalgo, by 2000 only 34% lived in this area (Beristain and Rodriguez: 
2001). 
This process of population expansion into the State of Mexico has intensified during the 
current administration of Mayor Lopez Obrador as a consequence of his strategy for land- 
use regulation known as "Bando 2." The Bando prohibits the construction of new housing 
and commercial developments in the peripheral delegations of the DF. The original idea 
of the Bando was to increase the population density of the four central delegations 
(Cuauthkmoc, Benito Juarez, Miguel Hidalgo, and Venustiano Carranza) which lost 1.2 
million people in the last thirty years. To do so, the Bando prohibited sprawl into the 
southern and eastern delegations of Alvaro Obregon, Coyoachn, Cuajimalpa, Iztapalapa, 
Magdalena Contreras, Milpa Alta, Tliihuac, Tlalpan, and Xochimilco. However, due to 
the high prices of land in the central delegations in comparison to localities in the State of 
Mexico, people have been moving even further away from the DF into the State of 
Mexico. 
The overall decline in the population growth rate of the DF has had direct consequences 
on the neighboring State of Mexico which, for the aforementioned reasons, has been 
absorbing significant numbers of people moving away from the DF. In 2000, it was 
estimated that 49% of the inhabitants of the metropolitan municipalities in the State of 
Mexico were born in another State (Iracheta 2004). According to some estimates, 70% of 
the immigrants that arrived in the metropolitan municipalities during the second half of 
the 1980s, and 65% of those arriving during the first half of the 1990s came from the DF 
(Iracheta 2004). As a result, from 1995 to 2000 the population in the ZMVM changed 
from an even distribution between the DF and the metropolitan municipalities, to a 
concentration of 53% (9.2 million) of the population in the latter and the remaining 47% 
in the former (8.6 million). This expansion resulted from the tremendous population 
growth of the metropolitan municipalities, which experienced a population increase of 
320% from 1970 to 2000, as compared to the 35% experienced in the DF (see Figure 
2.1). Academics believe that this tendency will continue, and their demographic scenarios 
estimate that in the year 2020 between 55 and 65% of the population of the ZMVM will 
live in the metropolitan municipalities, as compared to an estimated 35 to 45% who will 
live in the DF (Iracheta 2004). 
Figure 2.1. Population of the ZMVM, 2000
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This trend in population growth has been closely matched by the spatial expansion of the
ZMVM into the State of Mexico. This spatial expansion has been incremental and has
resulted from the continuous incorporation of the municipalities of the State of Mexico
into the territory of the ZMVM. In 1950, for example, just the municipality of
Tlanepantla in the State of Mexico formed part of this area. However, the number of
incorporated municipalities increased in the following decades to the point that in 2005,
there are about 60 municipalities forming part of the ZMVM. As a consequence of this
expansion, the territory of the metropolitan area of the State of Mexico currently occupies
52% of the total area of the ZMVM, and the DF occupies the remaining 48% of the
metropolitan territory.
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2.3. The ZMVM as a unit of analysis 
The population and spatial expansion from the DF into the State of Mexico has resulted 
in the formation of the area that I refer to as the ZMVM. Both because of its origin, and 
the current interaction between its comprising jurisdictions, the ZMVM exists as a de 
facto functional unit expanding over a temtorial domain that does not coincide with 
political boundaries. Despite this de facto existence, Mexican legislation still does not 
recognize the hnctional operation of this area, or any other metropolitan area in the 
country, as an integrated political andlor administrative entity. 
There are various political, economic, social, and legal factors that account for this lack 
of metropolitan recognition. Politically, it is not in the interest of most actors to move 
beyond their local strongholds of power and try to compete for new constituencies that 
are already under the control of other political forces. Economically, rich jurisdictions 
tend to prevent the formation of any intermediate type of government that would push for 
more redistributive policies at their expense. Socially, groups that benefit from the 
current distribution of power will not want to share their special privileges with the social 
forces of neighboring jurisdictions. Legally, Mexico has an explicit constitutional 
prohibition against the formation of any kind of intermediate tier of government. As a 
consequence, the country lacks any official definition of a "metropolitan zone?"' The 
definition most widely used comes from academia, which refers to metropolitan zones as 
concentrations of 100,000 or more people. According to a methodology elaborated by 
Garza (2003), these urban centers can be located either within one or in various 
contiguous m~nici~al i t ies .~  
For of all these reasons, the ZMVM is still largely understood as a conglomerate of 
independent state and local jurisdictions, with minimum capacities to interact as an 
integrated or coordinated metropolitan-wide entity. This situation has had important 
5 According to Lopez Pkrez (2003), any attempt must take an interdisciplinary approach in order to capture 
the legal, institutional, and conceptual difficulties tied to the definition of such zones. 
For a detailed explanation of the methodology used to define metropolitan areas in Mexico, see Garza 
2003: 97-99 and 15 1-1 53. Also note that although INEGI does not yet provide an official definition, 
according to some of its publications on metropolitan zones, these are loosely defined as "the total surface 
extension of the municipalities in which the urban cities and localities of the metropolitan area are located" 
(INEGI 2002). 
planning and analytical consequences. In terms of planning, it has resulted in a complete 
lack of a metropolitan vision, with very negative effects on the administration of all urban 
services, whose provision is constantly plagued by problems of coordination, 
inefficiency, and inequality. The analytical consequences have also been substantial, 
because they have prevented the consolidation of the ZMVM into a single unit of 
analysis, upon which meaningful economic studies can be conducted. Clearly, restricting 
the analysis of this area to the DF, as is commonly the case, gives a partial vision, as it 
ignores the "other part" of the metropolis where more than half of the population 
currently lives. 
If the ZMVM does not yet exist as an integrated metropolitan area, then I wonder what 
this area really represents? Although the term "ZMVM" is meant to be a reference for 
metropolitan planning, at this point it only represents a territorial delimitation that helps 
academics and policymakers map the geographic dimension within which a number of 
socioeconomic activities take place. Because the geographic definition of a spatial area is 
to some extent an arbitrary exercise, I use the most recent definition from the Ordering 
Plan of the Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico, that considers this area to be 
comprised of the 16 delegations of the DF, 58 municipalities of the State of Mexico, and 
the municipality of Tizayuca in the State of Hidalgo (POZMVM, 2000). 
Fi ure 2.2. Territor of the ZMVM, 2004
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There are other available territorial definitions of this area, but they only vary in the
number of metropolitan municipalities that they take into account. Therefore, because my
analysis is eminently financial, I could have chosen any other territorial definition and my
results would not have been affected in a substantive way.7 This is because most of the
finances of the metropolitan area are concentrated in a handful of municipalities that are
contiguous to the DF, all of which are included in the definition that I selected, but also in
the other available definitions. Following this same logic, I decided to exclude the
municipality ofTizayuca, in Hidalgo from this territorial definition because it would have
complicated the gathering of information enormously and would have not contributed in
any substantial way to this study.
7 Some other definitions of this area include: Area Metropolitana de la Ciudad de Mexico (AMCM) that
comprise the DF and 17 metropolitan municipalities in the State of Mexico, and the Zona Urbana del Valle
de Mexico (ZUVM) that comprise the DF, 32 metropolitan municipalities in the State of Mexico, and the
municipality ofTizayuca in Hidalgo.
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Beyond the actual definition of the metropolitan area used, it is important to notice the 
dual nature of the ZMVM. On one hand, it is formed by a single territorial continuum, 
but on the other hand, it is comprised of a series of very different local and state 
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions vary in their legal, administrative, political, economic, 
and demographic characteristics. In terms of its wealth level, the ZMVM is composed of 
two poles: an eminently rich one in the DF, and a poorer one in the State of Mexico 
(Appendix 2, Table A2.1). At the state level, the differences between these two entities is 
astounding. For example, in the year 2002, the DF was the entity with the highest total 
spending per capita in the country, and the State of Mexico the entity with the lowest. 
This contrast is also present at the local level, where all of the local governments with the 
highest GDPs (with the exception of the delegation of Milpa Alta), are concentrated in 
the DF, while the State of Mexico has some of the poorest municipalities in the country 
(Figure 2.3). In terms of population, jurisdictions in the DF are generally more populated 
than in the State of Mexico. However, there is not a clear pattern, as there are very 
populated jurisdictions (of more than one million people) on both sides of the border 
(Figure 2.1). The most significant differences in levels of population, however, are not 
between the DF and the State of Mexico, but between the State of Mexico's own 
metropolitan municipalities, where municipal populations range from 3,500 to 1.6 million 
inhabitants. Actually, the dispersion of population in the metropolitan municipalities has 
a coefficient of variation (1.7) of more than twice the value of that in the DF (0.7). In 
addition to all these differences, the jurisdictions that form part of the ZMVM belong to 
five different types of legal, economic and political regimes. 
Figure 2.3. GDP per capita in the ZMVM, 2000
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The jurisdictions that form the ZMVM are the DF, its delegations, the State of Mexico,
its municipalities, and the federal government, which intervenes in the DF because of its
status as the nation's capital. The multi-jurisdictional nature of this area makes it a
particularly complex metropolitan formation, and calls for an understanding of some of
its basic characteristics. Mexico is a federal republic formed by 31 states, a federal
district, and 2,426 municipalities. The State of Mexico, like all other states, is a sovereign
entity entitled to perform all functions not expressly reserved for the federal government.
The territory of the State of Mexico is divided into municipalities that represent the
political and administrative units of the federation.8 At present, the State of Mexico has
122 municipalities (58 of which are currently part of the ZMVM) all with the same legal
status, because Mexico's constitution does not legally recognize any local distinctions in
8 Unlike the United States and other federal systems, in Mexico, municipalities represent the lowest formal
tiers of government.
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terms of size, population, wealth, etc. Municipalities in the State of Mexico, as in the rest 
of the country, have dual roles as structures of political representation and providers of 
local services. They have almost complete power over their local concerns, but several of 
their substantive functions still pass through the state legislature. Municipal governments 
in Mexico do not have formal legislative power. Their legislative bodies (cabildos) have 
a deliberative rather than a normative nature, and their only legislative capacity is to draft 
administrative regulations. Due to this limited legislative capacity, the state Congress 
formally legislates on their behalf. 
Like the State of Mexico, the DF is also a federal entity, but because it is the capital of 
the country, it has a different legal and political status. The debate over the legal and 
political characteristics of the capital city has been alive for the last two centuries, but 
currently the constitution (article 44) defines the DF as both the capital of the country and 
the "house" of the federal powers. In addition, the constitution equates Mexico City with 
the DF, and considers it to be a federal entity rather than a state.9 Due to its double role, 
the DF hosts both the federal government (the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches) and its own local government, composed of the Chief of Government of the DF 
(executive), the Legislative Assembly, and the Superior Tribunal of Justice of the DF. In 
addition, the government of the DF not only has all the fiscal faculties of a state, but it 
also centralizes all the fiscal functions of its delegations. Thus, for example, the DF not 
only collects payroll taxes-the most important state taxes-but it also collects the 
property taxes that are the primary own-source of municipal revenues. Similarly, the DF 
directly collects the payments for user charges, fees, fines, etc. at both the state and the 
delegation levels. 
Unlike the rest of the States, the territory of the DF is divided into 16 delegations, which 
are administrative units with semi-autonomous political rights, but largely dependent on 
the government of the DF. Delegations do not have the right to exploit their local fiscal 
bases, as all the local fiscal activity is centralized in the Treasury of the DF. Thus, 
- - -  
' The constitution does not define the DF as a "state," but as a "federal entity." All states however, are also 
federal entities. 
delegations lack fiscal autonomy as they operate entirely on the budgets apportioned by 
the DF's Legislative Assembly. Another fiscal peculiarity of the DF's delegations is that 
they do not receive their intergovernmental transfers in a clear, explicit, and predictable 
way This is because the DF is the only federal entity in the country that does not have a 
law of fiscal coordination that sets formulas for transfer allocations. The current status of 
the DF and its delegations has been the result of a long process of political reforms that 
took place throughout the 20th century. Because these reforms largely explain the present 
legal and political condition of the DF and the ZMVM, I will briefly comment on them. 
2.4. The political reform of the DF in brief 
The political history of the DF is long and complex, so in order to present it in a clear and 
succinct way, I will follow Marvan (2000) who divides the political evolution of the DF 
into three stages. The first stage is from Independence to 1928, when the territory of the 
DF was divided into municipalities and given autonomy to govern its own internal 
affairs. The second stage is from 1928 to the end of the 1980s, when the municipalities of 
the DF were substituted with delegations that were highly dependent on the central 
power. And the third stage is fiom the end of the 1980s until today, during which 
delegations have begun to gain back their political rights. 
Prior to 1928, the territory of the DF was divided, like any other state, into municipalities 
that were in charge of the provision of most of the local services in the capital city. That 
situation changed in the first decade after the revolution when the city's political and 
administrative crisis pushed the Revolutionary General Alvaro Obregon to send a 
proposal to reform the DF and abolish its municipalities. That year saw the creation of a 
central department called the Department of the Federal District (DDF), whose Mayor 
was directly appointed by the president. The old municipalities were substituted with the 
delegations, whose heads or delegates were nominated by the Mayor but appointed by the 
President. That period was marked by the constant presence of the federal government in 
the local affairs of the City, but that did not preclude the authorities of the DDF from 
taking full responsibility over many of their urban functions. Notably, local authorities 
remained in control of their own fiscal accounts, as they had to rely on their own sources 
of revenue to cover a large portion of the city's urban infrastructure expenditures (Davis 
1994). 
Marked by a lack of democratic rule in the DF, this period continued through the end of 
the 1980s when some important reforms started to take place and delegations began to 
gain back their political rights. During the 1980s and 1990s the DF went through a series 
of political changes that, by and large, explain its current condition. There are many 
factors that contributed to the passing of these reforms. Two of the most important were 
the general process of democratic transition that began in the 1980s that put an end to the 
PRI's authoritarian control of virtually all elected authorities, and the earthquakes of 
1985 that created a civic consciousness that resulted in the formation of a number of 
social movements, and that led people to look for wider spaces of political participation. 
As a response to citizen demands for more mechanisms of political participation, in 1987 
city authorities created the Assembly of Representatives of the Federal District (ARDF) 
that was envisioned as a mechanism of popular representation. This reform gave back to 
the citizens of the DF the right to elect their representatives directly. In addition, it gave 
the ARDF the capacity to draw up regulations and to designate the judges of the Judicial 
Tribunal of the DF. Overall, however, the Assembly had very limited legislative powers, 
because, as Davis (1 994) argues, it was only intended to alleviate grassroots demands for 
democratic participation without compromising the PRI's ability to control urban 
policymaking in Mexico City. 
Despite the initially limited powers of the ARDF, its formation represented a first step 
towards the future creation of an independent government in the DF. In 1993 another 
constitutional reform was passed to broaden the powers of the ARDF and to consolidate 
the institutional autonomy of the DF. One year after this constitutional reform, the first 
statute of government of the DF appeared, which is a sort of constitutional document that 
regulates almost all the functions of the capital city. Other important changes introduced 
by the 1993 reform included the removal of the federal Congress' responsibility for the 
approval of the fiscal and budgetary legislation of the DF; the creation of the Council of 
Metropolitan Coordination; the indirect election of the Mayor; and the election of 
delegational councils. Overall, the reform increased the DF's independence from the 
federal branch, but limited its autonomy in three fundamental ways: (I) the Federal 
Congress maintained legal control over the DF through the approval and reform of the 
DF's statute of government, (2) the level of indebtedness of the DF remained in control 
of the federal executive and ~ o n ~ r e s s , ' ~  and (3) the President maintained control over the 
designation of the DF's Attorney General and Chief of the Police. 
The limitations of the 1993 reform created a push for a new constitutional amendment 
that in 1996 changed the status of the ARDF from a representative to a legislative body. 
As a result, in 1997 the first Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF) came 
into existence; in addition the citizens of the DF were given the right to elect the Mayor 
directly for the first time in 1997, and the right to elect delegates starting in the year 
2000. The first democratic government of the DF was elected for a period of three years 
(1997-2000), and after that it changed to six years like the rest of the states. Delegational 
authorities were to be in place for three years, like the rest of the local governments in the 
country. 
Despite the fact that these changes opened the door for the democratization of the DF, its 
political autonomy remained bounded on several fronts. First, the DF kept its 
constitutional status as the "house" of the federal powers, a situation that precluded it 
from being legally considered an additional state of the federation. Second, the approval 
of the DF's legal statute and level of indebtedness remained under the control of the 
federal Congress-and not of the ALDF. Finally, the reform fell short of transforming the 
delegations into autonomous local governments. Unlike the rest of the local governments 
in the country, delegations were deprived of local councils and lacked any kind of fiscal 
autonomy. 
10 The level of indebtedness of the DF is annually approved in the Law of Revenue of the Federation, in 
which the Federal Executive begins with a proposal that is then approved by both the lower and the upper 
houses of Congress. 
The constitutional reform of 1996 made substantive progress in changing the political 
nature of the DF, but despite these advancements, all political forces agreed that 
additional reforms were needed, especially to separate the DF from federal influence and 
to give more legal and financial autonomy to the delegations. During the last years of the 
1990s, political parties began to frame a new political reform for the DF, and in 
November of 2001, they presented a proposal that sought to give the ALDF total 
legislative control over the internal affairs of the DF. In particular, this political reform 
tried to give the ALDF the full capacity to approve and modify the DF's statute of 
government, and aimed to exclude the national Congress from the approval of debt 
ceilings in the DF. Both the ALDF and the Federal Chamber of Deputies approved the 
reform, but the PRI's faction in the DF's Legislative Commission in the Senate of the 
Republic voted against. In my interviews, I found that representatives of various political 
parties (some even from the PRI) regret that the PRI stopped the reform in the Senate, as 
they saw it as a firm step forward in consolidating the political independence of the 
capital city. Some political representatives even thought that this reform was meant to be 
a first step toward the future regulation of the metropolitan phenomenon in the area 
(Interviews J and K). 
Despite the inability of political parties to agree on the direction for future reform of the 
DF, there is a wide agreement among the economic, political, and social actors of the city 
that something needs to be done, especially because the political transition has rendered 
all the previous institutional arrangements between the federal and the local authorities 
inoperable. Despite the urgency of the matter, in the current context of continuous 
political fhction among the main actors in the ZMVM, the chances for a new political 
reform that would solve the metropolitan-wide problems of the DF look rather slim. 
2.5. The Political composition of the ZMVM: from a PRI stronghold to political 
plurality 
There are various political and legal factors that account for the lack of a new political 
reform in the DF, and more generally for the absence of a metropolitan agenda in the 
ZMVM. In addition to the legal constraints already presented, one characteristic that is 
having a direct consequence on the current condition of the area is its high degree of 
political fragmentation. The series of legal changes that the DF underwent in the last two 
decades opened the door to electoral competition, thereby decimating the presence of 
national politics-especially those emanating from the PRI elites-in the capital city. The 
weakening of the PRI was not restricted to the DF, but also began to happen in other 
jurisdictions of the ZMVM, that fell under the control of the right-wing (PAN- National 
Action Party) and left-wing (PRD- Democratic Revolutionary Party) parties. In fact, 
during the 1980s the PRI's hegemonic power, which for decades traded votes for public 
services through an electorally efficient corporativist system, began to give way to an 
electoral turnover, completely changing the political composition of the ZMVM from a 
PRI stronghold to a politically plural region (Dominguez 1999 and De Alba 2004). As I 
discuss in the rest of this section, electoral change happened in virtually all elected 
positions in the area, from the federal electoral districts in the DF and the State of 
Mexico, to the local jurisdictions of these two entities. 
The jurisdictional composition of the ZMVM at the state level includes the governorship 
of the State of Mexico and its local Congress, and the Mayor of the DF with its 
Legislative Assembly. At the local level, this area includes the 16 delegations of the DF 
and the 58 metropolitan municipalities of the State of Mexico with their corresponding 
local councils. Overall, this comprises more than 200 elected authorities that have 
experienced a dramatic electoral change in a period of about ten years. In terms of the 
political composition of the DF, until 1997 the PRI totally dominated the executive and 
delegation levels. This domination came directly from the federal branch, as the President 
had virtual control of the capital through his appointed Mayor, who was largely his 
political operator in the city. The hegemonic control of the PRI in the DF came to an 
abrupt end in 1997 when the government of the DF, together with all of its delegations, 
switched to PRD control. That year Cuauhtbmoc Chrdenas, a long time political activist 
from the left, won the governorship of the city for the first time. Ever since then, the 
capital city has been in control of the PRD. Cardenas left office early to compete in the 
federal election of 2000, but his party colleague Rosario Robles finished his term in 
office. In 2000, when the first election for a six-year term took place in the DF, the PRD 
won the capital, and Lopez Obrador became the new mayor (see Appendix 2, Table A2.2, 
for a complete list of the DF's Mayors). 
At the delegation level, the democratic transition began in the year 2000, when the 
citizens of the DF won the right to elect their local delegates for the first time. This right, 
however, was limited to the election of delegates or local executives because delegations, 
unlike the rest of local governments in the county, do not have local councils. In that 
year, 9 delegations went to the PRD and 7 to the PAN (www.iedforr.mx, 2005). The PRI, 
which three years before controlled all delegations, did not win any of them. In 2003, the 
PRD gained control over three more delegations (moving from 10 to 13), the PAN lost 
control over three (moving from 6 to 3), and the PRI captured one. In terrns of local 
legislative turnover, 1988 was the first time when the citizenry of the DF had the right to 
elect representatives to the first ARDF. In the three periods of the ARDF's existence 
(1 988- 199 1, 199 1 - 1994, 1994- 1997) the PRI managed to keep the majority of its 66 seats 
(34 in first period, 40 in the second, and 39 in the third). The PRI dominance of the 
ARDF comes as no surprise, because during this period the PRI also maintained control 
over the executive and administrative functions of the DF, which still gave it almost total 
control of the city. As in the executive branch, the PRI's dominance of the legislature 
changed dramatically in 1997 with the creation of the first Legislative Assembly of the 
DF (ALDF). At that time the PRD won control of 38 seats and the PRI got only 11. The 
political landscape of the ALDF changed again in 2000 when none of the political parties 
won a majority in the ~ s s e m b l ~ .  ' l  In the most recent legislative period (2003-2006), the 
political landscape changed again in favor of the PRD, which won a simple majority of 
the Assembly with 37 seats. 
As the following table illustrates, after the DF gained its democratic rights in 1997 the 
political landscape of the capital city changed dramatically from PRI domination to 
political pluralism. As this process of political plurality evolved in the DF, the 
neighboring State of Mexico also experienced important political changes. The State of 
I 1  In the second legislative period of the ALDF (2000-2003), the PRD had 19 seats, the PAN 17, the PRI 
:16, and the remaining 14 seats went to various minority parties. 
Mexico has always been a political stronghold of the PRI. Not only are the political elites 
of Toluca, the state capital, closely aligned to the federal party officials, but for decades 
local authorities served as efficient electoral machines that brought the votes that the PRI 
needed to maintain its hegemonic control of the state. In the 1980s however, this situation 
began to change, especially in the state's metropolitan area. 
Table 2.1. Political composition of the DF before and after the democratic transition 
Before 1997 
Some of the reasons for this political change have to do with the fact that the political 
groups from the metropolitan area began to feel alienated from the political struggles that 
were taking place in the capital city of Toluca. Toluca is the epicenter of local power in 
the State of Mexico, and all the important political nominations have always come from 
its local political groups, notably from the Atlacomulco group (Iracheta 2002). This 
continued focus of the state's political elites on the political groups of the Toluca area 
resulted in a virtual abandonment of the metropolitan area surrounding the DF, and in 
turn, gave rise to new political forces in this part of the State (Iracheta 2002). During the 
rapid urbanization process of the metropolitan part of the State, municipalities began to 
face severe service demands that they were unable to meet without the continuous and 
deliberate support of the state government and the party elites of the Toluca area. In this 
context of the PRI's failure to deliver services, the opposition parties began to exploit the 
opportunity to gain a political presence in the metropolitan part of the State. In some 
cases, local electorates decided to elect municipal administrations with better technical 
capacities than those of the PRI, and in other cases, different political parties (mainly the 
PRD) were able to build strong political clientele out of the dissatisfied citizens whose 
particular demands were not met by the PRI's local authorities. 
After 1997 
PRI 
Mayor (1) 
Delegations (1 6) 
Legislature (66) 
Total (83) 
Other PRI change PRI 
Source: Author, based on www.iedf.org.rnx, 2004. 
1 
16 
39 
56 
Other 
0 
0 
37 
37 
0 
1 
7 
8 
1 
15 
59 
7 5 
- 1 
-15 
-32 
- 48 
In addition to these reasons, Iracheta (2002) identifies a series of other determinants that 
contributed to the weakening of the PRI in the State of Mexico during the 1990s. These 
are (I)  the general discontent with the PRI after the economic crisis of 1994, (2) a 
weakening of political cohesion within the party resulting from the loss of political 
strongholds throughout the country and the separation of the president of the country 
from the PRI leadership, and (3) an increase in the capacities of other political parties to 
win electoral positions and to offer new alternatives to the electorate. 
All these factors help to explain the decline in electoral support for the PRI in the State of 
Mexico, both at the local and the federal levels. For example, in the 1981 presidential 
elections, almost 60% of the votes in the state went to the PRI, but in 2000 the PRI only 
received 32% of the total votes. Conversely, the PAN moved from 24 to 45% of the 
votes, and the PRD from 5 to 20% of the total votes for president. The election for 
governor followed the same trend, with the PRI losing electoral support. Thus, while in 
198 1 the PRI received 82% of the votes for the gubernatorial election, in 1999 that 
number declined by half (42.5%). The percentage of votes lost by the PRI went mainly to 
the PAN, whose support increased from 7.6 to 35.4% and to the PRD, whose share of the 
total votes increased from 3.4 to 22%. The PRI also lost power in the local Congress, 
moving from 34 (out of 57) seats in 1990 to 24 seats in 2003. 
At the municipal level, the PRI also gave up power to the PAN and the PRD. While in the 
municipal elections of 1990 the PRI won control over 1 1 8 of the then 12 1 municipalities, 
in the election of 2003 that number declined to 67 (out of 122) municipalities. During this 
time both the PAN and the PRD widened their presence in the State by moving from 2 to 
24 municipalities in the case of the former, and from 1 to 22 municipalities in the case of 
the latter. The weakening of the PRI's political control in the State of Mexico was 
particularly acute in the part of the State that forms part of the ZMVM. Thus, according 
to my own calculations, while in the municipal elections in the State as a whole, the PRI 
moved fi-om controlling 98% of the municipalities in 1990 to 55% in 2003, in the 
metropolitan municipalities the PRI presence fell from 95 to 48% of municipalities in this 
same period. 
These data on electoral turnover illustrate the dramatic political change experienced by 
the ZMVM in the last fifteen years. Although there is no general agreement on the extent 
to which this political plurality has impeded the formation of a metropolitan agenda, 
during my interviews diverse political actors told me that this is one of the main reasons 
for the lack of inter-jurisdictional cooperation in the area. This political fragmentation 
together with the legal constraints on the recognition of metropolitan areas in the country 
has turned this area into an agglomeration of single jurisdictions rather than an integrated 
metropolitan unit. In this context, the question that arises first and foremost is, why 
should an area with these characteristics be envisioned as a single functional unit? If after 
all, jurisdictions in this area have different levels of resources, legal status, and political 
representation, then what is to be gained from including them into a broader metropolitan 
structure? In the rest of this chapter, I provide some preliminary answers by looking at 
the functional interrelations that exist among the different jurisdictions that form part of 
the ZMVM. 
2.6. Functional integration: the ZMVM as a unit of analysis 
In the previous sections, I have thoroughly documented the high level of political, legal, 
and fiscal fragmentation that exists among the jurisdictions that comprise the ZMVM. 
Despite this fragmentation, I have been arguing that this area should be envisioned as a 
functional temtorial continuum rather than as a conglomerate of independent 
jurisdictions. In this section, I provide a series of additional arguments to support this 
claim. According to Duhau (2003), one idiosyncrasy of metropolitan areas is that despite 
their multi-jurisdictional composition, their individual characteristics can only be 
explained as forming part of a common structure, which normally functions as a single 
and integrated unit. In other words, the nature of a metropolitan structure derives from the 
relationship that each individual jurisdiction has with the rest of the jurisdictions in that 
same structure, which are different than those relationships between jurisdictions that do 
not forrn part of the same metropolitan structure. 
In this theoretical framework, the characteristics of the single jurisdictions forming part 
of the ZMVM can hardly be explained without reference to other jurisdictions in the area 
and, at times, to the metropolitan area as a whole. In fact, the dramatic population growth 
in the metropolitan municipalities is directly linked to the secular dynamics of the DF, 
and this alone has given rise to a process of continuous functional integration among the 
jurisdictions of the ZMVM. Regardless of the dividing lines between states, delegations, 
or municipalities, people constantly move fiom one place to the other within the 
metropolis to perform a multitude of socio-economic activities which include work, 
dwelling, consumption, education, leisure, etc. To put it in the words of a publication on 
air quality in the Mexico mega city area, the flow of people, trade, and services between 
the DF and the State of Mexico reflect the many ways in which these two areas represent 
a single entity (Lezama et al. in Molina & Molina eds. 2002). All these activities, 
together with the dense net of social and economic interactions taking place above the 
formal legal divisions of the ZMVM, cause this area to operate like a functional 
metropolitan unit. 
Functional interaction among the comprising jurisdictions of the ZMVM occurs in a 
number of urban sectors such as environmental management, public security, 
transportation, housing, water, and solid waste management, amongst others. Out of all 
these sectors, perhaps the one that best illustrates the functional integration of the ZMVM 
is housing. The evolution of the housing market in the ZMVM has followed a natural 
trend dictated by the rapid population increase (both by migration and natural birth) in the 
metropolitan municipalities. As already mentioned, the population expansion of the 
ZMVM has taken place in the State of Mexico, a phenomenon which has increased the 
demand for housing. The very high demand for housing in the metropolitan 
municipalities has been largely driven by the high real estate prices in the central city that 
have forced people to look to areas with lower property values. In fact, as Ward (1990) 
argues, the process of population expansion into the State of Mexico has resulted fiom 
the constraints imposed by the land and housing markets rather than by the outcome of 
migrant choice. People move where there is available land, and where property prices 
give newcomers the opportunity to buy instead of having to rent or share space in the 
central city. 
The population and housing expansion into the State of Mexico has occurred on a 
massive scale. From 1995 to 2000, for example, out of the 201,000 households that left 
the DF, 53% moved to the metropolitan municipalities. Similarly, from the 102,000 
households that the DF received in this period, 40% came from the metropolitan part of 
the State of Mexico, resulting in a net migration of 65,700 households to the metropolitan 
municipalities (Eibenschutz 2004). According to a real estate developer, as a result of this 
migration, the metropolitan area of the State of Mexico is building around 100,000 
houses per year; most of these houses-between 60,000 and 70,000-are affordable 
housing projects, or what is called "social interest" housing (Interview H). By and large, 
these projects of social interest housing in the State of Mexico function as sleeping 
communities for commuters who form part of the DF's labor market. Out of the 
remaining 30,000 to 40,000 houses, about half is made up of middle-income level 
households, and the other half is informal settlements. 
In terms of the mobility of these commuters, Gakenheimer et al. (2002)-based on a 
COMETRAVI report-argue that 25% of the trips in the ZMVM occur between the DF 
and the State of Mexico, the other 55% of the trips are concentrated within the DF, and 
the remaining 20% within the State of Mexico. Although there is no precise measurement 
of the total number of trips in the ZMVM, they amount to about 30 million, meaning that 
about 7.5 million trips take place between the DF and the metropolitan part of the State of 
Mexico. According to an estimate from a real estate developer, between 5 and 6 million 
people travel everyday from their bedroom communities in the State of Mexico to work 
in the DF (Interview H). As land in the area contiguous to the DF has become more 
congested, new construction has been pushed to more distant places, to the point that 
some commuters from the State of Mexico must travel up to two and even three hours 
one way to get to their work places in the DF. Currently construction is mostly taking 
place in the third and even fourth "ring" areas of the State of Mexico. The expansion into 
the first ring took place during the 1950s, when most construction was built in the 
municipalities adjacent to the DF (e.g., Naucalpan, Nezahualcoyotl). Then, during the 
1970s and 1 980s, population expanded into the second "ring" area where construction 
began to take place in more distant places, like Atizapan, Coacalco, and Atenco. Now, 
population is expanding into the third or even forth "ring" areas, which include 
municipalities like Tecamac, more than 40km away from the city center (Ward 1990). 
The high degree of mobility of the population between the DF and the State of Mexico 
has generated a number of sectoral activities, which have an inherently metropolitan 
scope. Some of these metropolitan-wide activities include the management of air 
pollution, water, transportation, and solid-waste. The issue of water use and management 
is highly illustrative of the functional relationship between the DF and the State of 
Mexico, as almost the totality of the water consumed in the former comes from basins 
located in the latter. A similar situation is observed in the case of solid waste, but here the 
production takes place in the DF and then it gets dumped into the State of Mexico. 
Transportation is another sector that has clear metropolitan characteristics, as it connects 
the flow of people between different parts of the metropolitan area. So far, there is no 
single transportation network in the ZMVM; infrastructure is highly unequal and very 
loosely integrated despite the fact that the segments of transportation networks in the DF 
have direct consequences on those in the State of Mexico and vise-versa (Iracheta 2004). 
Finally, air pollution is another sector that has clear metropolitan scope. The natural 
dispersions of pollutants, both from fixed and mobile sources, create a continuous 
number of environmental externalities in the different jurisdictions of the ZMVM, and 
these can only be mitigated with a common metropolitan strategy (see Molina & Molina 
eds. 2002). 
The activity that takes place within and across the numerous jurisdictions of the ZMVM, 
without any regard to their political and legal boundaries, is what generates the 
metropolitan nature of this area. In the last few decades, public officials and academics 
have underscored this metropolitan nature and have called for its legal recognition. 
Unlike other metropolitan formations throughout the world (OECD 2001), but similar to 
other Latin American capitals like Buenos Aires (Pirez n.d.), the ZMVM has been very 
slow and highly inefficient in dealing with its common problems. Some policies have 
been put in place, but they are still insufficient. In the next section, I conclude by 
providing a brief account of these policies and explaining where the ZMVM stands today. 
2.7. Conclusion: where do we stand? 
In summary, the ZMVM is a conglomerate of state and local independent jurisdictions, 
which despite their functional inter-relationships are not recognized as an unified entity 
with integrated administrative or political functions. The current situation presents one of 
the worst possible scenarios for this area, as no one is responsible for the costs that 
individual jurisdictions impose on each other and on the metropolitan area as a whole. 
The frequent number of social and economic transactions (travel, commercial activities, 
pollution, crime, etc.) that take place among the jurisdictions of the ZMVM generate a 
series of externalities with negative consequences for the metropolitan area as a whole. 
Although much more work is needed to quantify the costs and benefits that accrue to the 
jurisdictions in the DF and the State of Mexico, political actors recognize the enormous 
amount of spillover that exists under the current structure. Actually, it has already 
become part of the political strategy of the DF to underscore the costs-in terms of 
pollution, congestion, infrastructure deterioration, etc.-imposed by the millions of 
commuters from the State of Mexico. Similarly, the State of Mexico furiously argues that 
it is not being compensated for all the services that it provides to the DF (mainly water), 
and on almost every occasion points to the superior service infrastructure that exists on 
the other side of the border. 
In the presence of externalities, such as in the case of the ZMVM, economic theory 
recommends the formation or legal recognition of intermediate tiers of government to 
internalize such spillovers (Rothenberg 1970). For the political, legal, and historical 
reasons already discussed, the ZMVM has not been able to follow this route. In fact, at 
this point, the ZMVM is characterized by the opposite situation: a complete lack of 
metropolitan vision, and a precarious and limited system of metropolitan coordination. 
Iracheta (2002: 23) summarizes the current situation in the following way: 
For the Federal District or the State of Mexico, the city ends within its own limits. Each of these 
entities considers that the other is indeed 'other' in almost every sense. Because of the 
particularities of the democratization process in Mexico, this same scheme has begun to be 
reproduced in the delegations of the Federal District and the metropolitan municipalities of the 
State of Mexico. The municipal presidents of the State of Mexico and the delegates of the Federal 
District conceived of 'their territories' in a very isolated manner; with little interdependence and 
co-responsibility with their neighbors, moving away from a metropolitan vision 
In order to deal with their metropolitan problems, authorities in the ZMVM have mainly 
relied on a series of limited planning mechanisms (See Davis & Raich 2003). Mexico has 
a long yet incomplete history of intergovernmental mechanisms aimed at solving 
problems that involve a multiple jurisdictions. At present, these mechanisms are largely 
reduced to the formation of collective bodies or commissions, and to narrow bilateral 
agreements. In the ZMVM, there are various sectoral commissions and there is even a 
multi-sectoral commission of metropolitan affairs (Executive Commission of 
Metropolitan Coordination), where authorities from the DF, the State of Mexico, and the 
federal government meet to plan for the metropolitan area. Despite the fact that most 
metropolitan planning has been channeled through these commissions, their results, with 
the exception of the commission for the environment (CAM), have been rather limited. 
There are various factors that account for the weakness of the commissions, primarily 
their inability to generate binding agreements, and their lack of financing and political 
support. 
In addition to the limited availability of mechanisms for metropolitan planning, the 
political turnover in the ZMVM has made the current situation for metropolitan 
coordination even more critical. During my interviews, it became clear that there is 
agreement among academics and public officials that this political change has further 
delayed the formation of a metropolitan agenda in which the jurisdictions from both sides 
of the border come together to envision a common strategy for the ZMVM. In the past, 
not only did the federal government play a convening role, with a more visible economic 
and political presence in the area, but politicians in the DF and the State of Mexico 
seemed to have understood that what happened on one side of the border had direct 
repercussions on the other side. This was clearly the case in the expansion of the metro B 
line from the DF into the eastern part of the State of Mexico, when authorities from the 
DF (Mayor Camacho) and the State of Mexico (Governor Pichardo Pagaza) agreed that 
this project was beneficial to the metropolitan area as a whole. Although examples like 
this one are limited, the current lack of metropolitan awareness is particularly critical, not 
only between the DF and the State of Mexico, but among the jurisdictions within these 
federal entities. A former delegate clearly illustrated the current condition in the 
following terms: "the only way to get things done is to focus on our own projects; little 
can be gained by turning our heads to the other delegations or municipalities, not to 
mention the central authorities of the Federal District" (Interview L). 
The consequences of this lack of metropolitan vision are many. Scholars have begun to 
underscore the urgency of approaching metropolitan problems on a sectoral level. Thus, 
studies on water (e.g. PUEC 2004a), transportation (e.g. Gakenheimer et al. in Molina 
and Molina eds. 2002), and the environment (e.g. Molina and Molina eds. 2002) have 
begun to emerge with a metropolitan vision. So far, however, very few analysts have 
investigated the financial condition of the ZMVM. In particular, they have not studied the 
effects of decentralization policies on the fiscal disparity of the ZMVM. One of the main 
reasons for this situation is the lack of a financial database that includes spending and 
revenue data on all of the state and local jurisdictions that form part of the ZMVM. This 
exercise is the objective of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES OF THE ZMVM 
3.1. Introduction 
The Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM) is not only politically, 
economically, and legally diverse, but also quite fiscally fragmented. The local 
jurisdictions that form part of this area have different fiscal compositions, levels of 
revenue, and expenditures. As in most other sectors, studies on Mexico City's public 
finances largely focus on the Federal District, without considering the fiscal condition of 
the metropolitan zone of the State of ~ e x i c o . '  This results in a partial and skewed vision 
of the area, because it ignores the fiscal reality of the 58 metropolitan municipalities, 
where more than half of the population of the ZMVM lives. One of the main reasons for 
this lack of an integrated vision is the scarcity of data at the state and municipal levels 
and the absence of a basic methodology to integrate the financial information of 
jurisdictions with different fiscal compositions. 
Because the unit of analysis of this work is the ZMVM, understood as a single temtorial 
and functional continuum, the construction of an integrated fiscal framework becomes 
necessary to perform any kind of metropolitan-wide analysis. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the ZMVM faces a number of problems of metropolitan scope, but the 
prevailing vision of this area fails to recognize that its comprising state and local 
jurisdictions have very different revenue sources, and therefore must exert different levels 
of fiscal effort to provide similar levels of public services. In order to recognize this fiscal 
heterogeneity and to incorporate it into policy measures that will alleviate problems in the 
ZMVM, one first step lies in generating an integrated framework of the public finances of 
the metropolitan area as a whole. 
In this chapter I construct a comprehensive picture of the public finances of the ZMVM. 
To the best of my knowledge, this effort represents a unique exercise that seeks to show 
the complexities and tensions between the state and local jurisdictions of the ZMVM. 
' Some notable exceptions are Morales (2002) and Iracheta (2002). 
Because there is no model for the construction of such a picture, I propose to do it in 
three main parts. In sections 3.2 and 3.3, I present the finances of the DF and the State of 
Mexico at the state-wide level, while in section 3.4 I turn to the local level to discuss the 
public finances of the metropolitan municipalities of the State of Mexico and the 
delegations of the DF. Together, these three sections illustrate the overall fiscal condition 
of the ZMVM. 
The current fiscal condition of the ZMVM is accounted for by a number of determinants. 
In addition to the legal and political factors that I discussed in Chapter 2, here I present 
the social and economic characteristics of the ZMVM. I explore these characteristics 
because the economic activity in the state and local jurisdictions of the ZMVM and their 
social composition affect the fiscal condition of this area as a whole. The process of 
decentralization is another factor that has affected the fiscal condition of the ZMVM. In 
this chapter I present the evolution of the public finances in the region during a decade of 
important decentralization reforms, and leave for the two subsequent chapters the 
analysis of how decentralization has contributed to the current fiscal fragmentation of the 
ZMVM. 
3.2. The Federal District 
The DF is the wealthiest federal entity in Mexico, and due to its economic vitality, it 
generates substantial revenue. Historically, the DF has always been the federal entity with 
the highest amount of revenue generation, but although this is still the case, the economic 
and demographic changes of the last few decades have placed its public finances under 
increasing pressure. In this section, 1 review the evolution of the public finances of the 
DF in the last two decades. Because the fiscal condition of the DF derives from its social, 
demographic, and economic characteristics, I begin by providing a brief description of 
these characteristics. 
As the wealthiest entity in the country, the DF receives high scores in the basic indicators 
of development. According to the United Nations, it has the highest Human Development 
Index in Mexico, with a 97% literacy rate (in comparison to the national average of 
90.5%), and with a concentration of 12% of the total number of teachers in the country. 
Concerning healthcare, the DF has the highest number of hospitals and doctors of any 
other state; and concerning basic infrastructure, the DF boasts the best in the country, 
with the widest coverage of water, drainage, and energy services. In terms of economic 
indicators, the DF is the largest contributor to the country's gross national product, 
currently representing 22.4%. In addition, 17% of the total employed population is 
concentrated in the DF, it receives the highest (62%) level of foreign direct investment 
(JP Morgan 2003), and it has the highest income per capita in Mexico, calculated at 
approximately US$14,000, which is about three times the per capita income of the rest of 
the country (Beristain and Rodriguez: 2001). 
Despite being the strongest economy and the most productive entity in the country, in the 
last few decades the DF has faced significant pressure to sustain its economic vitality. 
This pressure has been caused by various conditions, especially the drastic shift in the 
economy from the industrial to the service sector, a decline in public investment, and the 
opening of the economy to free trade. In terms of the shift from an industrial to a service 
and commercial economy, for the last thirty years the DF has been losing its industrial 
capacity to other states with closer proximity to export markets. In the meantime, its 
service and commercial sectors have come to represent more than 75% of its internal 
product. According to Beristain and Rodriguez (2001), 7 out of 10 jobs in the DF are in 
the transport, commercial, and service sectors, and one out of every four jobs is in the 
public sector. The loss of manufacturing jobs has had a direct consequence on the 
finances of the DF, which has seen the conversion of highly productive jobs into more 
informal and fragmented services with lower productivity levels. This situation 
contributed to a slowdown of the economy, to the point that the economy of the DF grew 
i ~ t  rates below the national average at various times during the 1990s. Similarly, its 
relative importance in the country's gross national product fell from 23.9% in 1993 to 
22.3% in 2001. 
Another element with important implications for the economy of the DF has been the 
slowdown of federal investment in the area. As explained in Chapter 2, until the 1980s, 
authorities in the DF used public and private investments to expand the production of 
services and infrastructure well beyond the national average. Up until that time, very 
important investments took place in all sectors of development fiom water and 
transportation, to housing and commercial infrastructure. All these projects were possible 
due to the widespread use of public funds to stimulate private investment. During the 
1990s however, that vision changed, and the fiscal retreat of the federal governrnent fiom 
the DF, together with the DF's inability to increase its revenue, has prevented the DF 
from bringing in the levels of investment that a city of this magnitude requires (Moreno 
et al. 2004). 
3.2. I .  Public finances in the DF 
According to standard public finance theory, in a federal system, the states with the 
highest concentration of economic activity collect the largest amounts of revenue and 
have the highest spending levels (Slack 2001). This is clearly the case in the DF, which, 
as the most economically sound entity in Mexico, has a high concentration of private 
income and employment and thus a large tax base. Consequently, the DF also has high 
levels of public spending, required to finance the infrastructure and public service needs 
generated by its high economic activity. 
Because of its high concentration of economic activity, the DF is the only federal entity 
in the country that generates more than half of its revenue from its own fiscal base. In 
fact, while the DF receives about 40% of its total revenue fiom federal transfers, the rest 
of the states receive, on average, 85% of their revenue from transfers. This condition is 
due to the DF's unique fiscal composition, which combines the fiscal characteristics of 
both a state and a municipality. In practice, this means that the central government of the 
DF (GDF) not only has access to all state-wide taxes, namely the payroll tax (the main 
state tax), but also to local taxes, including the property tax, which is the most important 
municipal tax in Mexico. 
In order to provide a detailed account of the fiscal composition of the DF, I rely on two 
databases: one prepared by the DF's Legislative Assembly (ALDF) and the other by the 
Treasury of the DF. Both databases concentrate information from the yearly public 
accounts, and although they include similar data entries, in various cases they 
complement each other. The analysis covers the years from 1989 to 2000 for which 
complete information is available, but in some cases it includes other years when there 
are existing data. Although the data only cover a ten-year period, this series includes the 
decade of the 1990s when, as discussed in Chapter 1, a number of important fiscal 
decentralization policies took place in the country. 
3.2.2. Revenue in the DF 
From 1989 to 2002, total revenue in the DF grew 56% in real per capita terms. Unlike the 
rest of the states in the country, this increase was the result of the consolidation of the 
DF's own-source revenue, rather than an increase in its dependence on federal funding. 
Thus, while own-source revenue grew 65% in real per capita terms during the period, 
transfers grew 45%. This change in the financial structure of the DF was the result of a 
fiscal reform at the beginning of the 1990s that increased its collection of local taxes and 
fees, and of a series of changes to the National Systems of Fiscal Coordination that 
reduced the federal transfers flowing to the DF. 
Table 3.1: DF. Total revenue per capita and as a proportion of total 
Source: Author, based on ALDF (2004). 
~ o t a l  transfers 
1 !K of  total 
Own-source 
Totaltransfers 
The increase in the DF's own-source revenues was largely the product of a major fiscal 
reform that took place during the administration of Mayor Manuel Camacho (1988- 
1.994). When Mayor Camacho came to power at the end of 1988, the finances of the DF 
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51.8 
50.9 
49.1 
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46.4 
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36.5 
58.4 
41.6 
59.5 
40.5 
61.8 
38.2 
60.6 
39.4 
59.7 
40.3 
57.3 
42.7 
53.0 
39.0 
52.9 
43.7 
51.8 
46.1 
51.3 
47.8 
were in good shape because the federal government had just taken over all financial 
obligations of the DF after the earthquakes of 1985. Thus, Camacho had enough leeway 
to begin a series of reforms that attempted to strengthen the collection of the DF's own- 
source revenue through a series of policies that included the modernization of 
information technology services, improvement of the cadastral systems, administrative 
simplification, improved enforcement policies, and the restructuring of the whole system 
of tax administration. As a result of these changes, from 1989 to 1994, the DF 
experienced an increase in almost all of its local sources of revenue, and its total own- 
source revenue almost doubled in real per capita terms. This fiscal soundness, however, 
was severely damaged by the peso crisis of 1995, which together with the lack of any 
substantive fiscal reforms since then, have prevented the DF from reaching the 1994 
levels of revenue collection. 
Table 3.2: DF. Own-source revenuc 
I I I 
Own-source revenue 1 2,092) 3,9521 2,867 
I I I 
Taxes 1 6161 1,5611 1,144 
I I I 
Fees 1 2491 6861 461 
I I I 
Products 995 795 628 
Fines 40 192 127 
Betterment levies 21 1081 4: 
I I 
Other 1 1441 6111 461 
! Der ca~ i ta  (con! tant 2002 ~ e s o s )  
Source: Author, based on GDF, Ministry of Finance. 
Table 3.2 shows that taxes are the most important element of the DF's own-source 
revenue, representing about 41% of the total. Taxes grew during the period largely 
because of an increase in the collection of property taxes and the introduction of a local 
payroll tax in 1988 (Table 3.3). Since its introduction, the payroll tax has represented an 
important source of revenue, amounting to 39% of total tax collection. Property taxes, 
however, remain the main source of local taxation in the DF (43%); the proportion of 
property taxes to total taxes is by far the highest in the country. In fact, from 1989 to 
2001, the collection of property taxes in the DF represented almost half of the total 
receipts of property taxes in the country (Appendix 3, Table A3.1). 
After taxes, so-called "products" are the second most important source of local revenue, 
amounting to almost one quarter of total own-source revenue. Products consist of revenue 
obtained from the provision of services that are private in nature. In the case of the DF, 
most revenue in this category comes from the provision of auxiliary police services. Fees 
are the third most important source of local revenue, and this category experienced some 
of the highest increases during the period. The collection of fees for the provision of 
water services grew almost five times in real per capita terms fiom 1989 to 1994, largely 
due to a reform of the water system in the early 1990s that had an important privatization 
component (Haggarty et al. n.d.). 
[other taxes 194 278 225 165 249 185 163 200 231 246 18 
Table 3.3: DF. Own-source revenue per capita (constant 2002 pesos) 
TOTAL TAXES 
Property 
Payroll 
Source: Author, based on GDF, Ministry of Finance. 
1989 
616 
111 
311 
TOTAL FEES 
Water provision 
Other fees 
After own-source revenue, transfers represent the second most important source of 
revenue in the DF. The DF is the only federal entity that covers more than half of its 
expenditures with its own revenue sources. Despite this moderate level of vertical 
imbalance, the total transfers per capita also experienced real growth from 1989 to 2002. 
Until 1998, when the system of earmarked transfers or aportaciones was created, the total 
transfers were largely composed of unconditional transfers or participaciones, which 
experienced modest but positive real growth until 1994. Then, with the peso crisis of 
1995, the partic@aciones declined, but began to rise again in 1997. The growth of 
transfers since 1997 has been the product of both a recovery from the economic crisis of 
461 
210 
110 
142 
TOTAL PRODUCTS 
Auxiliary, banking, and industrial police 
Credit, interests, and stocks 
Other products 
1994 
1,561 
694 
589, 
249 
60 
107 
82 
628 
369 
217 
42 
464 
230 
95 
140 
686 
297 
131 
257 
995 
347 
612 
36 
1995 
1,144 
534 
385, 
585 
441 
88 
55 
795 
480 
110 
204 
1996 
1,168 
592 
411 
100 
48 
23 
29 
539 
276 
116 
146 
625 
5 15 
45 
65 
1997 
1,535 
572 
714, 
482 
274 
85 
123 
791 
551 
190 
50 
795 
641 
85 
69 
1998 
1,243 
571 
486 
554 
298 
107 
149 
567 
295 
108 
165 
695 
631 
- 
65 
832 
599 
163 
69 
152 
- 
87 
66 
100 
58 
29 
12 
595 
320 
125 
151 
% 
100 
43 
39 
1999 
1,275 
591 
520, 
552 
296 
100 
156 
2000 
1,432 
653 
580 
2001 
1,586 
728 
627 
2002 
1,570 
698 
625 
1995, and of a reform to the SNCF in 1998 that increased the total amount of the General 
Revenue Sharing Fund from 18.5 to 20% of the Federal Revenue Sharing Pool (RFP). In 
addition, the creation of the aportaciones at the end of 1997 began to channel new, 
earmarked resources to the DF, mainly to cover its health and security-related expenses. 
This situation explains both the increase in aportaciones and in transfers as a whole. 
Source: Author, based on ALDF (2004). 
In addition to participaciones and aportaciones, there are other less-structured transfers 
that the federal government uses for specific purposes. For a number of decades, the 
federal government channeled several of these transfers to the DF, but since the 1990s 
they have been in decline and recently they have virtually disappeared. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the purpose of these transfers was to help the capital city cover the costs of its 
infrastructure projects, mainly in the areas of water and transportation. The origin of 
these special transfers goes back to the 1960s, when according to Davis, "the urban 
infiastructural development had been undertaken by the national party leadership through 
nationally funded institutions and programs in order to jump-start the Mexico City 
economy for purposes of national development" (1 994: 1 19). These mega projects were 
largely financed by the federal government, but by the late 1970s the federal authorities 
decided to transfer major infrastructure expenses, such as the construction and operation 
of the metro system, to the DF. At that time, the federal government began to make 
special transfers to the DF, primarily subsidies to the metro. During the 1980s the federal 
government increased the use of these special transfers to help the DF out of the financial 
crisis created by the crash in oil prices in the early 1980s and the high cost of 
reconstruction after the 1985 earthquakes. During the first part of the 1980s these special 
transfers went from 6.4% of the total DF's revenues in 1980 to almost 40% in 1986 
(Table 3.5). 
This high level of special transfers, together with federal government interventions in the 
1980s to alleviate the DF's debt, began to create the image that the DF was being 
subsidized to the detriment of the rest of the states. To respond to this situation, in 1990 
Table 3.5: Dl?. Federal Transfers (millions, 1990 constant pesos) 
President Salinas-who came to power through a questionable democratic process and 
Year 
Amount 
O h  of total revenue 
needed to gain legitimacy in the states-significantly reduced the distribution of special 
federal transfers to the DF. With this decision, the DF became fully responsible for 
covering the operation of its big infrastructure projects with its own revenue. Out of all 
the big infrastructure projects in the DF, the metro system generates the most financial 
Source: Moreno et al. (2004). 
1980 
420 
6.4 
pressure. Because of the high political cost of raising the price of metro fees, the 
authorities have absorbed subsidies of roughly $4 billion pesos (US$365 million) per year 
since 1990 (Moreno et al. 2004). The DF has largely paid for these subsidies with debt, 
1982 
1080 
13.7 
another very important financial source for the DF. 
In addition to own-source revenue and transfers, debt is the third source of funding for 
subnational governments in Mexico, and it has always been an important part of fiscal 
policy in the DF. When examining the DF's use of debt, the first thing an analyst notices 
is that the capital city has a special debt regime. Unlike all the other states, it is the 
Federal Congress, and not the ALDF, who authorizes debt ceilings for the DF. In 
practice, the federal government formally contracts out the debt, and it covers this debt by 
1984 
2489 
28.8 
using the DF's participaciones as collateral. Thus, the federal government functions as a 
lender of last resort, but the DF remains directly responsible for paying the debt service. 
1986 
2897 
37.4 
This special debt regime has been controversial, and has significant advantages and 
disadvantages. 
1988 
2125 
22.6 
The major advantage of this system is that creditors conceive of the capital city's debt as 
il federal debt,. Therefore, the DF commonly has access to preferential borrowing rates. 
Perhaps more significant is the apparent certainty that in the case of financial distress, the 
1990 
1044 
9.9 
1992 
267 
2.8 
federal government will step in and take over the DF's debt obligations (JP Morgan 
2003). This happened a few times in the past when the DF was still a Department of the 
Federal Government, and the politicians at both federal and local levels had the same 
political allegiances. However, the recent movement towards political pluralism in 
Mexico creates uncertainty about how the federal government would handle future 
insolvency in the DF. Based on past experience, the situation does not look promising for 
the DF. When Mayor Ckrdenas took office in 1997 and requested that the federal 
government take over the DF's debt obligations, as the federal government had done in 
the past when other federal entities like Baj a California Sur and Quintana Roo formally 
became parts of the federation, the federal administration of then-President Zedillo 
denied the request. Regardless of what happens in the case of a future financial crisis in 
the DF, the arrangement is still controversial because it is not clear if the other states are 
excluded from the implicit federal back up enjoyed by the DF. When I interviewed the 
Minister of Finance of the Zedillo administration, he mentioned that all states (including 
the DF) have similar guarantees as they all have theirparticipaciones as collaterals. He 
also noted that the federal government must have an extremely neo-liberal approach to let 
one of its federal entities go into financial crisis, regardless of whether it is the capital 
city or any other state (Interview A). His position was not completely shared by the DF's 
Minister of Finance during the Camacho administration who, in another interview, told 
me that he considers that the debt of the capital city to be different from that of other 
states. According to his view, because the debt of the DF is formally part of the debt of 
the federal government-unlike the situation in any of the other states-"the debt 
problems of the DF are problems not only of this entity but of the country at large" 
(Interview B). 
Concerning the disadvantages of the current status of debt in the DF, a central concern is 
its lack of autonomy over debt policy. The yearly debt levels of the DF are approved both 
by the President who includes the debt ceiling in the provision that he sends to Congress, 
and then by lower and the upper houses of Congress, since the debt ceiling forms part of 
the annual Law of Revenues. This situation not only limits the autonomy of the DF's own 
legislative branch, but it also creates problems by making a pure financial concern the 
subject of a broader political negotiation. The rationale of this system is that the DF's 
debt is formally part of the federal debt, and therefore the whole country should have a 
say in its management. In practice, however, political groups in the Federal Congress use 
their power over this budget line to bargain for other general concerns that have nothing 
to do with the public finances of the DF. A former Minister of Finance mentioned to me 
that this has been the case several times during past annual budgetary negotiations, when 
political forces have only been willing to trade their support for the DF's debt level in 
exchange for specific concessions on other budget items (Interview A). 
Having reviewed some of the main characteristics of debt policy in the DF, in the 
remainder of this section I discuss the DF's use of debt in the last few years. Today, it is 
the most indebted entity in the country. Although the DF has not always had high debt 
levels, its use of credit goes back several decades. The DF's recent debt trend started with 
the construction of the big infrastructure projects of the 1950s. During that period a 
massive urban expansion took place in the DF, which required enormous amounts of 
investment. Oldman et al. (1967: 25) documented that over the decade from 1953 to 
1963, the revenues and expenditures of the then DDF "increased nearly five times in 
current prices and over three times in real terms." Since the DF did not have enough 
resources of its own, these infrastructure and service needs were financed either directly 
with federal funds, or indirectly through the use of credit. 
From that time until the mid-1980s the DF reached high levels of indebtedness 
intermittently, but the federal government always stepped in to alleviate its financial 
stress. The first time this happened was in 1977, when the federal government agreed to 
alleviate the costs of the construction of the metro system. Continuous demands for urban 
services pushed the DF to incur high debt levels that by 1982 reached the maximum level 
of 8.2% of its GDP. This situation, together with the oil crisis of that year, pushed the 
federal government to step in again to absorb $163 million pesos of debt created by the 
loss in the exchange rate.2 Three years later, in 1986, the federal government once again 
In 1983 the DDF and the federal government signed the "Agreement for the Restructuring and Absorption 
of Debt" which the latter committed to take over the losses created by the slide in the exchange rate from 
intervened to help the DF out of the crisis caused by the 1985 earthquakes, taking over all 
its debt commitments.' 
The bail-out of 1986 left the finances of the DF in a sound condition that lasted for the 
next nine years. The fact that the DF had a healthy fiscal condition in the second half of 
the 1980s allowed it to increase its collection of own-source revenue and to maintain 
fiscal discipline. As a result, the DF reached a real reduction of 87.2% of its total debt, 
and the achievement of primary surpluses in various years (Camara de Diputados 2001 ; 
Banobras 2004). This situation abruptly changed with the peso crisis of 1995, which 
reduced the total revenue of the DF by 25%, and pushed the authorities to resort to the 
use of credit. Since access to credit was then favorable because of the DF's good fiscal 
condition in previous years, the DF decided to exploit its credit capacity (Interview B). 
During that year, Mayor Espinoza started what was called the "Multi-annual Investment 
Program of Credit for the DF, 1995-2000," which aimed at reaching the levels of 
investment necessary for the DF to keep up with its service and infrastructure demands. 
This Program established a debt ceiling of $33 billion pesos for the year 2000, and 
restricted the use of these funds for the financing of transportation, water, and sewage 
projects (Moreno et al. 2004). 
During the first three years of the Multi-annual Program, the administration of Mayor Espinoza 
contracted credits for $10.6 billion pesos, of which 35% was allocated to transportation and 45% to 
water-related projects. The specific projects that financed by these credits were, in the transportation 
sector, the metro, the light rail, and the trolley systems; and in the water sector, the deep drainage, the 
water-metering system, and the expansion of the primary and secondary water and sewage networks. 
The remaining 20% was allocated to justice and public safety programs, which do not regularly justify 
the use of debt, as they do not contribute to the building of assets (Moreno at al. 2004). In 1997 when 
the first opposition government came to power in the DF, it had an outstanding debt of $1 1.8 billion, 
26 pesos per US dollar in 1982 to 130 pesos per US dollar in 1983. With this measure, in 1983 the DF 
reduced its deficit by 43% with respect to the debt levels of 1982 (Carnara de Diputados, 2001). 
3 In 1986, the DF and the federal government signed the "Agreement of Financial Rehabilitation" in which 
the latter took over 96% of the total passives of the DF, which amounted to $418 million pesos (Camara de 
Diputados, 2001). 
which the federal government refused to take over (Table 3.6). Despite this, Mayor cardenas4 decided 
to go ahead with most of the debt commitments of the previous administration, and requested 
additional credits for $7.5 billion in 1998-an amount that represented the highest annual debt ever 
authorized to the DF. As can be seen in Table 3.6, since then the administrations of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD) have continued to rely on the use of debt, to the point that by 2003 the debt 
levels of the DF had increased by almost thirty times in less than 10 years. 
Table 3.6: DF. Consolidated debt (thousands of current ~esos )  
Source: Moreno et al. (2004), *Banobras (2004). 
Year 
1994 
As a result of this situation, in 2002 the DF had the highest level of absolute debt of all 
the federal entities, representing more than 30% of the total subnational debt in the 
country. Despite the DF7s high levels of indebtedness, the current authorities believe that 
the current situation is fiscally sustainable because of the size of its economy and its 
payment and revenue generation capacity . In addition, the current administration of 
Mayor Lopez Obrador is well aware of the negative consequences that the payment of the 
debt service could have in the short run, so in 2001 he renegotiated its debt, rolling it over 
to the next 7 to 10 years, reducing its interest rates and generating savings of about $400 
million pesos per year (JP Morgan 2003). 
In 1997 the powers of the Mayor changed and with that the formal name of the rank change from 
"Mayor" to "Chief of Government," however, just for simplicity reasons I will also refer to the executive of 
the DF after 1997 as a Mayor. 
Net debt 
344 
Debt balance 
1.473.290 
Aside fiom the systematic growth of debt levels during the PRD administrations, it is also 
noticeable that the priorities for the use of debt have changed since the previous 
administrations. Following Moreno et al. (2004), I identify four special features of the 
new orientation in the use of debt. First, there has been a shift from the financing of big 
infrastructure projects in the transportation and water sectors to smaller and more 
atomized projects. Second, in the case of investments in urban services such as water and 
transportation, credit has not primarily been used to pay for the physical expansion of 
these services, but mostly to cover their operating and maintenance costs. Third, the use 
of credit by a series of local entities that in the past did not usually administer debt, 
mainly the delegations. Finally, debt began to be used to cover some of the regular 
operating programs and non-productive projects, which were previously financed by the 
DF's own-source revenue. In order to understand these particularities of the DF's use of 
debt, I explore not only the sources of the revenue, but also where it has been targeted. In 
the next section, I present a general overview of the DF's public expenditures. 
3.2.3. Expenditures in the DF 
As in the case of revenue, the expenditures of the DF went through important changes 
during the 1990s. The main change can be observed in the economic object of spending, 
which shifted fiom capital to current expenditures. As Table 3.7 illustrates, while in 1990 
each of these types of expenditures represented almost half of the total programmable 
spending, by 2002 capital spending only represented 28% of total spending5 In real per 
capita terms, this means that on average, from 1989 to 2002, the government of the DF 
spent $3,800 pesos per capita on administrative affairs compared to $2,100 on capital 
spending. The constant increase in current spending during the 1990s was basically due 
to an expansion in the number of government employees in the DF, and to an increase in 
their salaries and benefits. 
5 Programmable spending excludes the expenditures of participaciones and debt payments. 
88 
Table 3.7: DF. Programmable spending per capita and as a proportion of total 
spending (constant 2002 pesos) 
Similar to the aforementioned shift from capital- to current-account spending, the 
structure of spending by sectors also experienced some modifications in the period of 
study.6 Expenditures have also shifted from high levels of public investment in traditional 
infrastructure sectors, like water and transportation, to the financing of small-scale 
programs and also to more socially-oriented programs, like pensions and scholarships. In 
the case of the water sector, spending was reduced from 12% of total programmable 
spending in 1997 to 6% in 2002.~ Spending in the transportation sector has also seen a 
substantive decrease in the last few years. While spending represented $14 billion pesos 
in 1989, it declined to $6.4 billion pesos in 2002, a reduction of more than 50%? Garbage 
collection and solid waste treatment is another sector that has experienced substantial 
spending reductions. From 1995 to 2002, the budgetary allocation of this service 
decreased by about $1 billion pesos, from $3.383 billion to $2.374 b i l l i ~ n . ~  
Totalspending 
Current 
--- 
Capital 
% of total 
Current 
Capital 
While the water, transportation, and solid waste sectors have been losing importance in 
the DF's budget, the sectors that have been receiving more budgetary allocations are 
" Studying the sectoral allocation of spending is not easy because the prevailing accountable methods do 
not readily identify the items of spending. A way to do so is to dig into the DF's public accounts to trace 
the budgets that have been assigned to each of the institutions in charge of providing the particular services. 
Moreno et al. (2004) went through this involved process, and the analysis in this section is based on their 
iindings. 
7 Similarly, during this time current spending in the sector increased by 23.4% and capital spending 
decreased by 62.3%. These numbers refer to the two main institutions in charge of the water service in the 
IIF, which are the General Direction of Hydraulic Operation and Construction, and the Water Commission 
(CADF). 
These numbers correspond to the main three transport related programs: regulation of urban 
transportation, services of transportation and parking lots, and infrastructure for urban transportation. 
These are real numbers and correspond to the Program of Solid Waste Control, which is the most 
important program in the sector. 
1989 
4,134 
2,390 
1,744 
Source: Author, based on ALDF (2004). 
57.8 
42.2 
1990 
5,041 
-- 2,509 
2,531 
49.8 
50.2 
1991 
5,334 
-- 2,945 
-- 
2,388 
55.2 
44.8 
1992 
6,086 
3,451 
2,635 
56.7 
43.3 
1993 
6,368 
3,706 
58.2 
41.8 
1994 
6,568 
4,092 
62.3 
37.7 
2,662 2,476 1,744 2,046 
1995 
4,922 
3,178 
1,906 
64.6 
35.4 
1996 
5,472 
3,425 
1997 
6,525 
4,619 
70.8 
29.2 
62.6 
37.4 
1,678 
1998 
5,692 
4,013 
70.5 
29.5 
1,529 
1999 
5,902 
4,372 
74.1 
25.9 
1,829 
2000 
6,745 
4,916 
72.9 
27.1 
2,126 2,072 
2001 
7,274 
5,147 
70.8 
29.2 
2002 
7,409 
5,336 
72.0 
28.0 
public safety, housing, education, and health. Public safety has been one of the main 
concerns of the citizens of the DF, and this explains a 30% real increase in the spending 
allocations going to this sector from 1994 to 2003. Another sector that has experienced 
important budget increases is social welfare, which includes programs for scholarships, 
housing renovations, assistance to street children, and milk and medicine subsidies. These 
budgetary allocations have grown enormously from $500 million in 1995 to $9 billion in 
2003. The health budget also grew during these years from $1.800 billion in 1999 to $5.1 
billion in 2002. Similarly, the housing sector budget grew from $1.25 billion in 1995 to 
$2.048 billion in 2003. 
Finally, the education sector deserves special consideration because, by and large, its 
financing still falls under the responsibility of the federal government. In 2001, the DF's 
budget for education began to increase slightly when its government decided to start 
participating in the provision of middle- and high-level education. In total, in 2001 and 
2002, the DF spent only $900 million in the education sector, which is negligible 
compared to the spending that most other entities allocate to the financing of their 
education sectors. 
The special situation of the DF's education sector dates to 1992 when the federal 
government began decentralizing the services of basic education to all the states with the 
exception of the DF. At that time the National Education Workers Union (SNTE) 
established as a condition of the decentralization process that the DF would be excluded, 
because it did not want to lose direct control of the union in the capital city (Ibarra 2003). 
Since then the Federal Ministry of Education (SEP) has financed most of the DF's 
education budget. This arrangement has been very controversial because the rest of the 
states perceive it to be inequitable in terms of public spending. In contrast, the authorities 
of the DF argue that this situation is not totally inequitable because even though a high 
proportion of education resources go to institutions that are located in its territory, 
actually these resources benefit the country's population at large. lo  Both arguments are 
partially correct. It is true that people from all over the country come to the DF to study 
and that the budgets of various nation-wide education institutions are counted as part of 
the DF's total spending in education." However, it is also true that another portion of the 
education budget is spent exclusively on DF residents, who do not directly contribute to 
these education expenses. 
Since the beginning of the decentralization of education in 1992, states have asked that 
the DF be made responsible for its own education budget. At this point, most of the legal 
modifications that are needed in order to transfer educational services to the DF have 
already been made; now, it is only a matter of gaining the political majority to approve 
the reforms." Recently, in May 2004, Congress approved a bill that obligates the DF to 
contribute $9 billion pesos for education, which is the average amount borne by the rest 
of the states for education (El Universal. May 28, 2004). One of the States that has 
continuously insisted that the DF should cover its own education spending is the State of 
Mexico, the entity that spends the highest amount of its budget (about 50%) on its state 
educational system. Authorities from this state point to this situation to explain why the 
State cannot keep up with the high demands for services and infrastructure in the 
metropolitan area (Interview C). 
3.3. The State of Mexico 
Ln almost every sense, the State of Mexico is distinct from the DF. Despite the fact that 
they share a border and face similar demands for services and infrastructure, these two 
entities not only have different economic and social conditions, but also different revenue 
10 It remains to be calculated what proportion of the federal education budget that goes to the DF is spent on 
programs or institutions that benefit the population at large, in comparison to those expenditures that only 
benefit the residents of the DF. Moreno et al. (2004) provide a rough proportion of about 60%. 
11  Some of these nation-wide institutions whose budgets are counted as part of the subsidy going to the DF 
are: the National Autonomous University (UNAM), the Polytechnic National Institute (IPN), the National 
Autonomous University (UAM), TV channel 1 1, the National Institute of History and Anthropology, and 
the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT). 
12 The original proposal for the 2004 Law of Revenue that President Fox sent to Congress mandated that 
the DF should cover the expenses of its basic education. All the deputies of the PRD and a fraction of 
deputies of the PRI (the 'elbistas') voted against it, and this provision was removed from the Law approved 
by Congress. 
and expenditure structures. The State of Mexico is one of the most dynamic states in the 
country, with the largest population in Mexico. The decentralization policies of the 1980s 
and the 1990s in the areas of health, education, and infrastructure have had a substantial 
impact on this entity, which faces a continuous and increasing demand for goods and 
services. Because the fiscal condition of the State of Mexico derives from its social, 
demographic, and economic characteristics, I begin by providing a brief description of 
these characteristics. 
After the DF, the State of Mexico has the second largest economy in the country, 
generating 10.2% of Mexico's total GDP. The state's most important economic activities 
have been the construction and manufacturing sectors, which respectively represent 10.5 
and 16% of the nation's GDP in these sectors. The State of Mexico has the second largest 
manufacturing sector in the country, especially in the areas of metal production (32% of 
the total production in the country), food (2 1 %), and chemical products (1 8%). In terms 
of employment, 5 1 % of the population is in the work force (about the national average) 
mainly in the service sector, which has 60% of the employment. The other 3 1.4% of the 
jobs are in the industrial sector, and 5.6% in the rural sector (Camara de Diputados 
2001a). 
Despite the economic importance of the State of Mexico, the state has experienced very 
rapid population growth, which has dramatically increased the demand for public 
services. From 1960 to 2000, its population grew by almost seven times, and in 2000 
amounted to more than $1 3 million people, representing 1 3.2% of Mexico's total 
population. The most rapid expansion took place in the 1960s when population grew at 
an average annual rate of 7.6%. In the next decade, the rate remained high at 6.8%, and in 
the decade of the 1980s, it declined to 2.7%. From 1990 to 2000, the growth rate slightly 
increased to 3%. Since the 1960s, the population growth rate of the State of Mexico has 
been above the national mean. This rapid population growth is largely the product of 
migration; in 1995 almost half of the population (46.3%) of the State of Mexico was born 
in a different part of the country. Most of the migrants arrive in the metropolitan area of 
the state, where 75% of the total population is concentrated.13 In contrast, the natural- 
born growth rate in the state has been below the national average since the 1970s. 
As a result of this rapid population growth, the state has experienced low per capita 
incomes; in 1999 its per capita GDP was $33,240 pesos, an amount 23% below the 
country's average. Similarly, due to its large population, it has the highest absolute 
number of poor people in the country, which according to the World Bank (2003) is 
around 5 million, out of which 1.3 million live in extreme poverty. This level of poverty 
is reflected in various social indicators in which the State of Mexico scores low both in 
comparison with its richer neighbor the DF, and in some cases also with respect to the 
rest of the country. In the education sector, 6.6% of the population does not know how to 
read and write, in comparison to 3.3% in the DF, but this rate is much better than the 
national average of almost 10%. In terms of higher education, the State of Mexico is 
slightly below the national mean and well below the DF, which has twice the number of 
students who have received higher education. Similarly, in terms of health, the State of 
Mexico scores lower than the DF and the rest of the country. In 1999, the State of Mexico 
had 56 hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 189 in the DF and a national 
average of 79. Similarly, it had 35 consulting rooms in comparison with 89 in the DF and 
a national average of 89. In terms of doctors, the State of Mexico had 75 per 100,000 
residents in comparison to 257 in the DF and a national average of 117 (Camara de 
Diputados 200 1 a). 
13 Almost 35% of the total population of the State lives in just four municipalities of the metropolitan area. 
These are: Ecatepec (12.4%), Nezahualcoyotl (9.3%), Naucalpan (6.6%), and Tlanepantla (5.5%). 
3.3.1. Public Finances in the State of Mexico 
The evolution of the State of Mexico's public finances has been largely determined by 
constant expansion in the demand for services-resulting from its rapid population 
expansion-and by the process of decentralization that has increased its responsibility for 
providing important services like education, health, and infrastructure. Both of these 
factors have directly impacted the revenue and the spending structures of the State of 
Mexico. 
3.3.2. Revenue in the State of Mexico 
In the State of Mexico, the process of decentralization has had a clear effect on its total 
revenue, which has increased from 5.6% of the State's GDP in 1995 to 8.2% in 2000. 
This increase is mostly due to federal transfers rather than the State's own-source revenue 
because the decentralization of spending responsibilities has been accompanied by a 
corresponding transfer of resources to cover the costs associated with new 
responsibilities. 
Table 3.8: State of Mexico. Proportion of total revenue by source (percent) 
Source: Author, based on INEGI's data. Bolded amounts are totals. 
Compared to the DF, the State of Mexico has not been capable of generating a high 
Own-sourcerevenue 
Taxes 
Fees 
Products 
Aprovechamientos 
Betterment levies 
Participaciones 
Aportaciones 
BudgetaryItem33 
Decent. Agreements 
Other 
percentage of revenue from its own bases. Table 3.8 shows that, on average, from 1990 to 
1997 
5.5 
55.3 
25.2 
8.7 
10.2 
0.4 
43.0 
44.2 
95.5 
4.4 
7.1 
2001, the State of Mexico's own-source revenue accounted for barely over 10% of its 
total revenue. However, taxes and fees are the most important own sources of revenue, 
1990 
16.7 
37.3 
16.7 
14.8 
31.1 
76.1 
0.1 
100.0 
- 
6.8 
accounting for almost 90% of the total. State fees come primarily from the registry of 
2001 
6.7 
55.3 
33.6 
4.9 
5.8 
0.2 
43.6 
45.0 
92.6 
7.3 
4.5 
1998 
7.5 
52.4 
30.2 
7.8 
9.3 
0.1 
48.1 
43.3 
93.8 
6.1 
0.9 
1991 
13.0 
46.1 
32.5 
9.6 
11.6 
64.0 
8.7 
1.8 
98.1 
14.1 
1992 
17.0 
30.7 
25.7 
32.9 
10.5 
53.5 
11.7 
1.3 
98.6 
17.6 
1994 
8.4 
47.9 
35.0 
6.6 
10.3 
- 
42.4 
24.0 
99.6 
0.3 
25.0 
.- 
1999 
7.8 
43.3 
24.5 
23.5 
5.9 
2.6 
46.0 
41.8 
99.2 
0.8 
4.3 
1993 
11.7 
36.2 
27.7 
27.7 
8.3 
45.6 
27.5 
99.9 
0.0 
15.0 
2000 
6.4 
54.2 
31.2 
8.5 
5.7 
0.2 
48.6 
44.9 
95.5 
4.4 
- 
1995 
7.5 
41.3 
31.5 
13.8 
12.6 
0.6 
37.7 
26.4 
99.5 
0.4 
28.3 
1996 
6.2 
47.9 
31.6 
11.0 
8.9 
0.4 
44.8 
27.1 
99.7 
0.2 
21.7 
various public transactions (like properties), license authorizations (mainly for informal 
commercial activities) and transit-related services. During the last few years, this source 
of funding has remained stable, representing only 2.2% of total revenue. Taxes, on the 
other hand, represent a more important own-source of revenue and primarily consist of 
payroll taxes, and more recently, taxes on used and new cars. In 1998 the federal 
government transferred to the states the collection of federal taxes on used vehicles 
(tenencia), and on the acquisition of new vehicles (ISAN). The federal government 
continued to set the rates of these taxes, but states were given the right to keep the entire 
receipts. Concerning the payroll tax, its rate in the State of Mexico is set at 2.5%, one- 
half percentage point higher than the rate in most other states. 
Own-source revenue as a proportion of total revenue in the State of Mexico is rather 
small, but it is at the level of most states in the country. What makes the case of the State 
of Mexico particularly contentious is its actual proximity to the DF. Although it has not 
yet been studied because of the difficulty in accessing data, there is a common belief that 
the State of Mexico loses some of its payroll and vehicle taxes to the neighboring DF. To 
a certain extent, this is likely to be the case, as several firms in the State of Mexico often 
pay their payroll taxes in the DF, where they have their headquarters. This is also true in 
the case of the tenencia, as it is estimated that up to one-third of the vehicle fleet of the 
State of Mexico is registered in the DF (World Bank 2003 and Iracheta 2002). 
Because the own-source revenue of the State of Mexico is unable to finance more than 
10% of its budget, the state depends on federal participaciones and aportaciones. Up 
until 1998, theparticipaciones were the main transfers in the State of Mexico, and they 
were primarily used to cover the governments' current expenses. In 1998, the 
aportaciones were introduced to cover the financing of the decentralized services in the 
areas of education, health, and infrastructure. Since the year 2000, the aportaciones have 
represented a higher proportion of total revenue than the participaciones, and if no 
changes are made, this proportion will remain constant. 
As in the rest of the States, the aportaciones in the State of Mexico are primarily for the 
education and health sectors. On average from 1998 to 2002, the education sector 
(composed of the FAEB and FAETA funds) received 61% of these funds, followed by 
the health sector (FASSA) with 14.4% (Table 3.9). The infrastructure fund, FAIS, 
represents 7.8%, but just 0.9% stays at the state level as the other 6.9% is passed down to 
the municipalities. The Fund for the Strengthening of the Municipalities (FORTAMUN), 
accounts for 13% of the state's total aportaciones, but it is directly allocated to the 
municipalities. 
The increasing demands for public services and infrastructure faced by the State of 
Table 3.9: State of Mexico. Ramo 33 (million of current pesos) 
Mexico as a consequence of its urbanization process have left the State with little other 
option but to rely extensively on the use of debt. For several decades, the political reality 
of the country, together with the regulatory framework for subnational borrowing 
Source: Author, based on INAFED data. 
FAEB: Fund for Basic Education. FASSA: Fund for Health Services. FAIS: Fund for Social Infrastructure. 
FORTAMUN: Fund for the Strengthening of the Municipalities. FAM: Fund for Multiple Purposes. 
FAETA: Fund for Tertiary and Technical Education. FASP: Fund for Public Security. 
2002 
12,249 
3,076 
1,780 
3,017 
417 
374 
249 
21,163 
Average 
9,586 
2,307 
1,257 
2,101 
3 12 
199 
288 
16,05 1 
facilitated the use of credit in the State of Mexico. However, in the year 2000, the system 
% of total 
59.7 
14.4 
7.8 
13.1 
1.9 
1.2 
1.8 
100.0 
FAEB 
FASSA 
FAIS 
- 
FORTAMUN 
PAM 
FAETA 
FASP 
TOTAL 
of subnational borrowing changed, making it more difficult for the State of Mexico to 
1999 
8,108 
1,822 
1,024 
1,855 
257 
3 60 
13,426 
1998 
5,866 
1,204 
678 
865 
208 
8,821 
access new debt. 
Prior to the reform of 2000, the State of Mexico was the most heavily indebted state in 
2000 
10,109 
2,405 
1,279 
2,129 
292 
276 
399 
16,889 
the country in absolute terms. Between 1993 and 1997, it ran substantial fiscal deficits 
2001 
1 1,598 
3,030 
1,525 
2,64 1 
386 
343 
432 
19,955 
that it covered largely by borrowing funds. These deficits accumulated despite a series of 
extraordinary and discretionary transfers negotiated and obtained from the federal 
government. Most of these transfers were made to compensate the state for its very high 
education expenditures, which represented a huge financial burden for the state, as I 
explain below. In addition, on several occasions, namely during the peso crisis of 1995, 
the federal government stepped in to take over some of the state's debt commitments. 
The State of Mexico was able to access credit relatively easy before the reform of the 
year 2000 because it had the implicit-and in various cases explicit-guarantee of the 
federal government. With the reform, however, the federal government introduced a new 
market-oriented system for subnational borrowing that was intended to impose a hard 
budget constraint by canceling the possibility of discretionary transfers and federal 
guarantees. The new system sought to create a real market for subnational borrowing, 
establishing a closer link between the lenders and the capacity of the states to pay back 
their loans. This objective was achieved through a system of credit ratings, based on the 
financial capacity of the states. The new credit rating system, although successful in 
establishing market discipline, has been disadvantageous for the State of Mexico because 
its low ratings prevent it from taking on new loans. 
In addition, the State of Mexico has not been able to increase its own revenues, which 
together with the fact that it lacks control over its federal transfers, has put it in a very 
tight financial position. The state's financial problems continue today and will most 
likely persist as the demand for services and infrastructure continues to grow. This 
situation is not only due to limits on raising more revenue, but also to a series of spending 
rigidities, to which I now turn. 
3.3.3. Expenditures in the State of Mexico 
The decentralization of spending responsibilities in Mexico has been accompanied by 
corresponding transfers of monetary resources that are directly disbursed by the states. 
This explains why from 1989 to 2001 the total expenditures of the State of Mexico 
steadily increased in real terrns from $1,364 pesos per capita to $3,719. Despite this 
increase, the state's budget has various rigidities that have prevented it from releasing 
resources to invest in the services and infrastructure projects that it so urgently requires. 
An unpublished study by the World Bank (2003) estimates that the State of Mexico's 
programmable spending accounts for 75% of its total budget, 60% of which goes to 
education and the rest to health and other infrastructure projects. The remaining 25% is 
non-programmable spending, which goes to servicing its debt (7%) and to municipal 
transfers (1 8%). 
In contrast to the DF, where education represents a minor proportion of its budget, the 
main characteristic of the State of Mexico's spending structure is its very high level of 
spending on education. The rapid demographic expansion and economic growth of the 
state in the past two decades has led to an increase in the demand for education services. 
This has resulted in the largest and most rapidly growing education system in the country, 
with a current student enrollment rate of more than 12% of the total number of students in 
Mexico. The situation has placed the state budget under severe pressure, to the point that 
for every peso spent by the state, more than 50 cents go to the education sector (World 
Bank 2003). 
The State of Mexico's high level of spending on education is a direct consequence of the 
decentralization of the education sector. The story of this decentralization process is a 
long and complex one, but because it is central to understanding the state's finances, I 
provide a brief review. The process of decentralizing the education sector in Mexico 
began in 1 992, when the federal government transferred responsibility for the provision 
of education to the states. At that time, the State of Mexico received funds to pay for 
physical infrastructure, teachers, financial resources, and administrative personnel to 
cover the provision of education. In this process, two education systems began to operate 
at the same time: the state education system, which was already hnctioning in the past, 
and the federalized system, which was being decentralized. 
These two education systems are financed with both state and federal funds. Out of the 
60% of its programmable spending, the State of Mexico covers 24.5% with its own 
revenue, and the remaining 35.5% with federal funds from the aportaciones system. 
Three funds in the aportaciones system cover the expenses of the federalized education 
system: the FAEB, the FAETA, and a segment of the FAM. In addition to the 
aportaciones, the federal government contributes to the State's education spending 
through other means. For example, the federal government covers 50% of the 
construction, payroll, and operating costs of the State's institutions of higher education. 
Also, there are other programs of federal financial support such as OPORTUNIDADES, 
the National Program for Free Textbooks, and the Program to Provide School Breakfasts, 
among others. 
Sources of both federal and state education financing have increased in recent years, but 
the increases have been much higher in federal than in state spending. While from 1995 
to 2001 State spending in education increased 27% in real terms, the increase in federal 
spending reached almost 90%. In fact, the State of Mexico receives the highest absolute 
proportion of federal funding (FAEB) of all the states, but in terms of spending per 
student, it receives the least amount of federal spending. This is because the distribution 
of the FAEB punishes those entities, like the State of Mexico, that invest in their own 
education system, have large populations, and low levels of education and school 
attendance (Ibarra 2003). 
In the decentralization process, federal funds are added to state contributions and 
administered as a single budget, which in principle should simplify budget 
administration, allocation, and control. Although in the past resources were closely 
earmarked by item and project, with the creation of the aportaciones system resources are 
no longer so tightly earmarked. The State of Mexico, however, has not been able to take 
advantage of this flexibility, as more than 95% of federal resources are allocated to 
salaries, 4% to operating costs, and less than 1% to investment (World Bank 2003). 
The coexistence of these two education systems puts substantial pressure on the State's 
budget, as there are various cost duplications in terms of the number of schools, 
bureaucratic structures, etc. Originally, the 1997 Law of Education of the State of Mexico 
mandated the integration of the state and federal educational subsystems into a single 
structure, but this process of integration has proven to be extremely complicated and so 
far incomplete. One factor contributing to this situation is the existence of various 
education unions, whose amalgamation would result in the loss of positions that represent 
union and political power. Also, there has been a series of managerial and technical 
difficulties in building a single education structure out of two distinct organizations, each 
with different salary structures, regulations, promotion schemes, benefit plans, etc. 
In summary, the DF and the State of Mexico have very different revenue structures and 
spending obligations. The DF collects more revenue per capita, is still favorably treated 
by the federal government, and has relatively easy access to credit markets. In terms of its 
expenditures, it does not have the burden of an education budget and has been moving 
away from the financing of mega-proj ects. On the other extreme, the State of Mexico 
collects far less revenue, receives fewer transfers per capita than the national average, and 
cannot easily contract new debt. Also, the state's very large education burden together 
with other budgetary rigidities (debt payments and municipal transfers) prevents it from 
spending on its priority projects. These differences between the DF and the State of 
Mexico are not only present at the state level, but also, as I show in the next section, at 
the local level. 
3.4. Local governments in the ZMVM 
A complete fiscal picture of the ZMVM requires consideration of the public finances of 
its local jurisdictions, in addition to the previously discussed state finances. The ZMVM 
is currently composed of 74 local jurisdictions: 16 delegations in the DF, plus 58 
municipalities in the State of Mexico. Although the delegations and municipalities lie 
side-by-side, they are financially distinct in their revenue sources and expenditures. This 
last section of the chapter completes the fiscal picture of the ZMVM by discussing the 
revenue and spending characteristics of the delegations and the metropolitan 
municipalities. 
3.4.1. Fiscal structure of local governments in the ZMVM 
Municipalities and delegations have different financial and organizational structures. The 
State of Mexico, like all other States in the country, divides its territory into 
municipalities, which constitute the basis of their political and administrative 
organization. Currently the State of Mexico has 122 municipalities, all of which share the 
same legal and structural organization despite their enormous differences in population, 
infrastructure, poverty levels, and revenue-generating capacities. Each municipality is 
governed by an ayuntamiento that is composed of an executive and a legislative branch 
(see Appendix 3). 
Municipalities in Mexico have fiscal autonomy to collect their own taxes and approve 
their own annual budgets. This autonomy, however, is delimited by the state congresses, 
which on a yearly basis approve the law of revenue of the municipalities, oversee their 
budgets, and authorize their borrowings. Moreover, the state congress is responsible for 
the approval of municipal rates for taxes and fees.I4 The municipal revenue sources are 
defined in the federal and state constitutions. Like state finances, municipal revenue 
comes from three main sources: own-source revenue, intergovernrnental transfers, and 
local borrowing. Own-source revenue is generated mostly by taxes and fees, but also by 
fines, products, and betterment levies. ' Also, through intergovernrnental transfers, 
municipalities receive both participaciones and aportaciones. Finally, since the year 
2000 municipalities are increasingly accessing credit markets and using local borrowing 
as a regular source of revenue. 
In contrast to the State of Mexico, the DF is divided into delegations that have limited 
financial autonomy. The DF is a centralized entity and the delegations are administrative 
divisions with narrow tax and spending powers. Delegations receive a majority of their 
l4 Prior to the constitutional reform of 1999, state congresses had broad powers to determine the rates of 
municipal taxes and fees, but the reform gave municipalities the right to propose their rates to their state 
congress, which is still responsible for their approval. In a strict sense, the pre-reform period can be seen as 
one in which municipal taxes and fees were not truly local in the sense that the municipalities did not have 
control over the rates. While this is certainly true, in many cases municipalities (especially the small and 
financially weak ones) did not set their own rates, not because they did not have the right, but because they 
(lid not have the capacity to do so. Even today, many municipalities do not use their right to set rates, but 
instead let their state congress make the decision. However, the bigger and more affluent municipalities 
have benefited from this reform, as they now have greater ownership over their revenue sources. 
15 By fees I mean derechos. Both derechos and products or productos could be classified as user charges. 
While derechos are fees paid in exchange for the provision of public services, productos are revenues that 
municipalities receive for the use and exploitation of their own patrimony, such as the rent or sale of 
municipal properties. By fines, I refer to what it are formally called aprovechamientos, which mainly 
include fines and surcharges, and all other revenues that do not fit in any of the other revenue categories. 
revenue fiom budgetary appropriations authorized by the DF's Legislative Assembly 
(ALDF). The way this works is that the delegates propose a budget to the GDF, which, in 
turn, integrates the annual law of expenditure and submits it to the ALDF for yearly 
approval. Although the delegates participate in the budgetary process by developing the 
original proposal for their delegations, their authority is rather limited because the final 
budgets are entirely decided upon and approved by the central authorities. The budgetary 
appropriations of the delegations represent the highest proportion of their revenues, but as 
I will show, they also have other secondary sources of revenue. Finally, in terms of their 
spending responsibilities, both municipalities and delegations are in charge of the 
provision of a similar array of local public services. 
3.4.2. Local revenue in the ZMVM 
At the local level, there are a number of financial differences among the ZMVM's 
jurisdictions, both between delegations and metropolitan municipalities, and between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipalities. Metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
municipalities have different revenue-generating capacities and expenditure 
responsibilities. This is largely because they have varying populations and levels of 
development (Chapter 2). The metropolitan municipalities have a higher proportion of 
revenue proceeds and spending obligations than the non-metropolitan municipalities. 
More concretely, the metropolitan municipalities account for about three-quarters of the 
total municipal revenues of the State of Mexico, collect 84% of the property taxes, and 
receive about 65% of total transfers (Table 3.1 0). 
Table 3.10: Metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipalities in the State 
I -- Aportaciones 64.81 35.21 195.6) 309.61 224.8 
of Mexico. Main revenue and expenditure accounts ( ~ v e r a ~ e  1989-2000) 
Total revenues 
Property tax 
Participaciones 
Note: The amount of total revenues and total expenditures is accounted for by the aportaciones.'6 
Metro= Metropolitan municipalities, Non-metro= Non-metropolitan municipalities. 
Current 
,Capital 
The concentration of fiscal resources in the metropolitan municipalities comes as no 
surprise, considering their large populations and economic vitality. However, what it is 
surprising is that in per capita terms, the finances of the non-metropolitan municipalities 
are more sound than those in the metropolitan area. As table 3.10 shows, this situation 
results not from differences in the collection of property taxes, but rather from the fact 
that the non-metropolitan municipalities received 40% more participaciones and 60% 
more aportaciones than the metropolitan municipalities. Actually, each person living in 
the non-metropolitan municipalities received substantially more federal transfers than a 
similar person in the metropolitan municipalities. Only a handful of metropolitan 
municipalities received a similar level of transfers per person than the non-metropolitan 
municipalities (Figure 3.1). This difference in the allocation of transfers arises both 
because aportaciones are for the financing of basic infrastructure which is more lacking 
in rural than in urban areas, and because the system ofparticipaciones does not readily 
adjust for cases of rapid population expansion (see Section 4.2.3). 
16 Data on the total revenues and expenditures come fiom INEGI. However, INEGI's data on aportaciones 
are incomplete, so I used the data directly provided by the Unit of Public Investment of the government of 
the State of Mexico. These make the totals reported by INEGI lower than the actual revenue, whlch 
explains why the numbers on total revenue and expenditures do not match. 
Proportion of total (%) 
Source: Author, based on INEGI. 
74.3 
67.1 
Metro 
73.5 
84.0 
67.7 
Real per capita 2002 pesos ($) 
Non-metro 
26.5 
16.0 
32.3 
Metro 
697.4 
99.3 
254.8 
25.7 
32.9 
Non-metro 
731.6 
55.0 
352.5 
- 
361.4 
119.5 
State mean 
706.1 
87.9 
279.9 
340.4 
164.7 
356.0 
131.1 
Figure 3.1 Total transfers per capita in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan
municipalities of the State of Mexico, Avg. 1989-2000
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The contrast in revenue levels between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan
municipalities is also present in their levels of public spending. Because the metropolitan
municipalities contain a higher proportion of people and economic activity than the non-
metropolitan municipalities, they spend three-quarters of the total local budget. However,
in per capita terms, the metropolitan municipalities are worse-off than their non-
metropolitan counterparts. On average, from 1989 to 2000 they received a smaller
amount of total expenditures per capita than the non-metropolitan municipalities.
Similarly, their level of capital spending per person was below that of the non-
metropolitan municipalities; a person in the metropolitan municipalities received 45
pesos less in capital spending than a similar person in the non-metropolitan
municipalities.
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The disadvantages faced by the metropolitan municipalities with respect to the rest of the
State of Mexico become more significant when compared to the public finances of the
delegations of the DF. Metropolitan municipalities and delegations have important
financial differences. The first and most significant is the disparity in their levels of total
revenue. As Figure 3.2 shows, delegations have a much higher level of total revenue than
the metropolitan municipalities. As a result of the process of fiscal decentralization, from
1989 to 2000 total revenue in the metropolitan municipalities grew from $602 to $883
real pesos per capita, a 45% increase (Table 3.12). Despite this increase, local revenue in
the metropolitan municipalities is still below the average total revenue in the delegations.
In the year 2000, for example, total revenue per person in the metropolitan municipalities
was $883 pesos, while the average total revenue for the delegations was $1,283 pesos,
450/0 more than in the metropolitan municipalities.
Figure 3.2: Revenue per capita, DF and Metropolitan municipalities, 1989-2004*
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Source: Author
The data on the DF are from the 1990-2004 average. The Metropolitan municipalities' data are from
the 1989-2000 average.
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Like in the metropolitan municipalities, revenue has been growing in all delegations of 
the DF for the last 14 years (Table 3.1 1). However, because the revenue structures of the 
delegations are so different from those of the metropolitan municipalities, the increase in 
revenue in these two types of local government cannot be interpreted in the same way. 
While in the metropolitan municipalities increases come from any of the municipal 
revenue sources, in the case of the delegations they come from an increase in their 
budgetary appropriations. The public finances of the delegations are centralized in the 
Treasury of the GDF; therefore these increases cannot be attributed to greater collection 
of revenue in the delegations, but only to higher budgetary appropriations, which are 
mostly allocated according to the delegations' populations. According to the DF's Fiscal 
Code (Art. 41 5A) the delegations' budgets should be allocated not only based on their 
populations, but also according to the delegations' poverty levels, urban infrastructure, 
urban services, and commuting population. However, the ALDF argues that budgets are 
allocated on a per capita basis because the GDF does not have official data on its 
commuting population, levels of extreme poverty, and urban services and infrastructure 
(Diario OJicial de la Federacidn. January 3 1,2002 in Hemimdez and Sobarzo 2002). 
Cuajimalpa 1,729 2,075 2,000 3,292 3,071 
CuauhtCmoc 1,154 1,574 2,144 3,457 2,875 
Gustavo A. Madero 528 728 1,124 1,697 1,548 
Table 3.11 : Delegations of the DF. Appropriated budgets per capita 
(Constant 2002 pesos) 
Iztacalco 533 848 1,343 2,038 1,940 
Iztapalapa 400 630 865 1,320 1,174 
Magdalena Contreras 948 1,391 1,456 2,377 2,113 
Miguel Hidalgo 1,111 1,426 2,046 3,105 2,862 
M i l ~ a  Alta 2.693 3.231 3.558 5.038 4.803 
benustiano Carranza 1 9641 1.1861 1,620) 2.6901 2.445 
Alvaro Obreg6n 
Azcapotzalco 
Xochimilco 2,282 2,431 1,358 2,075 2,118 
Distrito Federal 783 1,046 1,283 2,022 1,832 
Source: Author, based on DF's Budgetary Laws, several years. 
2000 
1,020 
1,218 
1990 
653 
772 
1995 
904 
957 
2001 
1,752 
2,046 
2002 
1,603 
1,754 
2003 
1,632 
2,126 
2004 
1,612 
1,814 
Average 
1,094 
1,251 
Change 
8.7 
8.1 
Despite the fact that delegations and metropolitan municipalities have different revenue 
structures, their revenue ultimately comes from similar sources. Therefore, by looking at 
these revenue sources, I can track the origin of the varied revenue levels in the ZMVM. 
Similar to the state level, at the local level the three main revenue sources are own-source 
revenue, intergovernmental transfers, and debt. There is a fundamental distinction 
between own-source revenue in the delegations and in the municipalities, in the sense that 
delegations only collect limited own-source revenue because all of their tax functions are 
centralized in the GDF. Their only own-source revenue comes from the provision of a 
few services that have private characteristics such as child nurseries, parking lots, and the 
renting of land for sports facilities. This revenue represents a minor component of the 
delegations' budgets." In contrast, own-source revenue in the metropolitan 
municipalities represents an important source of revenue; in the year 2000, for example, 
it amounted to 28% of total municipal revenue. 
Although own-source revenue is an important source of revenue in the metropolitan 
municipalities, its importance decreased during the process of decentralization. From 
1989 to 2004, the relative importance of own-source revenue declined by more than 50% 
with respect to the total revenue. In real per capita terns, that decline meant a reduction 
of $140 pesos per person. As can be seen from Table 3.12, most of the decline in own- 
source revenue came from a reduction in the collection of fines, which decreased from 
representing almost one third of total own-source revenue to only 10%. Tax collection 
was stable during the period, maintaining its relative importance at more than 50% of the 
municipalities' own-source revenue. Specifically, property taxes remained constant at 
about 60% of total municipal taxes. 
l 7  There is no available data to calculate the proportion of the total budget that this revenue represents, but 
according to all my interviews, the revenue is negligible. 
In addition to fines, another reason for the decline in the relative importance of municipal 
Table 3.12: Metropolitan municipalities. Revenue per capita and as proportion of 
total (Constant 2002 pesos) l8 
own-source revenue was the increase in transfers during the decentralization period. 
Actually, the most salient financial characteristic of the metropolitan municipalities is 
Change* 
4.5 
(3.6) 
1.6 
0.9 
(0.1) 
12.7 
(7.4) 
7.9 
37.1 
their growing dependence on intergovernmental transfers. While in 1989, metropolitan 
Source: Author, based on INEGI and GEM (2003). The numbers in bold represent proportions of revenue 
sources out of the respective subtotals. * Refers to the average annual rate of change from 1989 to 2000. 
2000 
883.5 
100 
226.3 
27.8 
131.1 
57.9 
79.0 
60.3 
51.1 
22.6 
8.0 
3.5 
25.5 
11.3 
356.2 
43.7 
232.4 
28.5 
municipalities generated almost 70% of their total revenue from their own-source 
1999 
861.9 
100 
246.4 
29.6 
119.6 
48.6 
82.0 
68.6 
82.5 
33.5 
12.1 
4.9 
22.6 
9.2 
364.8 
43.8 
221.2 
26.5 
revenue, by the year 2000 that proportion fell to 28%. By that time transfers 
(participaciones and aportaciones) increased from 30% to more than 70% of total 
1997 
576.1 
100 
230.9 
45.7 
140.0 
60.0 
86.2 
61.5 
45.4 
19.7 
12.7 
5.5 
26.8 
11.6 
274.7 
54.3 
0 
1996 
593.8 
100 
263.7 
52.8 
151.4 
57.4 
132.8 
87.7 
70.6 
26.8 
16.3 
6.2 
17.4 
6.6 
235.9 
47.2 
0 
municipal revenues. In per capita terms that represented an increase fiom $602 real pesos 
1998 
734.2 
100 
261.4 
38.3 
127.7 
48.9 
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82.3 
31.5 
13.9 
5.3 
26.5 
10.1 
290.0 
42.5 
130.7 
19.1 
1995 
531.1 
100 
256.7 
56.7 
151.3 
59.0 
129.3 
85.5 
47.4 
18.5 
14.3 
5.6 
33.9 
13.2 
196.2 
43.3 
0 
Total revenue 
Yo 
Own-source 
Yo 
Taxes 
Yo 
Property tax 
Yo 
Fees 
Yo 
Products 
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Yo 
Participaciones 
% 
Aportaciones 
Yo 
in 1989 to $883 in the year 2000. This high proportion of transfers was the result of a 
1989 
602.7 
100 
365.0 
68.3 
130.8 
35.8 
83.2 
63.6 
99.5 
27.3 
13.5 
3.7 
121.2 
33.2 
169.3 
31.6 
0 
10% increase in the relative weight ofparticipaciones fiom 1989 to 2000, and of the 
creation of the aportaciones, which by the year 2000 already represented one-third of 
total municipal revenue. 
Like the metropolitan municipalities, delegations also have access to transfers, which 
represent a very important source of revenue. Actually, transfers to the delegations are at 
'' Appendix 3 (tables A3.2 to A3.4) presents the data on total revenue and spending per capita and as a 
proportion of the total accounts for all the 122 municipalities of the State of Mexico. 
higher total per capita levels than in the metropolitan municipalities. While in the 
delegations the average level of transfers is above $1,000 pesos per capita, most 
metropolitan municipalities are well below that level (Figure 3.3). This is because of the 
rapid population expansion in the metropolitan municipalities and because in the State of 
Mexico an important proportion of transfers go to the non-metropolitan part of the State. 
Despite the importance of transfers to its delegations, the DF is the only entity that does 
not have a Law of Fiscal Coordination that sets out explicit criteria for the allocation of 
participaciones and aportaciones to the delegations. When federal transfers reach the 
DF's Treasury, a portion is incorporated into the annual budgets of the delegations, 
distributed according to a population criterion. Thus, all transfers that delegations receive 
form part of their annual budgets, with some minor exceptions that are passed directly to 
the delegations according to federal legislation. This is the case with the Fund for 
Municipal Strengthening (FORTAMUN) which comes from the aportaciones system that 
was created in 1998, but has only been received by the delegations since the year 2001. 
This fund was created as part of Ramo 33, with the name of "Fund for 'Municipal' 
Strengthening" (FORTAMUN) and originally the DF was excluded because it does not 
formally have municipalities. In 2001 the DF became a recipient when the name of the 
fund was changed; at the end of the word "Municipalities" the authorities added the 
words ". . .and the Territorial Entities of the Federal District." The transfers that the DF 
receives from FORTAMUN represent 8.3% of the fund's total, and they are distributed 
among the delegations on an equal per capita basis. On average, from 2001 to 2004, each 
person in the DF received $205 from this Fund (Appendix 3, Table A3.5). 
Figure 3.3: Transfers in the ZMVM, Avg. 1989-2004*
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* The data for the DF are only for the year 2004. Data for the metropolitan municipalities are averages
of the years 1989-2000.
Delegations also receive federal transfers from the General Fund of Revenue-Sharing
(FGP) and the Fund for Municipal Promotion (FFM) from the participaciones system. In
the past, the DF's Ministry of Finance was not explicit about how these funds were
allocated among the delegations, but in 2004 it publicized its formula, which specified
that 100°A> of the funds from the FGP and FFM were disbursed on a per capita basis. In
2004, each resident of the DF received $523 from the FGP and $213 from the FFM,
which together amounted to $736 (Appendix 3, Table A3.6). In contrast to the
metropolitan municipalities that receive their participaciones according to mixed criteria
based on population and tax effort (Appendix 1), delegations receive them on a pure per
capita basis. In the DF, no "fiscal effort" criterion can be incorporated into the allocation
formulas because tax collection is currently centralized in the City's Treasury. In addition
to participaciones and aportaciones, delegations receive a percentage of two other
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transfer funds: the Program for Strengthening Federal Entities, PAFEF, and the Fund for 
Infrastructure Investment in Federal Entities,FIES (Interview D). 
A final source of funding for the delegations and metropolitan municipalities is credit. In 
general, local governments in Mexico have not made extensive use of debt as a regular 
source of financing, but in the last few years both delegations and metropolitan 
municipalities have begun to contract debt. The institutional structure for debt 
management as well as the importance of this source of revenue varies substantially 
between delegations and metropolitan municipalities. Municipalities have the legal right 
to contract debt, provided they have the authorization of their state legislatures. Overall, 
municipalities face the same rules and incentives for borrowing as the states (Section 
3.3.2). 
In the State of Mexico, debt regulation establishes that local congresses must approve 
municipalities' debt ceilings as well as the projects to which the credit will be assigned. 
Debt ceilings are set every year when state Congress approves the Law of Revenues of 
the Municipalities. The State of Mexico's legislation maintains the "golden rule'' of 
limiting the use of debt to capital investments. In addition to this requirement, in 
comparison to other states, the subnational credit system in the State of Mexico has a 
number of particularities, which include: (1) a mandate that municipalities present reports 
on their debt standings to the state government every three months; (2) a requirement that 
municipalities request the authorization of the state Congress to use their participaciones 
as collateral; (3) a stipulation that municipal debt must also be authorized by the state's 
executive; and (4) a lack of specification of the limits of municipal indebtedness 
(aregional.com 2002). 
Municipal debt in the State of Mexico was historically kept at very low levels, but in the 
year 2000 this situation began to change with the new system for subnational borrowing, 
which enabled the most fiscally sound municipalities to access credit markets. Although 
one of the goals of the current system of subnational borrowing is to generate transparent 
data on municipal debt, up to now this information has been difficult to access. Through a 
contact in the National Banking and Assets Commission, I was able to gain access to data
that show that by December of2003, the debt obligations of the municipalities of the
State of Mexico amounted to $810 million pesos (US$74 million). Out of this total,
metropolitan municipalities contracted $664 million, and municipalities in other parts of
the State borrowed the remaining $146 million.19
In terms of the allocation of this debt, 38 out of the 122 municipalities of the State are
responsible. Twenty of these 38 municipalities are in the non-metropolitan area of the
State, but they account for only 17% of the total debt. The remaining debt is concentrated
in the metropolitan municipalities. Municipalities with the highest revenue-generating
capacity are the most able to easily access credit markets, so it comes as no surprise that
most of the debt is concentrated in the metropolitan area of the state, particularly in four
of the most developed municipalities that together account for 64% of the total debt (see
Appendix 3, Table A3.8 for a list of debt by municipality). As Figure 3.4 shows, the
municipality of Tlanepantla alone accounts for 35% of the total debt, followed by
Huixquilucan (120/0),Ecatepec (90/0),and Naucalpan (80/0).
Figure 3.4. State of Mexico. Total municipal debt (2003)
o Non metropolitan ($139 million)
o Ecatepec ($75 million)
.llanepantla ($281 million)
II Naucalpan ($64 million)
o Huixquilucan ($97 million)
o Other metropolitan ($153 million)
Source: Author, based on information from the National Banking and Assets Commission.
As in the case of the metropolitan municipalities, delegations have also begun to use debt
as a source of financing since 2001. The process for accessing credit for the delegations is
19 Out of the total amount of debt $257 million was contracted with the development bank BANOBRAS,
and the remaining $552 million with commercial banks.
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Table 3.13: Delegations of the DF. Total debt (Avg. 2001-2004) 
Average Per capita % of Population Margin Index** Index** 
Delegations (million$) (pesos) total -ality* Infrastructure Services 
Alvaro Obreg6n 112.6 163.8 7.6 687,020 - 1.87 -0.6757 -0.4066 
Azcapotzalco 88.4 200.4 6.0 44 1,008 -2.0 1 -0.3009 0.6916 
Benito Jusirez 17.6 49.0 1.2 360,478 -2.45 1.3546 1.6598 
Author's calculations, based on data provided by The General Direction of Public Debt, GDF. 
* CONAPO's index of marginality. The higher the absolute value, the lower the level of marginality. 
** Hernandez and Sobarzo (2002). The urban infrastructure index includes: number of employees in the 
health and education sectors; number of medical units; number of schools; number of libraries; and number 
of public ministry agencies. The urban service index includes: extension of the secondary drainage 
network; number of water registers installed; volume of garbage collection; number of public lights; and 
the extension of the paved streets. 
In comparison with the metropolitan municipalities, delegations manage more debt 
resources. In the year 2003, for example, the total debt of the delegations was almost 
double the total municipal debt. The only exceptions were the four most-developed 
municipalities, which had about the same level of debt as the delegations. In per capita 
terns, delegations have a much higher level of debt than the metropolitan municipalities. 
Excluding the delegations of Benito Juhrez and Cuauhtkmoc, the average debt per capita 
in the delegations is above $100 pesos. In contrast, excluding the municipalities of 
Tlanepantla and Huixquilucan, the level of debt per capita in the metropolitan 
municipalities is well below that level (Figure 3.5). 
different from that in the municipalities, mainly because delegations do not have the right 
to contract debt themselves, but instead the GDF appropriates a portion of its own debt 
for them, without any kind of market-based criteria. Specifically, the delegations submit a 
"technical report" to the Treasury where they specify the amount of money requested and 
the intended use. The Treasury then reviews the projects and adjusts the original request, 
making sure that credit is allocated to capital investments. 
The process for debt allocation in the delegations is based on these technical reports, and 
also on the delegations' absolute population. According to my own calculations, there is a 
very strong correlation between a delegation's average total debt allocation from 2001 to 
2004 and its total population (Table 3.13). Such debt allocation, however, is not 
correlated with either the potential creditworthiness of the delegations, or with any other 
explicit criteria, such as the level of poverty, or infrastructure and service needs. In fact, 
the average allocation of debt from 2001 to 2004 was very loosely correlated with the 
delegations' poverty levels, and was actually negatively associated with their levels of 
service and infrastructure needs (Table 3.13). As a result, not only do the delegations 
with the highest needs receive the lowest levels of debt allocations, but also there is great 
variation from delegation to delegation. For example, in per capita terms, the allocation 
of debt among delegations from 200 1 to 2004 was $17 1, but at the extreme the delegation 
of Milpa Alta received 15 times less debt than Benito Juarez (see Appendix 3, Table A3.7 
for a list of debt by delegation). 
Figure 3.5. Debt in the ZMVM, Avg. 2001-2004*
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Source: Author
* The data on the DF are only for the averages from the years 2001-2004. The data on the metropolitan
municipalities are for the year 2003.
Despite the fact that the delegations manage more debt than the municipalities, they have
been less efficient in their use of debt. The whole system for debt management in the
delegations is removed from the rules of the credit markets-in favor of a more
discretionary allocation of debt-and has made it difficult to ensure that funds are spent on
productive projects. According to the Director of Public Credit of the DF, more ex-ante
and ex-post controls are necessary to ensure that the delegations use the credit as
originally expected according to their original contract-technical reports-with the GDF
(Interview G). In contrast, in the metropolitan municipalities such controls have derived
from the market systems in place, which regulate the overall use of municipal debt.
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3.4.3. Local Expenditures in the ZMVM 
Unlike the system of revenue, where there are substantive differences between 
delegations and municipalities, both types of local governments have similar spending 
responsibilities. Metropolitan municipalities, like the rest of the municipalities in the 
country, are responsible for the provision of an array of local public services, including 
water, sewer, sanitation, lighting, garbage collection, markets, cemeteries, streets, parks, 
and local police. Education, health and infrastructure are largely provided by states, but 
since the creation of the system of aportaciones, municipalities are increasingly engaging 
in the provision of these services, mainly with those related to basic infrastructure (see 
Appendix 3, Table A3.9 for the assignment of spending responsibilities across tiers of 
government in Mexico). 
By and large, delegations are in charge of the same local public services as the 
municipalities, with the notable exception of water, which is mostly managed centrally by 
the "Water System of the DF," a decentralized public entity. Delegations are responsible 
for the following services: public markets, sport facilities, parks and gardens, street 
cleaning, garbage collection, solid waste treatment, street lighting, civic protection, and 
public safety. In addition, delegations are also in charge of building, restoring, and 
maintaining secondary roads, sidewalks, pedestrian bridges, and speed bumps. They also 
participate in the restoration and maintenance of schools, libraries, museums, and cultural 
facilities; and in the promotion and coordination of programs against alcoholism, drug 
addiction, and family violence. 
Concerning the provision of local services, municipalities and delegations have similar 
means of provision, but municipalities have more flexibility. According to national 
legislation, municipalities are "responsible" for the provision of local services; but that 
does not mean that they must "provide" services directly. There are various ways in 
which municipalities provide services, the most common being the direct provision of 
municipal services, provision with collaboration of the State, municipal associations, and 
various forms of privatization. The selection of each of these provision schemes has to do 
both with the characteristics of the municipalities and of the services themselves. 
Unlike municipalities, delegations provide services either directly or concurrently with 
the central authorities of the GDF. Some of the local services that delegations can provide 
concurrently with the GDF are water provision and treatment, sewer systems and 
drainage, street construction, cleaning and maintenance of primary roads, public 
transportation for passengers, civil protection, fire protection, public safety, education, 
and health. Also, in some cases local services are provided by the GDF alone. According 
to the Statute of Government of the DF, there are three cases in which the GDF should be 
in charge of the provision-or concession-of public services. First, when the benefit of the 
services accrues to the whole city; second, when the impact of certain services spreads 
over two or more delegations; and third, when the service being provided at the 
delegation level requires a high level of technical expertise. 
Statistics on local public spending at both the municipal and delegation levels are not 
easily accessible, and those available present highly aggregated information that only 
allows a user to perform a general analysis. No public information is available on the 
delegations' expenditure accounts, and in the municipalities of the State of Mexico, the 
current accounting system only allows a user to distinguish between the most aggregate 
categories of spending2' Because of this situation, in the rest of this chapter I am only 
able to describe the main categories of spending of the metropolitan municipalities. 
;!o For years, INEGI's data on subnational finance reported on municipal spending divided into current and 
capital spending. While problematic, this reporting allowed a comparison of the proportion of current 
expenditures with those targeted to productive investments. Now the INEGI is in the process of changing 
its data tabulator to register the local expenditure data by the "object of spending," which reflects the 
categories of spending. While this is a move in the right direction, it has complicated the analysis of local 
public spending because various mistakes have happened in the process of converting the old data 
categories into the new nomenclature. 
According to Table 3.14, total spending in the metropolitan municipalities increased in 
Table 3.14: Metropolitan municipalities. Spending per capita and as a 
proportion of total2' (Constant 2002 pesos) 
real per capita terms from $603 pesos in 1989 to $884 pesos in 2000. This increase is 
mostly explained by the fact that since 1998, municipalities have begun to receive federal 
aportaciones to finance the provision of basic infrastructure. These spending data suggest 
1999 
861.9 
480.0 
208.2 
173.8 
Total spending 
Current spending 
Capital spending 
Other spending 
that an important proportion of the increase went to current spending (60%), while capital 
1997 
576.1 
359.3 
110.9 
105.9 
Proportion of total 
Total spending 
Currentspending 
Capital spending 
Other spending 
spending only accounted for 20% of the total budget. The difference between capital and 
2000 
883.5 
485.3 
157.9 
240.2 
1998 
734.2 
429.0 
153.8 
151.4 
1989 
602.7 
351.4 
161.1 
90.3 
current spending is a general indicator of the composition of the local budgets, especially 
Avg. 
601.0 
361.4 
119.5 
120.2 
Source: Author, based on INEGI (2003). 
of the portion that goes to cover recurrent government costs and the portion that goes to 
1995 
531.1 
339.0 
76.3 
115.8 
the creation of assets. Despite the fact that this difference allows the user to perform a 
1996 
593.8 
355.4 
111.8 
126.5 
100.0 
55.7 
24.2 
20.2 
100.0 
58.3 
26.7 
15.0 
basic analysis of public spending, it does not provide a measure for assessing the 
100.0 
62.4 
19.2 
18.4 
efficiency of local spending. Although a high proportion of capital spending is often 
100.0 
54.9 
17.9 
27.2 
100.0 
58.4 
--------- 
20.9 
20.6 
100.0 
63.8 
14.4 
21.8 
associated with productive or efficient outcomes, this is commonly misleading, because 
100.0 
58.8 
19.9 
21.4 
100.0 
59.9 
18.8 
21.3 
current expenditures can go to productive uses (e.g., hiring a professional IT technician to 
improve the tax administration systems of the municipality) and capital spending can go 
to waste (e.g., building schools and public buildings that are unoccupied). 
21 For the calculations of this table I followed the guidelines for correlating the old with the new 
nomenclatures, and I integrated the capital and current spending with the following accounts: Current 
spending = personal services (wages and salaries) + general services (office overheads) + equipment and 
inputs. Capital spending = acquisition of goods and properties (machinery, IT support, etc.) and public 
works and social actions (building of infrastructure and development of the commercial, industrial, and 
agrarian sectors). In "other spending" I incorporated the remaining spending categories not easily 
attributable to any of the two other categories. 
In addition, the proportion of current to capital spending alone does not provide for a 
sufficient analysis of the allocation of municipal resources by sector. This is because it is 
difficult to identify which areas represent the highest priorities for the metropolitan 
municipalities, or where they face the highest demands. However, in aggregate terms, the 
previous analysis underscores the difficult financial conditions that the metropolitan 
municipalities are facing. Although in real per capita terms, total expenditures increased 
during the 1990s, if I were to exclude the aportaciones, it would become clear that most 
of that increase came from federal funding and not from the municipalities' fiscal effort. 
This may not always be the preferred pattern of financing, because when federal transfers 
decline, municipalities are left with a low capacity to finance capital outlays. Finally, the 
most worrisome situation is in relation to capital spending accounts. Capital spending 
represents one-fifth of all spending, but it has been decreasing in recent years. In the year 
2000, each inhabitant of the metropolitan municipalities received less capital spending 
than 10 years before, which illustrates the inability of the municipalities to keep up with 
the high demand for public services and infrastructure. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the complex fiscal composition of the ZMVM, which has a 
number of particular characteristics. First, the area operates under five different fiscal 
regimes. Second, the federal government still treats the DF and the State of Mexico 
differently, mostly in favor of the former. Third, these two entities have very profound 
differences, both in terms of their general characteristics and their fiscal compositions. 
Fourth, while the DF is the richest entity in the country, and the only one capable of 
generating more than half of its revenues from its own tax base, the State of Mexico is the 
most highly populated entity, with an increasing level of expenditure needs. Finally, 
although municipalities and delegations have similar assignments of spending 
responsibilities, their organizational structures and financial capacities are different. In 
comparison to both delegations and non-metropolitan municipalities, metropolitan 
municipalities are facing the harshest financial situation, both because they receive the 
lowest transfers per capita, and because they have the highest demands for services and 
infrastructure. 
This discussion of the fiscal condition of the ZMVM complements the political and legal 
analysis of Chapter 2. In this two chapters, I make a diagnosis of a metropolitan area with 
significant complexities, contradictions, and challenges. Fiscally, it is an area that, 
although it operates as a functional unity where people live and work, it is comprised of 
local and state jurisdictions with very different revenue means and expenditure needs. 
The process of decentralization, by increasing the levels of subnational revenue and 
expenditures, has perforce affected the fiscal condition of the ZMVM. However, as I 
argue in Chapter 1, theories of decentralization have not yet begun to explore how such 
increases affect the fiscal condition of metropolitan areas in developing countries. In part 
this has been due to the lack of financial data at the metropolitan level. Having created a 
database on the finances of the jurisdictions of the ZMVM, I will now explore how and to 
what extent the process of decentralization has contributed to the current fiscal condition 
of this area. My data will be useful in investigating whether state intervention has 
equalized the finances of the local jurisdictions, enabling them to provide similar service 
levels, or if on the contrary, it has pushed them apart, increasing the level of fiscal 
fragmentation in the ZMVM. It is to this analysis that the next chapter turns. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALZAITION ON THE ZMVM: 
THE ROLE OF STATE INTERVENTION 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 illustrated the fiscal condition of the Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of 
Mexico (ZMVM). According to that analysis, the ZMVM is formed by a number of 
jurisdictions with very different revenue sources and expenditure needs. This has resulted 
in an area which, despite its functionality as a single territorial continuum, is confronted 
by deep fiscal fragmentation, mainly in the division between a rich pole in the DF and a 
poor pole in the State of Mexico. As I explained in Chapter 1, the process of fiscal 
decentralization in Mexico has consisted of the transfer of spending responsibilities from 
the federal to the subnational governments. From a public finance point of view, this 
process has meant increased federal transfers to states and municipalities, both to make 
up for their weak taxing capacities, and to cover their new spending responsibilities, 
mostly in the areas of education, health, and infrastructure. Because the process of fiscal 
decentralization has affected the revenue sources and the spending responsibilities of 
subnational governments, such a process has perforce impacted the fiscal fragmentation 
of the ZMVM. However, so far it is yet unknown what the characteristics of such an 
impact have been. In this chapter I explore the question of whether the decentralization 
policies of the 1990s mitigated or exacerbated the fiscal fragmentation of the ZMVM. 
Because the focus of this chapter is on the process of fiscal decentralization, I center the 
analysis on the main instrument of this process, that is the system of intergovernmental 
transfers. According to public finance theory (Bird 2000), national governments may use 
intergovernmental transfers to close the gap between revenue means and expenditure 
needs at various levels of government (vertical imbalance) and to compensate for 
inequalities between revenue-raising ability and fiscal needs between different 
governmental units at the same level of government (horizontal imbalance). Using this 
theory as a point of departure, I follow two steps to explore how state intervention, 
through the system of intergovernmental transfers, has affected the fiscal condition of the 
ZMVM. First, I explore the position of the DF, the State of Mexico, and the ZMVM in 
the country's system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, and second, I analyze the 
effect of the system of transfers on the level of fiscal disparity between the jurisdictions 
of the ZMVM. 
Concerning the positions of the DF, the State of Mexico, and the ZMVM in the 
intergovernmental fiscal system, my objective is to explore the question of whether 
decentralization has increased or decreased the availability of revenue in these areas for 
the financing of their increasing expenditure needs. In all circumstances, subnational 
governments face an inevitable vertical imbalance between revenue sources and 
expenditure needs so states use transfers to correct these imbalances (Shah, 1994). The 
state distribution of federal transfers, however, follows national objectives, in which there 
are always winners and losers depending on the characteristics of the system in place. In 
Mexico the process of decentralization has been "symmetrical," meaning that it has been 
applied across the board to all states, regardless of the differences in geography 
development, or technical-capacity. The only exception is the DF, which, being the 
capital of the country, has always received special fiscal treatment from the federal 
government. 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, the DF and the State of Mexico are the two federal entities 
with the most economic and political power in Mexico. Economically, they have the 
highest levels of production. Politically, they represent strategic power enclaves as, for 
example, they have the highest concentration of federal electoral districts in the country 
(36 in the State of Mexico and 40 in the DF). Because of these characteristics, the 
ZMVM represents a special interest for the national government, particularly the DF, 
which for decades has been at the forefront of Mexico's national development. Based on 
this political and economic importance, I hypothesize that the national government has 
given fiscally advantageous treatment to the ZMVM, and that a person who lives in the 
area receives more federal transfers than the average person in the country. In testing this 
hypothesis, I will examine how the national government has aided the ZMVM through 
the system of transfers to finance its expenditure needs, and I will advance a theoretical 
understanding of how fiscal decentralization performs in a context of a metropolitan 
formation characterized by multiple jurisdictions and rapid population growth. 
In addition to the role that transfers play in dealing with the problem of vertical 
imbalances between revenue sources and expenditure needs, transfers also adjust for the 
differences in needs and capacities between different jurisdictions at the same level of 
government--a situation currently referred as horizontal imbalance. In this way, transfers 
also address concerns about redistribution and equity, and are used by governments to 
ensure that jurisdictions provide similar levels of public services, at similar tax rates. 
Thus, in this chapter I also test the effect of Mexico's fiscal decentralization on the level 
of horizontal imbalance in the ZMVM. Particularly, I directly measure the level of fiscal 
disparity between the local jurisdictions of the ZMVM during the 1990s and assess the 
extent to which disparities have resulted from the transfer system in place. Indirectly, this 
exercise tests the degree to which the Mexican transfer system follows a redistributive 
criterion. 
4.2. The ZMVM in the intergovernmental fiscal system 
The fiscal picture of the ZMVM presented in Chapter 3 has resulted-at least in part-from 
the intergovernmental fiscal system in place, which is characterized by the Mexican 
federal government's intervention in the finances of subnational governments. However, 
the degree to which the fiscal fragmentation of the ZMVM has resulted from the transfer 
system still remains an empirical question. Answering this question is not a 
straightforward exercise. Mexico lacks legal recognition of metropolitan areas and this 
has prevented officials from consolidating data on the actual transfers going to the 
ZMVM. Therefore, as a first step, I generated such data, following the methodology that I 
explain below. 
'To calculate the total federal transfers of the ZMVM, I added the total transfers of the DF 
with those going to the metropolitan municipalities. Because the metropolitan 
municipalities are just one area of the State of Mexico, I named this area "Metropolitan 
Zone of the State of Mexico" (ZMEM, for its name in Spanish) to differentiate it fiom the 
non-metropolitan area of the State of Mexico, which will be excluded fiom the analysis. 
To calculate the transfers of the ZMEM, I added the data on the transfers of all the 58 
metropolitan municipalities. However, because data on transfers at the municipal level 
are not always available, for some calculations I took the State of Mexico's annual 
transfer data, and assuming that the State allocates its federal transfers on a fixed per 
capita basis, calculated the proportion going to the ZMEM, according to the total 
population of this area. ' 
In sum, I calculated the transfers of the ZMVM by adding those of the DF with those of 
the ZMEM. Because of the method of the data integration, these data can only be used to 
make comparisons between the ZMVM and other metropolitan areas, and not to analyze 
the allocation of transfers within the ZMVM. Even if the data reflect the transfers of this 
metropolitan area as a whole, the area is composed of two entities that receive very 
different transfer amounts. Therefore, the public finance data of the ZMVM is largely 
driven by the data of the DF, and just slightly affected by the public finances of the 
ZMEM. Thus, even if the analysis shows that per capita transfers in the ZMVM are some 
of the highest in the country, these data do not differentiate between the DF (which 
receives very high transfers per capita) and the ZMEM (which receives very low transfers 
per capita). 
Following this methodology, I study the position of the ZMVM in the intergovernmental 
fiscal system from three different perspectives. First, I calculate the total amount in 
transfers that the federal government distributed to the DF and the State of Mexico fiom 
1980 to 2001, and the proportion of those transfers that went to the ZMVM. This analysis 
focuses on the systems ofparticipaciones and aportaciones, which represented 90% of 
the total subnational transfers in 2001-43 and 47%, respectively (see Appendix 1 for a 
detailed analysis of these transfer systems). Second, I complement the previous analysis 
by looking at the territorial allocation of federal spending in the DF and the State of 
Mexico in the year 2002. Third, I calculate the proportion of transfers that seven other 
- - - - - - - - - 
When I use a different methodology to calculate the transfers of the ZMEM, I indicate that in the text. 
metropolitan. areas in Mexico received between 1980 and 2000, and compare them to the 
transfers received by the ZMVM. 
4.2.1. Allocation of transfers in the ZMVM 
According to my own calculations, since the creation of the National System of Fiscal 
Coordination (SNCF) in 1 980 and until the late 1990s, the ZMVM received more 
transfers per capita than the country average. In 1998 this situation changed and since 
then, total transfers per capita in the ZMVM have been at similar levels as the rest of the 
country (Figure 4.1 .). The evolution of federal transfers in the ZMVM has resulted from 
the combined effect of the two main transfer systems, the participaciones and the 
aportaciones, which I analyze separately. 
The ZMVM experienced severe cuts in the allocation ofparticipaciones during the 
period of study. From 1980 to 2001, it lost 10 percentage points, moving from 3 1 to 2 1 % 
of the total pnrticipaciones in the country.2 This decline resulted from the combined 
effect of theparticipaciones allocated to the DF and the State of Mexico. Since the 
creation of the SNCF, the DF and the State of Mexico have been the two entities 
receiving the highest absolute allocation ofparticipaciones. Until 2002, the DF received 
the highest absolute allocation, but in that year the DF fell to second place and the State 
of Mexico moved to first place. Despite this situation, the coefficient ofparticipaciones 
in the DF has been steadily declining from 23% in 1980 to 11% in 2004. This decline 
largely resulted from a reform to the SNCF in 1989 that changed the formulae for 
distributing the participaciones from a proportional to a compensatory system. This 
means that in 1989 the SNCF stopped rewarding the states with the highest levels of tax 
collection, and began compensating states on a population and tax effort basis. 
Ever since the 1989 reform, the criteria used in the participaciones formulae have been 
disadvantageous for the DF (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description of these formulae). 
The General Fund of Revenue-Sharing (FGP) has three components, none of which favor 
* For this calculation, I considered the total amount ofparticipaciones in both the DF and the State of 
Mexico, not just the part being transferred to the local governments. 
the DF. Component one is allocated according to population, so as other states become 
more populated, the DF loses in this portion of the formula. Component two is allocated 
according to the growth in the collection of "assignable taxes" (federal taxes on used and 
new cars, and a special tax on products and services, which includes gasoline, natural gas, 
diesel, beer, alcoholic beverages, processed tobacco, and water) and because this 
allocation follows the "growth rate" rather than the "absolute collection" of taxes, the DF 
also loses, because it already has a high absolute collection of these taxes. The third 
component is compensatory in that it is inversely allocated to the other two components 
(it is meant to compensate states that score low on the first two components), but since 
the DF still receives more absoluteparticipaciones than most other states, it also loses in 
this component. In the Fund for Municipal Promotion (FFM), which is allocated 
according to the growth rate in the collection of property taxes and water fees in the last 
two fiscal exercises, the DF does not benefit because it already has high rates of 
collection. Finally, the 1989 SNCF reform created a contingency reserve to compensate 
states whose share in the Federal Revenue-sharing Pool (RFP) in a specific year do not 
reach the growth of the RFP in the year 1990. The DF has been entitled to use this 
reserve every single year since the 1989 reform, but because the quantum of this reserve 
is quite small (0.25% of the RFP), and other states are also entitled to this reserve, the DF 
has only received funds in 5 out of the last 14 years. In the other 9 years, the reserve ran 
out of funds (which went to other states) before it could distribute funds to the DF. 
Additionally, in the 5 occasions in which the DF received funds from this reserve, the 
funds only covered about 5% of the difference between its present allocation of transfers 
and what it should have been allocated if the pre- 1990 system were still in place 
(Interview D). 
In contrast to the decline inparticipaciones allocated to the DF, from 1980 to 2004 the 
share ofparticipaciones allocated to the State of Mexico increased modestly, gaining 
around one percentage point in the last twenty years. However, in comparison to other 
states, the State of Mexico is also adversely affected by the current system of 
participaciones. In terms of the General Fund of Revenue Sharing (FGP), like the DF, the 
State of Mexico is also at a disadvantage. Until very recently, the calculation for the first 
component was based on population data from the official census, so there was a lag in 
taking into account the rapidly growing population of the state. In Component two, the 
State of Mexico does not benefit because its tax growth rate is calculated according to the 
growth rate in assignable taxes rather than on the absolute collection. Finally, the State of 
Mexico receives only a small fraction from Component three because it is the state with 
the highest absolute allocation ofparticipaciones, and this component is designed to help 
states that receive a low absolute allocation ofparticipaciones. 
The reduction inparticipaciones in the DF and the State of Mexico becomes more 
profound when analyzed in per capita, rather than absolute terms. In per capita terms, the 
DF receives moreparticipaciones than the average person in the country and the State of 
Mexico receives less than the national mean, but both entities have been consistently 
losing from the current system. While in 1980 the DF received 73% more participaciones 
per person than the rest of the country, by 2001 that comparative advantage declined to 
42%. In the case of the State of Mexico, the situation is even more dramatic. The State's 
per capita allocation decreased from a level 4% below the national mean, to 11% by 
2001. For the ZMVM this combined effect meant that, although from 1980 to 2001 a 
person in this area received more participaciones than the average person in the country, 
the relative advantage declined from a level 44% above the mean in 1980 to 13% in 
2001. 
If in addition to thepavticipaciones, I also take into account the allocation of the 
earmarked transfers or aportaciones, it becomes evident that since the creation of the 
aportaciones system in 1998 the ZMVM no longer occupies a favorable position in the 
federal fiscal system. Between 1998 and 2001 each person in the ZMVM received 15% 
fewer aportaciones ($1,602 pesos) than the national mean of $1,875 per capita (See 
Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Ratio of total transfers per capita vs. national average
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The total amount of aportaciones going to the ZMVM is equal to the sum of the
aportaciones for the DF and for the State of Mexico, which follow very different
patterns. Since the origin of the system in 1998, the State of Mexico has always been the
federal entity receiving the highest absolute allocation of aportaciones, and the DF the
entity receiving the lowest. The State of Mexico receives about 100/0 of the national total,
largely because the most important aportaciones funds cover expenditures related to the
decentralized health and education systems, which as I explained in Chapter 3, are quite
large sectors in the State of Mexico. Despite the fact that the State of Mexico receives the
highest absolute allocation of aportaciones, in per capita terms this proportion falls to the
second lowest allocation of aportaciones in the country, after the DF.
In contrast to the State of Mexico, the DF receives a lower allocation of aportaciones,
representing only 20/0 of the total aportaciones pool. This is because the DF is excluded
from the education (FAEB, FAETA) and infrastructure (FAIS) funds, and because it
began to receive the Fund for Municipal Strengthening (FORTAMUN) three years after
the rest of the states. The DF's exclusion from the federal government education funds,
which are by far the largest funds, has not been arbitrary but results from the fact that the
federal government still covers the budget for the DF's basic education services. The
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federal government covers this budget through a specific budgetary item, called Item 25. 
Note that although Item 25 does not form part of the system of aportaciones (budgetary 
Item 33), it has the same objective as the education funds that go to the rest of the states 
(FAEB and FAETA), so it must be added to the transfers of the DF. Figure 4.1. portrays 
the budgetary allocations of Item 25 as being added to the total transfers going to the DF; 
otherwise, the decline in the transfers of the DF and the ZMVM from 1998 to 2001 
would have looked even steeper. 
While there is a justification for the DF's exclusion from the education funds, there is no 
evident rationale for the DF's exclusion from the FAIS and of its delayed incorporation 
into the FORTAMUN. According to the federal authorities, this is because these funds 
are formally targeted to states and municipalities, and since the DF is a federal entity and 
not a state, and has delegations instead of municipalities, it is not entitled to these funds 
(Interview D). For this reason the FORTAMUN had to change its name to incorporate the 
territorial demarcations (delegations) of the DF before the DF could begin to receive this 
fund (see Section 3.4.2). Beyond these semantic and legalistic formalities, what this 
exclusion illustrates is the controversy around the political economy of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system, and particularly around the way the federal government 
treats the capital city. Unlike in the past, when the federal government provided financial 
support to the capital city, it is currently not in the interest of the federal govemment to 
do so. In the new context of political plurality, channeling funds to the DF would mean 
that the federal government is strengthening the financial position of its main political 
rival, and this goes against any rational electoral strategy. In fact, when I asked a former 
Minister of Finance about the way the federal government approaches the DF's system of 
federal transfers, he mentioned that "whenever possible, the federal govemment tries to 
reduce the flow of resources from the federation to the DF" (Interview A). 
Even though the DF is still excluded from certain aportaciones funds, if the resources of 
Item 25 are included in the calculation of its total funds (as they should be) a person in 
the federal capital receives more aportaciones than the average person in the country. 
However, when this is combined with the low portion of aportaciones per capita in the 
State of Mexico, the result is that a person in the ZMVM receives less aportaciones than 
the average person in the country. In fact, between 1998 and 2001 the national per capita 
mean was $1,875 ($1,280 in the State of Mexico and $1,980 in the DF) .~  In terms of the 
per capita allocation of aportaciones in the ZMVM as a whole, each person received 
$1,602 pesos, which is 15% less aportaciones than the average person in the country. 
In summary, there are two main findings that derive from this analysis. First, the DF has 
received very different treatment than the State of Mexico in the allocation of transfers. 
While a person in the DF has always received more transfers than the average person in 
the country, a person in the State of Mexico received less. This difference has decreased 
dramatically, but not because the State of Mexico has improved its position in the federal 
fiscal system, but because the DF has been receiving substantially fewer transfers than in 
the past. Second, while for many years the ZMVM received special treatment in the 
federal fiscal system, today it receives about the same amount in transfers per capita as 
the rest of the country. Some of the reasons underlying this situation are the continuous 
decline of the DF's participaciones, its exclusion from certain aportaciones funds, and 
the rapid population growth in the State of Mexico. 
4.2.2. Other transfers and federal spending in the ZMVM 
The previous analysis documented the position of the ZMVM in the systems of 
participaciones and of aportaciones, which together represent about 90% of the total 
formal transfers to subnational governments in Mexico. In addition to these two transfer 
systems, there are other programs through which the federal government channels 
resources to the subnational governments. These other programs also affect the quality 
and quantity of service and infrastructure in the ZMVM. In particular, as I discussed in 
Chapter 3, states also receive funds for specific services in the form of decentralization 
agreements and, more recently, from the Program for Strengthening Federal Entities 
(PAFEF). In addition, states also receive federal resources through each line ministry 
3 This figure takes into account the education budget that the federation spends directly in the DF (through 
Item 25); if it is excluded, the DF only received $320 in aportacioizes. 
which, although they are not part of the forrnal system of intergovernmental transfers, 
represent a substantial amount of sectoral spending in each state. 
The PAFEF and the decentralization agreements together account for most of the 
remaining 10% of the formal transfer system. According to my own calculations, the 
ZMVM received 18.2 and 2.9% respectively of the total resources of these programs. On 
average, from the year 2000 when the PAFEF was initiated to 2003, the DF received 9% 
of this program's total funds, and the State of Mexico received 12%. States use the 
PAFEF to cover some of their financial adjustment costs, and for infrastructure 
investments. Assuming that the allocation of the PAFEF in the State of Mexico was made 
on a fixed per capita basis, then in this period, the ZMVM received 18.2% of the total 
resources of the program. Unlike the PAFEF in which almost 1 out of 5 pesos went to the 
ZMVM, funding through decentralization agreements, which are intended to finance 
specific sectors, is not substantial in the ZMVM. On average, from 1998 to 2003 the DF 
received 0.3% of the total funds allocated through decentralization agreements, which 
makes it the entity with the lowest proportion out of all the states. Similarly, the State of 
Mexico only received 3.4% of the total, which means that overall, the ZMVM received 
only 2.9% of the total financial resources flowing to states in the form of decentralization 
agreements. 
Although states do not have much control over territorially allocated sectoral spending, 
this spending is conducted in their territories, and can amount to a substantial proportion 
of the states' public spending. Therefore, taking this spending into account provides a 
comprehensive picture of states' intergovernmental funding. However, because of the 
complexity of tracking the numerous programs through which sectoral spending is 
channeled to states, and due to the difficulty of finding data, public finance analysts do 
not commonly study the territorial allocation of sectoral spending. For this study, I was 
able to take advantage of a data set from the World Bank to calculate the territorial 
allocation of sectoral spending transferred by the federal government to the DF and the
State of Mexico in 2002.4
Because the federal government allocates sectoral spending at the state level, the primary
purpose of these data is to illustrate the contrast between the level of spending in the DF
and the State of Mexico. As a secondary objective, the data allowed me to calculate the
amount of sectoral spending that the federal government transferred to the ZMVM, but
these calculations only provide an order of magnitude, as I allocated the spending on a
fixed per capita basis. The data for this analysis include federal spending on the sectors of
education, health, roads, agriculture, anti-poverty programs (Oportunidades), water, and
electricity.
Figure 4.2. Direct federal spending by sector, 2002
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Source: Author, based on data from World Bank 2004.
My analysis of the sectoral spending levels shows a puzzling contrast between the DF
and the State of Mexico (Figure 4.2). Actually, these are the two federal entities that
received the highest and the lowest allocation of sectoral spending per person in the
country in the year 2002. While an average person in Mexico received $2,460 pesos in
4 I obtained the data set from the preparation of the World Bank project on Mexico's Public Expenditure
Review (2004).
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sectoral spending, in the DF, he or she received $6,800, as compared to $850 in the State 
of Mexico. In other words, a person who lived in the State of Mexico in the year 2002 
received three times less sectoral spending than the country's average person, and eight 
times less than a person in the DF. This enormous difference is mainly accounted for by 
the DF's high level of federal spending in education and health, which is explained by the 
fact that the capital district has the most specialized education and health facilities in the 
country? In addition to the differences in health and education, the State of Mexico has 
very low levels of sectoral per capita spending in virtually all other sectors, fiom roads 
and agriculture to anti-poverty programs (Oportunidades) and water and electricity 
subsidies. I am puzzled as to why the State of Mexico, which has the highest absolute 
number of poor people in Mexico, a significant rural sector and enormous infrastructure 
needs (see Chapter 3), is the state with the lowest level of direct federal spending by 
sector in the country. 
The disparity in the amount of federal sectoral spending in the DF and the State of 
Mexico adds to the already different treatment that these two entities receive from the 
formal system of transfers (SNCF). To determine the combined effect of these direct and 
indirect transfers, I calculated the total amount of spending received by a person in the 
State of Mexico and the DF in comparison to the rest of the population in the country in 
2002. Figure 4.3 presents this total amount of spending in the DF and the State of 
Mexico, together with the national average and the levels of total spending in the rest of 
the states. The figure also includes states' and municipalities' own-source revenue, which 
give an idea of the relative importance of transfers for local public finances. The purpose 
of including the other states in the federation is basically to allow comparison between 
the State of Mexico and various other states that are poorer than the State of Mexico but 
report higher levels of total spending per capita. 
' Various health and education services have benefits that spread through the nation (i.e., health research 
conducted in hospitals located in the DF, TV education channels of national coverage), but because they 
are located in the DF, their budgets are counted as part of the DF's budget. Ideally, the budgets of these 
nation-wide institutions located in the DF should be prorated throughout all states that derive some 
benefits, but data do not allow me to perform such a calculation (see Chapter 3, Note 12). 
Figure 4.3. Geographic distribution of per capita resources, 2002
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The addition of formal transfers (participaciones and aportaciones) to sectoral spending
and state and municipal revenues in each entity underscores the critical financial
condition of the State of Mexico, and its enormous contrast with the DF. After excluding
the State of Baja California Sur, which is the least-populated state in the federation, I find
that in 2002 the DF was the entity with the highest amount of financial resources per
capita in the country, at $15,180 pesos. In contrast, the State of Mexico was the entity
with the lowest amount of financial resources per capita in Mexico, amounting to $4,720
pesos. In other words, in 2002 a person who lived in the DF benefited three times more
from public spending than a similar person who lived across the border in the State of
Mexico. The critical condition of the State of Mexico's public finances stands out not
only when compared with the DF, which is the richest entity in the country, but also
when contrasted with other more similar states. For example, a comparison with the State
of Veracruz, the third-most-populated and fourth-poorest state in the federation, shows
that in per capita terms, Veracruz receives 40% more resources from public spending
than the State of Mexico.
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Government reports only provide information on the total amount of public spending at 
the state level (Figure 4.3), so this level of data aggregation does not allow me to 
precisely calculate temtorial spending in the ZMVM. However, if I make the extreme 
assumption that all public spending in the State of Mexico is allocated on a fixed-per- 
capita basis, then my calculations show that in the year 2002 the ZMVM as a whole 
controlled 23% of the total public financial resources in the country. Out of this total, the 
ZMVM received 49% of all state revenue, 1 1 % of municipal revenue, 2 1 % of 
participaciones, 1 1 % of aportaciones, and 2 8% of direct federal spending by sector. 
These numbers reveal that despite the decline in formal transfers of the ZMVM, this area 
still controls one quarter of the total public spending in the nation. Although most of this 
revenue comes from its own fiscal bases, it continues to be the recipient of substantive 
proportions of intergovernmental revenues. Notice, however, that this last calculation for 
the ZMVM is the result of aggregated data from two federal entities with very contrasting 
revenue levels, so this calculation is only a partial representation of the fiscal reality of 
the ZMVM as a whole. 
4.2.3. Intergovernmental transfers in a metropolitan context 
In the previous sections I compared the transfers of the DF with those going to the State 
of Mexico, and provided a broad metropolitan-wide analysis of the ZMVM. This analysis 
was of a broad nature because the available data only allow for the aggregation of the 
public finances of the DF and the metropolitan municipalities in calculating the finances 
of the ZMVM, rather than the calculation of specific transfers of the ZMVM. By 
calculating the transfers of the ZMVM this way, I was able to make a statistical construct 
for this metropolitan area. However, such a construct does not allow me to analyze the 
internal distribution of transfers within the ZMVM because, in reality, each jurisdiction 
(DF and ZMEM) receives and spends its own federal transfers. Despite this limitation, 
the statistical construct of the ZMVM is useful for making comparisons between the 
ZMVM and other metropolitan areas. 
As I explained in Chapter 1, decentralization and public finance theory have not given 
much attention to the fiscal implications of metropolitan formations in developing 
countries. Consequently there is not yet an analytical framework that I can use to test the 
fiscal impact of decentralization on the ZMVM. Thus far, I have conducted this test by 
exploring the public finances of the ZMVM's jurisdictions and by comparing them to the 
national average. This exercise, however, does not allow me to discern if the observed 
fiscal impact on the ZMVM results from a deliberate strategy of the national government 
to reduce fiscal transfers to the ZMVM, or if it is part of the overall process of fiscal 
decentralization in Mexico. Because the process of fiscal decentralization in Mexico has 
been symmetrical, treating all the states equally, I hypothesize that the federal 
government's fiscal policy treated other metropolitan areas in a similar manner as it 
treated the ZMVM. Such analysis helps to put the situation in the ZMVM into 
perspective, and to further the understanding of the redistributive nature of the SNCF. 
To test my hypothesis, I compare the allocation ofparticipaciones and aportaciones to 
the ZMVM from 1980 to 2000 with those allocated to the seven other metropolitan areas 
in the country with more than one million people. These metropolitan areas, together with 
their corresponding populations, are: Guadalajara, 3,49 1,540; Monterrey, 3,3 1 1,470; 
Puebla, 1,346,176; Leon, 1,333,576; Tijuana, 1,275,78 1 ; Ciudad Juarez, 1,217,818; and 
Toluca, 1,140,9 12. Like the ZMVM, all of these metropolitan areas are formed by an 
agglomeration of local jurisdictions, with the difference that none of them cross state 
boundaries. The overall results of this comparison show that the pattern of the federal 
distribution of transfers in the ZMVM is similar to that of other metropolitan areas in the 
country. These results can be directly interpreted as a manifestation of the symmetrical 
nature of the SNCF that has had a redistributive effect on the public finances of the 
country as a whole (Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4. Participaciones per capita vs national mean
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The allocation of participaciones to the metropolitan areas from 1980 to 2000 shows a
clear pattern of convergence towards the national mean, underscoring the redistributive
nature of the Mexican system ofparticipaciolles. The ZMVM followed a trend similar to
that of other metropolitan areas whose allocation of participaciones per capita was above
the average of the country. During these two decades, the metropolitan areas of Tijuana
and Monterrey, in the north of the country, received more participaciones per capita than
the ZMVM, and their participaciones steadily declined at an even faster rate (measured
as the annual rate of change) than in the ZMVM. While Monterrey experienced a
negative annual rate of change of almost 2% from 1980 to 2000, and Tijuana a rate of
1.6%, the participaciones per capita in the ZMVM declined at an annual rate of 1.3%.
While the ZMVM, Tijuana, and Monterrey, which received more participaciones per
capita, decreased their amounts over the entire period, the areas of Leon and Puebla,
which were below the mean, increased to a level similar to the average per capita
allocation in the rest of the country. The metropolitan areas of Toluca, Ciudad Juarez and
Guadalajara, whose participaciones per capita were close to the national average in 1980,
experienced slight declines during the following two decades, but stayed close to the
national mean.
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For the calculations in Figure 4.4, I assumed that states where the metropolitan areas are 
located allocate theirparticipaciones evenly throughout their whole territory, and I 
calculated the allocations to these metropolitan areas on a fixed per capita basis. 
However, if instead of considering the total amount of Stateparticipaciones, I calculate 
the actual participaciones received by the municipalities in these metropolitan areas, then 
I find a very similar trend of convergence towards the national mean fiom 1989 to 1999.~ 
In this case, the ZMVM, Monterrey and Tijuana were the metropolitan areas that 
received the highest amount ofparticipaciones per capita, but they also steadily lost their 
advantage with respect to the rest of the country. The metropolitan area of Guadalajara 
was also above the national mean, receiving an average of 30% more than the rest of the 
country. Leon and Puebla were still the least favorably treated metropolitan zones, but 
they increasingly moved toward the national mean. The metropolitan areas of Cd. Juarez 
and Toluca received about the same participaciones per capita as the rest of the country. 
Table 4.1. Ratio ofparticipaciones per capita of selected metropolitans areas vs. the 
national mean 
Similarities in the pattern ofparticipaciones allocation exist not only between the ZMVM 
and some of the other metropolitan areas in the country, but also between the amounts 
Metropolitan 
Zone 
Tijuana MZ 
Cd. Juarez MZ 
Leon MZ 
Guadalajara MZ 
Toluca MZ 
Monterrey MZ 
Puebla MZ 
ZMVM 
allocated to the metropolitan areas and the average for their respective states. According 
Source: Author, based on data from INEGI. 
* Refers to the State of Mexico only. 
1999 
0.79 
0.84 
0.93 
1.32 
1.36 
1.51 
1.40 
2.44 
to my own calculations, the ZMVM together with the metropolitan areas of Cd. Juarez 
ti The main difference between this and the previous calculation is that in the previous calculation I 
assumed that states distribute 100 of their participaciones to municipalities, while in this calculation I only 
include the actual participaciones received, which are about 20% of the total state participaciones. Notice 
that for the case of the DF, because it is not known what proportion of its participaciones are distributed to 
the delegations, I assumed an allocation of 20%, the minimum established by law for the rest of the states. 
Avg. 
1.61 
0.99 
0.91 
1.31 
0.99 
1.54 
0.84 
2.44 
1989 
1.91 
0.97 
0.76 
1.29 
0.89 
1.93 
0.73 
2.90 
Nationallstate 
mean 
1.05 
0.82 
1.04 
1 .OO 
1.08 
0.89 
1.01 
0.91* 
1990 
2.03 
1.15 
0.73 
1.28 
0.86 
1.73 
0.73 
2.78 
1995 
1.68 
0.82 
1.02 
1.32 
0.97 
1.43 
0.68 
2.02 
1997 
1.57 
0.89 
1.03 
1.38 
1.11 
1.47 
0.76 
2.61 
1996 
1.39 
0.76 
0.88 
1.20 
0.94 
1.19 
0.74 
2.23 
1998 
1.71 
0.70 
1.01 
1.36 
1.19 
1.58 
1.07 
2.43 
and Monterrey are the only three areas that receive a lower per capita allocation than their 
respective states, meaning that there is not always an urban bias in the distribution of 
participaciorzes in the country (see Table 4.1). In fact, it appears that in cases of rapid 
urbanization, the system of transfers does not automatically adjust to compensate for the 
rapid population expansion. This happens mostly because there is a lag in the 
incorporation of the data on the increasing population into the formulae. 
In order to present a thorough comparison of the transfers of the ZMVM with those of 
other metropolitan areas, I made a number of additional calculations on the distribution of 
aportaciones by metropolitan area. The overall result of these calculations is that the low 
proportion of aportaciones per capita in the ZMVM is also present in six out of the seven 
other metropolitan areas (Table 4.2). This result is not completely surprising as many of 
the aportaciones funds finance basic infrastructure projects located in the poorer, more 
rural parts of states, and because the costs of service provision can be quite high in rural 
areas.' Concerning the comparison of the allocation of aportaciones in the ZMVM and 
the rest of the metropolitan areas, when I take the total aportaciones into account, the 
ZMVM receives the lowest allocation, mostly because of the DF's exclusion from the 
education funds.* However, when I correct this exclusion by adding the resources that the 
federal government spends directly on education in the DF (Item 25), the ZMVM 
becomes the metropolitan area with the highest allocation of aportaciones per capita, 
with each person receiving 50% more than the average person in the country (see the two 
numbers in parentheses on Table 4.2). 
' In the provision of education services in the State of Mexico, for example, there is an agreement with the 
Teachers Union that forces the state to pay higher salaries to teachers in the rural than in the urban 
educational districts. 
For this calculation I distributed the total aportaciones in direct proportion to the population of the 
metropolitan areas. 
Table 4.2. Allocation of aportaciones in real per capita 2002 pesos and as a ratio of 
the national average in selected metropolitan areas (avg. 1998-2002) 
All Funds 
Pesos per capita I Ratio 
- -  - 
Tijuana 
Ciudad Juarez 
Leon 
Guadalajara 
Toluca 
Source: Author, based on data from INAFED and Camara de Diputados (2003). 
* Includes Budgetary Item 25 that covers the federal education expenses in the DF. 
FAIS and FORTAMUN 
Pesos per capita 1 Ratio 
Monterrey 
Puebla 
ZMVM 
If instead of considering all the aportaciones funds together and allocating them on a per 
1,930 
1,687 
1,489 
1,445 
1.318 
capita basis according to the population of the metropolitan areas, I only consider the two 
funds for which municip a1 information is available (FAIS and FORTAMUN), then the 
1,486 
1,623 
899 (2.5781" 
ZMVM appears to be favorably treated. In this case, the ZMVM is the only metropolitan 
1.10 
0.97 
0.85 
0.83 
0.75 
area that receives more aportaciones per capita than the national average. This situation 
0.85 
0.93 
0.51 (1.49)" 
is a direct consequence of the DF's inclusion in the distribution of the FORTAMUN in 
2001. Since that year, the DF has received about 10% of the fund's total national 
202 
176 
224 
223 
239 
resources. 
0.83 
0.9 1 
0.88 
0.88 
1 .OO 
2 13 
259 
301 
In summary, the comparison of transfer allocations among metropolitan areas confirms 
0.8 1 
0.98 
1.59 
my hypothesis that the observed fiscal impact on the ZMVM is the result of the overall 
process of fiscal decentralization in Mexico. The ZMVM receives similar fiscal treatment 
from the national government as the other metropolitan areas. In respect to the rest of the 
country, the ZMVM has experienced a decline in its level of federal transfers. However, 
when compared to other metropolitan areas, my analysis shows that there is nothing 
special about this decline, as it is also occurring in other highly populated metropolitan 
areas. Actually, the ZMVM's situation is less critical than other metropolitan areas that in 
the past also received transfers far above the national mean. For example, Tijuana and 
Monterrey not only received less aportaciones per capita during the period of study, but 
also experienced a more rapid convergence of theirparticipaciones toward the national 
mean. 
It is important to note that the objective of the calculations in this section and the two 
previous sections is to document the level of vertical fiscal imbalance in the ZMVM, and 
not to make any normative statement about the "fairness" of the transfer system in 
Mexico. According to my findings, the ZMVM is currently worse-off than before, but 
fiom a national perspective this means that the current system of transfers is 
redistributive. Although this redistribution does not directly benefit the ZMVM, it is 
beneficial from a national perspective because it addresses the problem of regional fiscal 
inequalities. This strategy is congruent with public finance theory, in which transfers are 
a tool for governments to push for national objectives, beyond the interest of specific 
states. 
4.3. Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal disparity within the ZMVM 
So far, the analysis has focused on how state-lead intervention, through the transfer 
system, affected the fiscal condition of the ZMVM during the decentralization process of 
the 1990s. According to this analysis, during this period the ZMVM constantly received 
lower transfers, to the point that currently a person in this area receives less transfers than 
the average person in the country. However, this applies to the ZMVM as a whole 
without differentiating the impacts of fiscal decentralization policies on the constituent 
jurisdictions of this area. Because the ZMVM is comprised of very diverse jurisdictions, 
it is to be expected that fiscal decentralization policies had a differentiated effect on these 
jurisdictions and, consequently, on the level of fiscal disparity within the ZMVM. 
According to the theory of metropolitan finance reviewed in Chapter 1, the differences 
among jurisdictions' tax and spending levels arise fiom a spatial misallocation of 
resources. The fiscal picture presented in Chapter 3 illustrates the uneven distribution of 
resources between the DF and the State of Mexico, which has directly contributed to the 
tax and spending differentials of the ZMVM's jurisdictions. In such a context, poor 
jurisdictions have little alternative but to increase their tax rates or reduce their spending 
levels. Due to the weak tax bases in poor jurisdictions, they often opt for the latter, 
thereby reducing the provision of public services, which in turn reinforces the unequal 
distribution of resources in the metropolitan area. In this situation of horizontal 
imbalance, which characterizes the current condition of the ZMVM, public finance 
theory argues that states may use their redistributive powers to intervene through the 
transfer system in order to help mitigate the differences in needs and capacities among 
jurisdictions. Based on this theory, I hypothesize that federal transfers have mitigated 
fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 
To test this hypothesis, in this last part of the analysis I explore the effects of 
decentralization on the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. In particular, I examine the 
conditions under which fiscal decentralization policies mitigated or exacerbated the level 
of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM during the 1990s. I begin the analysis by measuring the 
level of fiscal disparity in the 1990s, and then I assess the extent to which the system of 
transfers accounts for the observed level of fiscal disparity. 
4.3.1. Transfers and fiscal disparity in the ZM VM 
Following the literature on fiscal disparity in the United States, I begin with an analysis 
of the difference in total spending per capita between the DF and the metropolitan 
municipalities of the State of Mexico (ZMEM). As already noted, the DF and the 
metropolitan municipalities have very different levels of wealth and economic activity. 
As such, it is not surprising that total spending per capita is higher in the DF than in the 
metropolitan municipalities. During the 1990s, a person in the DF received one-third 
more public spending than a similar person living across the border in the metropolitan 
municipalities (Table 4.3). To compare the differences in total spending between the DF 
and the metropolitan municipalities, I measured the ratio of central city spending to 
outside central city spending (CC-OCC), following the ACIR (1973) and Bahl et al. 
(1 992) methodology. As I discussed in Chapter 1, this measurement is a simple ratio in 
which the numerator is the per capita spending (or, alternatively, transfers and taxes) of 
all the local governments of the central city area (DF), and the denominator is the per 
capita spending of all the local governments (metropolitan municipalities) outside the 
central city area (ZMEM). 
During the 1990s both the DF and the metropolitan municipalities increased their per 
Table 4.3. DF and ZMEM: Total spending per capita (Constant 2002 pesos) 
capita spending, but because the former experienced higher increases than the latter, the 
CC-OCC disparity ratio increased during the period. While in 1990 the total amount of 
spending per person in the DF was 18% higher than in the metropolitan municipalities, 
Source: Author, based on data fiom INEGI. 
DF 
ZMEM 
Ratio 
1994 
1,133.7 
732.1 
. 1.55 
by the year 2000 that difference grew to almost 50%. Despite this increase in fiscal 
1990 
783.0 
663.5 
1.18 
1991 
993.9 
673.5 
1.48 
disparity, the figures on total spending per capita alone do not allow me to assess the 
1995 
1,046.5 
531.1 
. 1.97 
extent to which this increase resulted fiom the fiscal decentralization policies. This is 
1992 
993.1 
685.9 
1.45 
because the total spending of the ZMVM's local jurisdictions comes fiom a number of 
1993 
1,002.4 
771.4 
1.30 
1996 
974.4 
593.8 
. 1.64 
revenue sources including transfers and own-source revenue. Thus, in order to assess the 
impact of fiscal decentralization I need to examine the CC-OCC ratios of transfers alone. 
1997 
1,182.1 
576.1 
, 2.05 
The disparity in transfers between the DF and the metropolitan municipalities decreased 
during the 1990s, underscoring the redistributive nature of the transfer system. Because 
the structure of public finances in the DF is still centralized, I cannot use the available 
data to show the amount of transfers that are allocated to each delegation. Therefore, I 
calculated the allocation of transfers based on two differing assumptions: one, that 
delegations received 20% and the other that they received100% of DF's total transfers. 
These are sensible assumptions considering that 20% is the minimum set by law for the 
rest of the states. Under both assumptions, my results show that the level of disparity in 
transfers per capita between DF and the metropolitan municipalities declined during the 
1990s (Table 4.4). 
1998 
922.3 
734.2 
. 1.26 
1999 
1,147.7 
861.9 
. 1.33 
2000 
1,283.3 
883.5 
. 1.45 , 
Table 4.4. DF and ZMEM: Total Transfers (participaciones and aportaciones) 
Source: Author, based on data from INEGI (2004). 
To calculate the actual level of fiscal disparity between the transfers of the DF and those 
of the metropolitan municipalities, I used the available data on transfers in two main 
ways. First, I considered the real allocation of transfers to the metropolitan municipalities 
from 1990 to 2000, and I assumed that the DF distributed to its delegations 20% of its 
t~tal~art icipaciones.~ Second, I took into account the total transfers of the State of 
Mexico and calculated the proportion received by the metropolitan municipalities 
according to their populations. In addition, I assumed that 100% of the transfers of the 
DF reached the delegations. 
Each of these sets of calculations has strengths and weaknesses. In the first calculation, I 
focus on the actual transfers that the municipalities received, but I had to make an 
assumption about the amount of transfers reaching the delegations. In the second set of 
calculations, I take into account all the available data on transfers, both at the municipal 
and state levels, but I assume that these transfers are equally allocated on a per capita 
basis. This last assumption complicates the analysis of the metropolitan municipalities in 
two fundamental ways.10 First, it overlooks the non-population (formal and discretional) 
criteria that governments follow in allocating transfers. Second, by only relying on a 
population criterion, I ignore any potential territorial bias in the allocation of transfers, as 
This is a sensible assumption considering that 20% is the minimum set by law for the rest of the states. 
However, I also made these calculations assuming a higher (30%) and a lower (10%) proportion of 
participaciones, and in both cases, I found that the level of disparity decreased. 
lo This is not so problematic for the DF because, after all, most of the transfers are distributed throughout 
its whole territory. 
I assume that a person in a metropolitan municipality receives the same in transfers as a 
person in the rural part of the state, which is not the case. Beyond these problems, what 
emerges from my analysis is that both calculations unambiguously show a decline in the 
level of disparity in transfers both to the DF and to the metropolitan municipalities from 
1989 to 200C). 
From 1989 to 2000 transfers to the metropolitan municipalities and the DF increased, but 
more in the former than in the latter. As a consequence, the disparity ratio decreased, both 
because of the overall reduction in the DF's transfers and as a result of the creation of the 
aportaciones system in 1998. While the decline in the DF's transfers explains the 
reduction fiom 1989 to 1997, the creation of the aportaciones system accounts for the 
high level of equalization that took place from 1998 to 2000, and that has taken place 
since then. When assuming that all transfers are allocated on an equal per capita basis, I 
show that while in 1989 a person in the DF received one and a half more transfers per 
capita than a similar person in the metropolitan municipalities, by 2000 that difference 
declined by half. This result is important because by including all the aportaciones funds, 
it shows that in various spending areas (i.e., health, education, and infrastructure) 
transfers are reducing the gap between the DF's delegations and the metropolitan 
municipalities. Despite this reduction, however, the level of disparity is still high: 70% 
more transfers are allocated to a person in the DF than to a similar person in the 
metropolitan municipalities. 
If instead of assuming that all state and local transfers are allocated to the municipalities 
and the delegations, I only consider the actual transfers that reached these local 
governments, the reduction in the disparity ratio is even greater (Table 4.4). From 1989 to 
2000 the level of disparity declined by almost two times. As in the previous set of 
calculations, I find that the decrease experienced from 1989 to 1997 was mainly due to 
the reduction in the DF's participaciones, and the even steeper decline from 1 998 to 2000 
was caused entirely by the exclusion of the delegations fiom some of the aportaciones 
funds. 
In order to complement the previous calculations, and to further test the effect of transfers 
on fiscal disparity, I correlated the transfers of municipalities and delegations with their 
corresponding GDPs. In all cases, the correlation was negative, meaning that transfers are 
inversely allocated to the wealth of the jurisdictions, which again provided evidence for 
the redistributive nature of the transfer system. In the case of the metropolitan 
municipalities, the correlation in the year 2000 was -0.37. The strength of the correlation 
is higher in the aportaciones (-0.50) that in the participaciones (-0.32), which comes as 
no surprise considering that several aportaciones funds specifically target poor areas. For 
the DF, because actual data on theparticipaciones that reach the delegations do not exist, 
I assumed that these are allocated using the same proportion as the rest of the budget 
(which is primarily based on population) and found a negative correlation of -0.17. For 
the aportaciones, I analyzed the allocation of the FORTAMUN fund, which is the only 
fund that specifically targets the delegations (also on a per capita basis), and found a 
negative correlation of -0.18. Thus, as all these data show, transfers have a redistributive 
effect both in the DF and in the metropolitan municipalities. 
In summary, all my calculations illustrate the redistributive nature of the transfer system. 
The results of Table 4.4, despite measurement problems, show that the disparity in the 
allocation of transfers in the ZMVM is declining. These results are also supported by the 
negative relationship between GDP and transfers in the local jurisdictions of the ZMVM. 
Together, these findings unambiguously support my hypothesis that state intervention 
through the transfer system has followed redistributive objectives and has reduced fiscal 
disparities in the ZMVM. 
4.4. Conclusion 
There are three main conclusions in this part of the analysis. First, the DF and the State of 
Mexico receive very different amounts in federal transfers; second, the ZMVM is no 
longer a winner in the federal fiscal system; and third, transfers have had an equalizing 
effect on fiscal disparities within the ZMVM. These three conclusions point to the 
redistributive nature of the intergovernmental transfer system. From a national 
perspective this shows how state intervention has enabled a more balanced system of 
regional development. While such intervention has served national objectives, it has 
caused some areas to be net losers from the redistribution system. In particular, the 
current situation does not present a very optimistic picture for the ZMVM. Federal 
transfers have decreased while the demand for spending on services and infrastructure 
has been on the increase. In addition, despite the horizontal equalization of transfers, rich 
tax bases continue to concentrate in one part of the metropolitan area (DF) while most 
service demands fall in the other part (the metropolitan municipalities) with the lowest 
revenue-generating capacity. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesized that because of the economic and 
political importance of the ZMVM at both the local and national levels, this area must 
have been a winner in Mexico's intergovernmental fiscal system (i.e., that transfers per 
capita are above the national mean). According to this analysis, my hypothesis was only 
partially verified, as this area is made up of two entities with very different financial 
conditions. Although the State of Mexico receives the highest absolute allocation of 
transfers, due to its very high population, it receives the lowest per capita amount of both 
transfers and total financial resources in the country (Figure 4.3). Conversely, the DF is 
still the federal entity with the highest amount of financial resources per person, and one 
whose transfers per capita were above the national average for almost two decades. 
However, the policies of fiscal decentralization of the 1990s have adversely affected the 
finances of the DF, to the point that nowadays this entity is far from the financially 
advantageous position it once held. 
The decline in transfers to the DF has reduced the fiscal gap between this entity and the 
State of Mexico (Figure 4.1). However, when in addition to the own-source revenue I 
consider the direct sectoral spending, the financial fragmentation between the DF and the 
State of Mexico becomes immense (Figure 4.2). This comparison between the DF and the 
State of Mexico shows a metropolitan area composed of the two entities that respectively 
receive the lowest and the highest amount of financial resources per person in the 
country. This not only explains why the DF's residents enjoy a very different quality and 
quantity of services and infrastructure than residents of the State of Mexico, but it also 
underscores a number of problems associated with a federal fiscal system that treats very 
differently two entities, that for many practical matters, only differ from the fact that they 
are separated by a territorial boundary. 
The second conclusion derives from an understanding of the ZMVM as an independent 
unit of analysis, rather than seeing the DF and the State of Mexico as two separate 
entities. Although the fiscal analysis of the ZMVM is largely a statistical construct-and 
will remain this way until a metropolitan body with autonomous tax and spending powers 
is created-using a comparative analysis aids in understanding the position of ZMVM in 
the fiscal system, both with respect to the rest of the country and to other metropolitan 
areas. In comparison with the rest of the country, the ZMVM shows a continuous 
tendency to converge towards the national mean. While for many years people in this 
area received more transfers than the average person in the country, since 1998 (with the 
creation of the system of aportaciones) they have received fewer. In comparison to other 
metropolitan areas, the ZMVM receives similar fiscal treatment from the national 
government to that of other metropolitan areas. This is evidence that Mexico's process of 
fiscal decentralization has been symmetrical, and that there is nothing special about the 
way in which the federal government treats the ZMVM in comparison to other highly 
populated metropolitan areas. 
The third conclusion is that the redistributive effect of transfers that is observed in the 
vertical allocation of transfers to states is also present in the horizontal distribution of 
transfers across local jurisdictions within the ZMVM. According to public finance theory, 
higher levels of government may use transfers to compensate for inequalities between 
revenue-raising ability and fiscal needs among units at the same level of government. 
Consistent with this theory, my analysis found that the level of fiscal disparity in the 
allocation of transfers in the ZMVM decreased by more than 50% during the 1990s. This 
means that the distribution of transfers within the ZMVM is becoming more equal. 
From a national perspective my conclusions add evidence to claim that the 
intergovernmental transfer system has redistributive results. According to public finance 
theory, one main function of national governments is to undertake redistributive policies 
in order to attain national goals (Musgarve 1973). Consistent with this theory, the 
Mexican national government has intervened in order to address the problems of regional 
fiscal inequalities in the country. However, from the point of view of the ZMVM, this 
state intervention has not been advantageous as it has not been benefitting from the 
current National System of Fiscal Coordination. Actually, my conclusions paint a very 
dismal picture for the ZMVM. This area is losing the comparative fiscal advantage that it 
once had, at a time when demands for services and infiastructure on both sides of the 
border are rapidly increasing. Additionally, the jurisdictions that comprise the ZMVM 
have very different fiscal capacities and differing levels of services and infrastructure. 
The combined effect of these two realities compromises the fiscal sustainability of this 
metropolitan area. Suffice to say that a recent report by the National Council of 
Population (CONAPO) argues that 4.5 million people who live in conditions of high and 
very high levels of marginality are concentrated in the ZMVM, 75% of whom live in the 
metropolitan municipalities (Reforma June 26,2003). 
According to my analysis, state intervention through the system of transfers has partially 
solved this horizontal imbalance by creating a more equal distribution of transfers among 
the local jurisdictions of the ZMVM. Despite the redistributive effect of these transfers, it 
should be noted that this has not been sufficient to equalize the fiscal disparities of the 
ZMVM entirely. According to Table 4.3., fiscal disparity in total spending per capita 
increased during the period of study. This means that the redistributive nature of the 
transfer system is being offset by other factors that account for the current fiscal 
fragmentation of the ZMVM. In fact, the fiscal fragmentation of the ZMVM is the result 
of complex interactions between multiple factors. State intervention is only one factor, 
and despite its equalization effect, it has not been able to mitigate fiscal disparity in the 
ZMVM. In the next chapter, I explore the factors that have been exacerbating the level of 
fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 

CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL DISPARITIES IN THE ZMVM: 
PROPERTY TAXES AND BEYOND 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I illustrated the differences in the public finances of the jurisdictions of the 
Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico (ZMVM). In Chapter 4, I analyzed the extent 
to which the fiscal decentralization process has contributed to the level of fiscal disparity 
in this metropolitan area. The analysis proved that state intervention through the transfer 
system has mitigated the level of fiscal disparity. Despite the equalizing effect of 
transfers, the analysis also showed that total spending per capita in the ZMVM remains 
highly unequal. This conclusion suggests that in addition to transfers, other factors affect 
the fiscal condition of the ZMVM. This conclusion is partially based on the fact that in 
Mexico the fiscal decentralization process has been symmetrical, meaning that-with the 
exception of the DF-decentralization policies have been applied in the same way across 
the board to all states and municipalities. Therefore, the fiscal condition of the ZMVM 
cannot be only attributed to the transfer system, because such a system also responds to 
the demands of all states in the federation and not just to those that conform the ZMVM. 
In fact, Mexico's fiscal pact is the axis of the country's federalist structure, and in order 
to hold this pact together, the Mexican state must follow national objectives-even if some 
of them go against the objectives of specific states. 
If the observed level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM is not only the result of the direct 
intervention of the State via the system of transfers, then what other factors account for 
this situation? In this chapter, I argue that the current fiscal condition of the ZMVM is 
also the result of the complex interaction of fiscal, political, historical, and spatial factors. 
Particularly, I argue that the property tax system has greatly contributed to the level of 
fiscal disparity in the metropolitan area. Property taxes are the main own-source revenue 
in the jurisdictions of the ZMVM; in 2002, they accounted for 53% of total tax collection. 
Property taxes are also the main fiscal tool in full control of local governments to 
autonomously increase their revenues. Therefore, the composition of the property tax 
structure is directly related to the level of fiscal disparity. According to the theory 
presented in Chapter 1, decentralization gives rich jurisdictions a larger tax base and a 
lower tax rate than poorer jurisdictions, and this tends to increase the income gap 
between jurisdictions (Prud'homme 1995). Based on this theory, I test the hypothesis that 
during the process of fiscal decentralization in the 1990s, property tax collection 
increased the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. 
In order to test this hypothesis, I look at four different determinants of property tax 
collection in the ZMVM. First, I move beyond the analysis of the direct impact of 
transfers conducted in Chapter 3, and examine the indirect effect of transfers on the 
collection of property taxes in the ZMVM. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the field of public 
finance has two main models, known as the "flypaper" and fiscal laziness models, to test 
the impact of transfers on the fiscal behavior of local governments. In Mexico, 
subnational governments depend heavily on intergovernmental transfers, so I expect that 
transfers have a negative indirect effect on tax collection; this is that as dependence on 
transfers increases, the level of local tax collection decreases (fiscal-laziness). 
Second, I look at the role that the ZMVM's spatial composition plays in the level of 
property tax collection. During the 1990s the population of the metropolitan 
municipalities grew by 3 million people; therefore I expect to observe a substantial 
increase in property taxes. My analysis explores the conditions under which rapid 
population expansion results in an increase in property taxes. I do this by comparing 
property tax collection in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipalities of the 
State of Mexico and also in the DF's delegations. Additionally, I look at the effect of 
household mobility on tax collection in eight of the largest metropolitan municipalities. 
Third, I look at the political and administrative costs associated with tax collection in the 
ZMVM. Since my analysis of property tax collection indicates that the level of collection 
has been particularly low in the metropolitan municipalities, I explore the question of 
whether the politico-administrative characteristics of these municipalities explain their 
low levels of tax collection. Fourth and last, I explore the impact of the different 
governance structures and systems of incentives in the ZMVM's jurisdictions on the level 
of fiscal disparity. The tax systems of the DF and the State of Mexico are very different. 
While the former has a centralized tax structure, the later is decentralized and therefore 
municipalities have the autonomy to set and collect their property taxes. Based on the 
theory of fiscal decentralization discussed in Chapter 1, I hypothesize that the level of 
fiscal disparity among the metropolitan municipalities is higher that in DF's delegations. 
Because the exploration of this hypothesis is relevant to the current discussion about the 
political reform in the DF, I make some general remarks about the advantages and 
disadvantages of having a centralized versus a decentralized system of local public 
finance. 
5.2. Property taxation as a determinant of fiscal disparity 
According to the results of Chapter 4, transfers have a redistributive effect in the ZMVM. 
These results confirm the hypothesis that transfers are reducing fiscal disparity in the 
ZMVM (see Table 4.4). Despite the redistributive effect of the transfer system, my 
analysis also shows that the ratio of total spending per capita in the DF to that of the 
metropolitan municipalities increased during the 1990s (see Table 4.3). This means that 
despite the effect of transfers, the level of fiscal disparity increased during this period. 
Thus, if transfers are mitigating the level of fiscal disparity, then something else should 
be accounting for its exacerbation. In order to find out, in the following analysis I explore 
the characteristics of the local governments' own-sources of revenue, particularly of 
property taxes, which are the most important source of local revenue in the ZMVM-and 
elsewhere in the country. 
In the ZMVM, property taxes account for a substantial proportion of local governments' 
own-source revenues. This proportion varies between the DF (20%) and the metropolitan 
~nunicipalities (35%), but in both cases property taxes represent the single most important 
own-source of revenue (see Tables 3.3 and 3.12). Property taxes in the DF and in the 
~netropolitan municipalities vary both in their general characteristics and in their 
collection levels. One major result of these differences is that the Center-to-Outside 
Center disparity ratio (CC-OCC) in property taxes grew substantially during the 1990s. 
While in 1989 the Treasury of the DF collected 340/0 more property taxes per person than
the metropolitan municipalities, by 2000 the ratio of that difference grew almost eight
times.
Figure 5.1. DF and ZMEM: Property tax per capita
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As Figure 5.1 illustrates,the increase in the property tax disparity ratio responds to two
factors: first,to a steep increase in property tax collection in the DF, and second to a
relative decline in collection in the metropolitan municipalities. From 1989 to 2000 the
DF increased itslevels of property tax collection from $111 pesos per person to $653
pesos per person. In real absolute terms this represented an increase of $4.5 billion pesos.
In sharp contrast to the DF, the metropolitan municipalities experienced an absolute real
growth of just $183 million pesos during the decade. Such a modest increase in property
tax collection, together with a population expansion of three million people during the
1990s in the metropolitan municipalities, resulted in a decline in the level of property
taxes per capita from $83 pesos in 1989 to $79 pesos in the year 2000.1 This contributed
I According to Figure 5.1, the collection of property taxes per capita in 1995 and 1996 was particularly
high. This is unusual, considering that the economic crisisof 1994 had an adverse effect on the country's
public finances. Because of this observation, I closely analyzed the data for those years and found that
neither in 1995 nor in 1996 did the metropolitan municipalities report data on the tax on property
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to the already deep polarization of property tax collection between the DF's delegations
and the metropolitan municipalities (Figure 5.2). Both the increase in tax collection in the
DF and the decrease in the metropolitan municipalities are due to a number of
characteristics of the property taxation system, to which the analysis now turns.
Figure 5.2. Property tax collection per capita in the ZMVM, Avg. 1989-2004*
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The data on the DF is from the 1999-2004 average. The data on the metropolitan municipalities is
from the 1989-2000 average.
transactions, which is the second most important tax on properties. This is clearly an error in the data
because it is not possible that for two years no property transactions happened in a place with such a
dynamic real estate market. The person in charge of the municipal and state database in INEGI did not
know the reason for this lack of data, but I would guess that for some reason it was actually included as part
of the collection of property taxes, which could be accounting for the high level of property tax collection
in 1995 and 1996.
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5.3. Indirect effect of intergovernmental transfers on property tax collection 
According to the public finance theory of tax effort presented in Chapter 1, transfers may 
either stimulate (flypaper effect) or inhibit (fiscal laziness effect) tax collection. Based on 
this theory, I explore the extent to which the transfers caused the increase of property 
taxes in the DF or the lack of growth in property taxes in the metropolitan municipalities. 
Due to the differences in the property tax systems of the DF and the State of Mexico, I 
will follow a different methodologies to test the impact of transfers on tax collection in 
these two jurisdictions. 
Since the metropolitan municipalities have autonomy over their property taxes, the data 
allow me to test if the increase in federal transfers during the 1990s is responsible for the 
lack of growth in of property taxes during this period. From 1989 to 2000 the proportion 
of transfers as a percentage of total municipal spending more than doubled from 30 to 
66%; therefore, based on the theory of tax effort, I expected that the increase in transfers 
had a negative effect on the collection of property taxes (fiscal laziness effect). In order to 
find out, I tested this assertion by performing a regression analysis on panel data of the 58 
metropolitan municipalities for the eleven-year period (1 989-2000) under study. This 
statistical method controls for omitted variables and calculates coefficients that take into 
account both the differences between the municipalities and across time. Empirical 
analysts do not agree as to which variables should be included in the regressions, but they 
commonly use property taxes (or any other tax variable) as the dependent variable and 
transfers and other wealth or tax-base measurements as independent variables. For this 
study, I selected property tax collection per capita for the dependent variable and the total 
amount of transfers (both participaciones and aportaciones) per capita for the 
independent variable. Because property tax collection per capita is a function of GDP per 
capita, I included the municipal GDP per capita as a control variable in the model 
(Prud7homme 1998: 10). I used property tax collection and participaciones data fiom 
INEG17s database on subnational finance, aportaciones data from INAFED, and 
municipal GDP data fiom the Human Development Indicators of the UNDP 2001 Report 
on Human Development .L 
Table 5.1. ZMEM and ZMNL: Impact of transfers on tax collection 
Dependent variable: Collection of real property taxes per capita 
r 1 Fixed-effects / Fixed-effects 1 Random-effects 1 Random-effects 1 
model 
Coefficient 
L~ransfers per capita 1 .009 1 .003*** 1 .lo5 1 .030*** 
p 10.10 ** p 50.05 *** p 50.01 
I GDP per capita (PPP $US) Transfers per capita 
PPP = purchasing power parity. 
ZMVM = Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico. ZMNL = Metropolitan Zone of Nuevo Leon. 
model 
Standard Errors 
Source: calculations by the author. 
-.018 
The results of my statistical regression confirm my hypothesis that transfers had a 
model 
Coefficient 
negative and significant effect on the collection of property taxes in the metropolitan 
model 
Standard Errors 
.007** 
municipalities. In Table 5.1 the coefficients show that an increase of $100 pesos in 
transfers has an associated decline in property taxes of about $2 pesos. These results were 
.0334 
-.O 16 
consistent using both a fixed and a random-effects model. The evidence in favor of the 
.005*** 
.006* 
fiscal laziness model in the metropolitan municipalities is consistent with other 
quantitative studies as well as with some qualitative evidence. Concerning the results of 
other quantitative analyses, a recent study by Sour (2004) on municipal tax effort in 
Mexico found that the ten municipalities with the lowest level of tax effort in Mexico-out 
of a sample of 155 urban municipalities-are all located in the metropolitan area of the 
State of Mexico. Similarly, a research project from the National University (UNAM) 
found that in the State of Mexico "the aportaciones have deepened the fiscal dependency 
of the municipalities and have weakened their own-sources of revenue, especially their 
property taxes9' (Ruiz Duran, 2002). 
- - - -  
Data on municipal GDP are only available for the year 2000, and they are reported in adjusted dollars 
(PPP US$). Because municipal GDP is only available for one year, I ran two models, first a fixed-effects 
and then a random-effects model. 
In addition to these studies, I also found qualitative evidence of fiscal laziness in the 
metropolitan municipalities. According to a former president of the metropolitan 
municipality of Texcoco, "of course, the federal transfers generate a negative incentive to 
collect taxes; they are so big, that sometimes they represent almost the total revenue of 
many municipalities in the State" (Interview E). According to this official, even if 
transfers generate a negative incentive to increase the collection of property taxes, 
municipal officials often prefer this source of funding over the collection of taxes. This 
preference relates to the political economy problems that arise from the proximity of 
local authorities to the source of fbnds. While transfers flow in a regular-and automatic- 
way to the municipalities without creating too much friction with the upper tiers of 
government that allocate these funds, in the case of property taxes, there is close 
proximity between taxpayers and local authorities. This proximity can reduce tax 
collection for a number of reasons. First, it is not unusual for social ties to exist between 
local authorities and taxpayers. Second, authorities are often faced with the dilemma of 
enforcing property tax compliance in poor and marginalized households. And third, 
municipalities with important commercial or industrial tax bases are tempted to make 
"informal concessions" (i.e. a voluntary lack of tax enforcement) to keep these tax bases 
in their municipalities to generate employment and economic growth (Interview E). 
The coefficients in Table 5.1 and the additional quantitative and qualitative evidence I 
have discussed demonstrate the presence of the fiscal laziness effect in the metropolitan 
municipalities. This evidence alone, however, is not sufficient to prove that the fiscal 
laziness effect is specific to the metropolitan municipalities, as it may also be present in 
the rest of the municipalities in the country. Therefore, in order to determine if the 
observed fiscal laziness effect derived from the particularities of the metropolitan 
municipalities, I compare them with municipalities in other metropolitan areas. Ideally, I 
would have performed the same type of regression analysis on a large number of 
metropolitan municipalities throughout the country, but due to data limitations (especially 
on reliable data on property tax collection) I was only able to perform the analysis for the 
nine metropolitan municipalities of Monterrey. For the analysis, I used the same 
methodology as I did for the metropolitan municipalities of the State of Mexico, and I 
also expected to find that transfers had a negative impact on local tax collection. In this 
case, however, my expectation turned out to be wrong, as transfers had a positive impact 
on the collection of property taxes in the metropolitan municipalities of Monterrey from 
199 1 to 2000. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the coefficients in both models were positive 
and significant. These results show the presence of the flypaper effect, which means that 
these municipalities use their transfers for the purposes for which they were given. One 
interpretation is that municipal authorities in Monterrey are not taking advantage of the 
fungibility of money to redirect part of their transfers to cover the provision of services 
currently provided with tax money. 
Like in the case of Monterrey-and unlike the metropolitan municipalities-property tax 
collection in the DF increased (five times) during the period of study (Figure 5.1). To 
find out the extent to which this increase resulted from the reduction inparticipaciones in 
the DF, ideally I should perform a similar analysis to that of Table 5.1 and test for the 
impact of transfers on tax collection. However, the lack of data on the actual transfers 
reaching the delegations, together with the centralized nature of property tax collection in 
the DF, prevents me from performing this quantitative test. In order to determine if the 
increase in the level of property tax collection was the result of decentralization, or of 
other independent factors like secular changes in property values, or of an increase in 
payment of tax arrears, for example, I conducted a series of interviews with key 
stakeholders, including the DF's Ministry of Finance who implemented the reform. 
According to the DF's Minster of Finance, the decentralization policies of the 1990s, and 
concretely the reduction ofparticipaciones, created incentives for the DF to increase tax 
collection. To use his own words: "after the reduction in participaciones, which resulted 
from the changes to the transfer system in 1990, we were left with no choice but to 
increase our own sources of revenue" (Interview B). He made this same point in a 
previous publication, where he argued that "as a consequence of the change in the 
participaciones formula and of the federal decision to cancel all the transfers to the 
transport system of Mexico City, a substantial reform was introduced to increase the 
water fees and the property and payroll taxes" (Beristain and Rodriguez 2001 : 179- 180. 
Italics are mine). To accomplish this objective, the administration of Mayor Camacho 
(1988-1994) implemented a major tax reform which accounts for the steep increase in 
property tax collection from $1 1 1 pesos per capita in 1989 to $694 pesos per capita in 
1994 (Figure 5.1). Tax reforms are always difficult to implement, and in this case two 
factors were crucial to the success of the reform: the good fiscal condition of the DF prior 
to the reform, and the support of the federal govemment. Concerning the first factor, 
when Mayor Camacho came to power at the end of 1988 the finances of the DF were in 
good shape because the federal government had just taken over all financial dues of the 
DF after the earthquakes of 1985. According to Camacho's Minister of Finance "it is 
much easier to make changes when you have healthy public finances, than when you are 
in fiscal distress" (Interview B). In terms of the second factor, Mayor Camacho himself 
told me that the strong support the DF received fiom President Salinas was critical for the 
success of various reforms of his administration (Interview F). 
The reduction in participaciones in the DF in 1990 was motivated by the discontent of 
other states in the federation with the special financial treatment the DF had received 
from the national govemment in the past. During the 1980s the federal government 
cancelled all the direct spending that it formerly channelled to the DF for the financing of 
its mega projects, mainly in the transportation and water sectors. Similarly, the 1989 
changes to the SNCF cut the DF's coefficient ofparticipaciones, starting with a reduction 
of two percentage points. The DF's authorities at the time knew that the new SNCF 
formulae would continue to decimate the finances of the capital city, so they saw the tax 
reform as a necessary strategy to keep up with the levels of services and infrastructure 
that the capital city required. 
The 1990 tax reform sought to increase the DF's collection of own-source revenue 
through various policies including the modernization of information technology services, 
administrative simplification, better tax enforcement policies, and the restructuring of the 
whole system of tax administration. The reform also made a number of specific changes 
to the property tax system, which according to Morales (2002) included: (1) an increase 
in tax rates by making the system more progressive, subdividing the upper-value 
brackets, and raising the minimum payments of the lower-value brackets; (2) the 
establishment of a single system to set the tax bases, streamlining the previous system in 
which rental-based and value-based methods for calculating the base of the property tax 
coexisted; and (3) an extension of the practice of self-determination of the tax base from 
only including commercial properties to include the valuation of all type of properties. 
Despite these changes, the reform was not able to solve a number of deficiencies that are 
still present in the property tax system in the DF, which include errors in the cadastral 
registries, failures in the notification process for non-compliance, and mistaken 
information on the tax forms (Moreno et al. 2004). 
Although the tax reform of the 1990s left a few unresolved problems, the collection of 
property taxes in the DF increased constantly from the start of the reform until 1994, 
when the peso crisis negatively impacted the finances of the capital city. The economic 
crisis was so severe that, by the year 2000, the DF was unable to reach the levels of 
property tax collection from 1994. The economic crisis affected the collection of property 
taxes in the second half of the 1990s primarily by reducing the prices of properties, and 
generally by decimating the purchasing power of consumers. In addition, Morales (2002) 
argues that the crisis brought about a number of changes that included a virtual 
disappearance of all credit for housing for medium- and high-income level households, 
an increase in the costs of construction and in the rental prices of the few properties in the 
rental market, and an accumulation in arrears on the existing credits. 
The qualitative information that I obtained from my interviews provides evidence that a 
reduction in the participaciones created an incentive to raise taxes. However, this 
information does not reflect the "intensity" of such an incentive to increase tax collection. 
In other words, even if I could establish a causal relationship between the reduction of 
participaciones and the increase in local tax collection, it would not mean that taxes were 
increased to their maximum potential. Actually, due to the technical and political factors 
associated with any tax reform, local tax increases almost always fall behind the optimal 
level. In fact, according to a high-ranking official in the DF Treasury, "the current 
property tax system is rigid, baroque, and could certainly be improved; there is capacity 
to increase the level of collection, but that is politically sensitive" (Interview N). Along 
the same line, Carlos Urzua, a forrner Minster of Finance in the DF declared to the press 
in 2001 that "easily, if we get our act together and make the non-compliers pay, instead 
of collecting 6 billion pesos in property taxes, we can collect 10 billion, without raising 
taxes" (Cited in Moreno et al. 2004).~ In summary, the case of property tax collection in 
the DF shows that, even if State intervention through the system of intergovernmental 
transfers can indirectly create incentives to increase tax collection, states and 
municipalities face political and technical constraints to collecting taxes to their fullest 
potential. 
5.4. Spatial determinants of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM 
In the previous analysis, I showed how State intervention through the system of transfers 
indirectly increased the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM both by reducing tax effort 
in the metropolitan municipalities, and by pushing for a tax reform that led to increased 
property tax collection in the DF. This indirect impact of transfers, however, is not the 
only determinant of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. The level and variation in property tax 
collection also responds to other structural characteristics that affect the composition of 
the property tax base and the efficiency of tax collection. In this section, I explore the 
extent to which the spatial locations of the ZMVM's jurisdictions account for the 
differences in property tax collection during the 1 990s. In particular, I analyze the impact 
of the metropolitan municipalities' territorial location on property tax collection with 
respect to both the non-metropolitan area of the State of Mexico and, most importantly, 
the DF. 
It has been a general policy of Mayor Lopez Obrador not to raise taxes. For example, according to the 5' 
transitory article of the constitutional reform of 1999, by year 2002, properties should be assessed at their 
real commercial values. In reaction to this, Mayor Lopez Obrador made a public commitment that he was 
able to comply with this law, without creating any additional burden to taxpayers, and he was right. What 
he did was multiply the property tax bases by ten (to comply with the regulation) but simultaneously 
divided the tax rate by the same proportion, so that, in the end, the total tax collection remained the same. 
5.4.1. Property tax collection in metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipalities 
The comparison of the metropolitan with the non-metropolitan municipalities shows that 
the State of Mexico is clearly fragmented into an urban and a rural area. Most 
metropolitan municipalities are located in the urban part of the state and, aside from the 
state capital of Toluca and four other adjacent municipalities (Lerma, Metepec, San 
Mateo Atenco, and Zinacantepec), the non-metropolitan area has a much lower level of 
urbanization than the metropolitan area. According to the last census (INEGI, 2000) 97% 
of the population in the metropolitan municipalities had access to electricity, 94% had 
access to water provision, and 78% had access to sewer services. In contrast, in the non- 
metropolitan part of the state these percentages were 95%, 84%, and 62%, respectively. 
Similarly, while in the metropolitan municipalities just 25% of the population lives in 
communities of less than 2,500 inhabitants and 2% of the population speaks an 
indigenous language, in the non-metropolitan municipalities 50% of the population lives 
in communities of less than 2,500 inhabitants, and 4% of the population speaks an 
indigenous language. 
The differen~~es in urbanization between the metropolitan and the non-metropolitan parts 
of the State of Mexico are also present in the collection of property taxes. According to 
my calculations, on average, from 1989 to 2000, for each peso collected in property taxes 
in a metropolitan municipality, a non-metropolitan municipality only collected 55 cents. 
This comes as no surprise considering the acute differences in the state's urbanization 
levels, and the fact that most marginalized municipalities are concentrated in the non- 
metropolitan area. With the exception of the capital State of Toluca and a handful of 
other urbanized municipalities, the non-metropolitan area of the State is far poorer, and 
therefore collects fewer taxes, than the metropolitan area (Figure 5.3). In fact, the non- 
metropolitan municipalities have a GDP per capita equivalent to two-thirds of that in the 
metropolitan area. GDP is strongly and positively correlated with property tax collection; 
therefore these differences in GDP account for the low level of property tax collection of 
the non-metropolitan municipalities. 
Figure 5.3. Property tax collection per capita in the metropolitan and non-
metropolitan municipalities of the State of Mexico, Avg. 1989-2000
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Despite their different levels of property tax collection during the 1990s, the ratio of
property taxes per capita between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipalities
experienced a substantial decline from 2.4 in 1989 to 1.6 in 2000 (Table 5.2). This is
particularly surprising because during that decade the population in the metropolitan area
grew five times more than the population in the non-metropolitan area, so I would have
expected that this resulted in a higher increase in tax collection. There are at least two
factors that account for the decline in the ratio of property tax collection in the
metropolitan and the non-metropolitan areas of the State. First, it took longer for the
n1etropolitan municipalities to recover from the peso crisis of 1994, as most of the taxable
base of the state is concentrated in their territory. The second factor is related to the scale
of collection, or to the effort that at the margin municipalities must exert to increase
taxes. Usually rural and small municipalities have lower levels of tax collection than
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urban and large municipalities, so at the margin a similar tax effort results in greater tax 
increases in the rural than in the urban municipalities. 
Source: Author, based on data from INEGI. 
FORTAMUN =: Fund for the Strengthening of the Municipalities 
FAISM = Fund for Municipal Social Infrastructure. 
Table 5.2. State of Mexico: Fiscal disparity ratio between the metropolitan and the 
non-metro?olitan municipalities, 1989-2000 
Even though the ratio of property tax collection between the metropolitan and non- 
Per Capita 
Totalspending 
Propertytax 
metropolitan municipalities declined during the 1990s, by the year 2000 tax collection 
per person in the former was still 60% higher than in the latter (Table 5.2). This 
difference, however, is not translated into more spending per person in the metropolitan 
municipalities. According to my calculations, the ratio of total spending per capita 
1989 
1.07 
2.41 
between the metropolitan and the non-metropolitan areas steadily declined during the 
1990s, and by the year 2000, a person in the metropolitan area received 15 cents less for 
Aportaciones 
each peso spent than a similar person in the non-metropolitan area. This decline was 
caused both by the dramatic population increase in the metropolitan municipalities and by 
1990 
1.03 
2.34 
the higher assignment of transfers to the non-metropolitan municipalities. In terms of 
participaciones, on average for each peso received by a person in the non-metropolitan 
0.75 
area, a similar person in the metropolitan area only received 72 cents. This difference is 
1991 
1.31 
2.08 
even more acute with the aportaciones. On average, a person in the metropolitan area 
0.80 
received 63 cents for each peso received by a similar person in the non-metropolitan area. 
1992 
1.04 
1.93 
The most dramatic difference is present in the allocation of the aportaciones 
0.85 
infrastructure fund (FAISM) that is targeted to basic infrastructure projects, which are 
common in the rural parts of the State. The Fund for the Strengthening of the 
Municipalities (FORTAMUN) is an exception, because the fund is allocated on a per 
1993 
0.96 
1.67 
capita basis, so that each person in the state receives the same proportion, regardless of 
location. 
0.70 
1994 
0.93 
1.88 
0.69 
1995 
0.90 
1.61 
0.69 
1996 
0.98 
1.75 
0.63 
1997 
0.93 
1.72 
0.66 
1998 
0.90 
1.56 
0.69 
0.59 
0.29 
1.03 
1999 
0.86 
1.76 
0.76 
0.65 
0.29 
1.03 
2000 
0.86 
1.63 
Average 
0.95 
1.80 
0.77 
0.64 
0.29 
1.03 
0.72 
0.63 
0.29 
1.03 
5.4.2. The DF and the metropolitan municipalities: a symbiotic relationship 
The ratios in Table 5.2 show that the metropolitan municipalities faced more financial 
constraints than municipalities in the rest of the state. Financial pressure came from both 
their limited own-source revenue and from the reduction in federal transfers. This 
financial pressure was accompanied by a very rapid increase in the demand for all kinds 
of public services. One factor that contributed to these increasing service demands is the 
enormous population growth that has been taking place in the metropolitan area in the 
last fifteen years. This growth originates partly fiom the area's proximity to the DF, as 
these metropolitan municipalities received an important influx of households leaving the 
capital city during the 1990s. During this decade, population grew in almost all the 
metropolitan municipalities, and the overall population of the area increased by about 
three million people (see Chapter 2). This increase resulted both from natural birth and 
from migration; in 1995,47% of the total population of the State of Mexico came from 
another state (Camara de Diputados 2001a). According to Eibenschutz (2004), from 1995 
to 2000, metropolitan municipalities accommodated a net migration of 65,700 
households, exclusively coming from the DF. During that five-year period, 20 1,000 
households left the DF, and 53% established themselves in the metropolitan 
municipalities. Similarly, during that period, 102,000 households moved out of the 
metropolitan area, and 40% of them moved to the D F . ~  
In this context of population growth and household mobility into the metropolitan 
municipalities, I expected to observe a corresponding increase in the collection of 
property taxes in this area. The rationale was that if the number of people and households 
increase, then the tax base of the jurisdictions where they reside must expand and so must 
the collection of taxes. However, despite the population increase, the average annual rate- 
of-growth in property tax collection in the metropolitan municipalities during the 1990s 
was only 4% (Figure 5.1). As already mentioned, one reason was the peso crisis at the 
end of 1994 that reduced the value of properties and had a generally negative impact on 
the economy. 
' The delegations fiom which most households moved to the metropolitan municipalities-but also to other 
parts of the DF-were Iztapalapa, Gustavo A. Madero, Coyoacan, Alvaro Obregon, and the central 
delegations of CuauhtCmoc, Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juarez, and Venustiano Carranza. 
In addition to the peso crisis, the income level of the households moving into the 
metropolitan municipalities, together with the type of real estate production in this area 
are other factors that account for the inability of the metropolitan municipalities to 
increase their tax collection during this period of rapid population growth. Tax collection 
levels depend not only on the number of households that moved into the metropolitan 
municipalities, but also on their wealth levels. The ZMVM is composed of jurisdictions 
with very different wealth levels. One way of measuring the levels of wealth in the 
jurisdictions is by looking at the percentage of households that earn more than ten times 
the minimum wage. In the year 2005, the minimum wage in Mexico is $43.5 pesos or 
around US$4. In the DF, most delegations have between 20 and 30% of households 
earning more than 10 times the minimum wage. In contrast, jurisdictions in the ZMEM 
have in general about 10 to 15% of the households earning as much. Between 60 and 
80% of the households in the ZMEM earn less than 5 times the minimum wage, while in 
the DF, this proportion is about 50% of the households. Because of this disparity in 
wealth, the ZMVM can be envisioned as an area characterized by two different poles: a 
rich pole that is largely located in the DF, in the southern and western parts of the 
metropolitan area, and a poorer pole mostly located in the State of Mexico, particularly in 
the southeastern and northeastern parts of the ZMVM.~ 
As I argue previously, the general pattern of household mobility during the 1990s was 
from the DF to the State of Mexico. To determine the impact of this household mobility 
on tax collection, I need to establish the income level of these households. In a recent 
study, Duhau (2003) showed that most rich households moving into the DF between 1995 
and 2000 relocated either to other parts of the DF or to some well-off metropolitan 
municipality. With the exceptions of V. Carranza and Azcapotzalco, which lost a net 
number of rich households, all other delegations and some rich metropolitan 
municipalities (eg. Naucalpan, Atizapan, and Huixquilucan) experienced increases in the 
number of rich households in their territories during this period. In contrast, between 
Although this is an accurate picture of the social distribution of space in the ZMVM, not all the rich 
jurisdictions are in the DF and not all the poor ones are in the State of Mexico. For example, there are fairly 
well-off municipalities, like Tlanepantla and Naucalpan, in the State of Mexico, and relatively poor 
delegations, like Milpa Alta and Xochirnilco, in the DF. 
1995 and 2000, most metropolitan municipalities experienced a negative mobility rate of 
rich households. This suggests that since the number of households establishing in the 
metropolitan municipalities did not come fiom jurisdictions with high income levels, they 
must have come fiom poorer jurisdictions. In the same study, Duhau (2003) examined the 
intra-metropolitan mobility of the poorest households (less than three times the minimum 
wage) and found that only a group of nine jurisdictions, which have gone through highly 
informal processes of urbanization (mainly through irregular settlements), experienced 
increases in the number of very poor households in their territories; the other jurisdictions 
had negative mobility rates for such  household^.^ Unfortunately, Duhau's study does not 
look any further into the intra-metropolitan mobility of the households with low- and 
medium-wealth levels (between 3 and 20 times the minimum wage); however, because 
the study covers the mobility of households of all other income levels, I assume that most 
of the households moving into the metropolitan municipalities were at low- and middle- 
income levels. The fact that the DF has retained upper-middle- and high-income 
households, while the metropolitan municipalities (with few exceptions like 
Huixquilucan and Naucalpan), are mostly occupied by lower-middle- and low-income 
households, has directly contributed to the concentration of different tax bases on each 
side of the border between the DF and the State of Mexico. 
The causes of this intra-metropolitan mobility into the State of Mexico closely relate to 
the characteristics of the real estate market in the metropolitan area. Primarily, there is a 
marked difference in property prices between the DF and the metropolitan municipalities. 
For example, while an apartment of 80 square meters in the DF costs over $1 million 
pesos (US$100,000), in the metropolitan municipalities a house of 60 square meters, 
including land and construction, costs less than one-fourth of that price ($230,000 pesos 
or US$23,000) (Interview H). These real-estate price differentials, together with the high 
cost of living in the DF, have been pushing low- and middle-income households to look 
for more affordable housing elsewhere. These price differentials result in part from 
These nine jurisdictions are Coyotepec, Teoloyucan, Acolman, Chimalhuacan, La Paz, Chalco, 
Chicolopapan, Chalco and Milpa Alta. 
location, and in part because of the unequal distribution of urban infrastructure in the DF 
and the State of Mexico. 
The pattern of intra-metropolitan migration in the ZMVM was closely linked with the 
expansion of real estate construction during the 1990s. According to a real estate 
developer, around 100,000 houses were, and are still being built each year in the 
metropolitan municipalities, 60% of which are "social interest" affordable housing for 
low- and middle-income households. The other 40% is split between informal settlements 
and housing for middle- and high-income households.' The expansion of "social interest" 
housing, resulting from the mobility of low- and middle-income families into the 
metropolitan municipalities, was facilitated by the availability of credit for financing 
these types of properties. After the economic crisis of 1994, credit for middle- and high- 
income households virtually disappeared, and most of the available credit went to the 
private construction of "social interest" housing. At that point, the government decided to 
provide credit for this type of housing through a series of housing solidarity funds such as 
Infonavit and Fovissste, and also through the Financial Fund for Housing, now the 
Federal Mortgage Society (Morales, 2002). 
The fact that most people who moved into the metropolitan municipalities belonged to 
low- and middle-income groups who moved into "social interest" housing or informal 
settlements, explains why the housing expansion of 100,000 units per year in the 
metropolitan municipalities only resulted in a 4% annual average rate increase in property 
taxes. Those in "social interest" housing pay very low property taxes, and those in 
informal settlements do not pay any property taxes at all. According to a real estate 
developer, on average, the owner of an affordable housing unit pays between US$1.5 and 
US$2 per month on property taxes. These payments represent less than .001% of the 
average property value and less than 1% of the total income of a low-income household 
(Interview H) . 
According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2004: xvi) "informal 
settlements continue to be created because the government has limited control over some lands, poor 
administration of ejidal land, and lack of affordable formal housing alternatives." 
So far, I have explained why the population expansion in the metropolitan municipalities
has not generated a corresponding increase in property taxes. In order to more clearly
understand how the increase in population and the expansion of the housing stock has
affected the collection of property taxes, I turn to a more detailed exploration of those
metropolitan municipalities that account for the largest share of property tax collection in
the area.
5.4.2.1. Effect of household 11l0bilityalld real estate cOllstructioll 011property tax
collectioll ill the metropolitall 11lullicipalities
In the metropolitan area of the State of Mexico, similar to the rest of the urban areas in
the country, property tax collection is concentrated in a few of the richest and most
populated municipalities. On average, from 1989 to 2000, 9 of the 122 municipalities in
the whole state collected almost three quarters (72%) of the total property taxes. Eight out
of those nine municipalities form part of the metropolitan area, and the other is Toluca,
the capital of the State of Mexico. Excluding Toluca, these eight metropolitan
municipalities collected 67% of the total property taxes in the state and 80% of the total
collection in the metropolitan area (Figure 5.4). Note that with the exception of
Cuautitlan Izcalli and Atizapan, all these municipalities are contiguous to the DF.
Figure 5.4. Proportion of total property tax collection in
the metropolitan municipalities (avg. 1989-2000)
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Because of the relative importance of these eight metropolitan municipalities for overall 
tax collection in the metropolitan area, I focus the rest of the analysis specifically on 
these cases. But before doing so, I review some of the general characteristics of the other 
49 metropolitan municipalities, which together collect the remaining 20% of the property 
taxes in the metropolitan area. During the 1990s these municipalities experienced 
spectacular population growth. With only one exception, all experienced increases of 
30% or more in their populations, and a few of them even doubled their populations. 
Consequently, most of them (40 of the 49 municipalities) experienced positive property 
tax growth rates, but the absolute collection of taxes remained low. This lack of a 
relationship between population expansion and an absolute increase in tax collection 
resulted from the fact that most households moving into these municipalities in the 
southern and northeastern parts of the metropolitan area belong to low-income groups, 
which traditionally pay very few, if any, property taxes. For my study, I define low- 
income households as those receiving less than three times the minimum wage per day. 
Concerning the eight metropolitan municipalities that collect 80% of the total property 
taxes, Table 5.3 provides information to test if there is any association between the level 
of property tax collection in these municipalities and their rate of population growth, 
household mobility, and type of urbanization pattern. Specifically, Table 5.3 presents 
data on (1) the municipalities' annual rates of change in property tax collection per 
person (dependent variable), and three independent variables: (2) the change in the 
absolute number of people during the 1990s, (3) the percentage of intra-metropolitan 
mobility of high-income households (for my study, high-income households are defined 
as those that earn more than 20 times the minimum wage per day, equivalent to a daily 
income of US$80) and (4) the type of urbanization pattern. At the far right of the table, 
there is a set of arrows that indicate the direction and the intensity in which variables (I), 
(2), and (3) moved during the 1990s. 
Ideally, Table 5.3 would have included a column with the number of new properties built 
in each municipality during the 1990s (to capture the expansion of the tax base); 
however, these data were not available, in part because in Mexico there is no single 
national housing plan, and municipalities have broad autonomy to decide their housing 
policies. In the metropolitan municipalities the government of the State of Mexico sets 
general guidelines for the housing sector, but in the end, municipalities have broad 
control over their housing policies. One real-estate developer described this situation as 
"the law of the jungle: because instead of following an ordered plan, municipalities based 
on their own discretion decide the type and number of construction projects that they 
wish to build every year or three-year period" (Interview H). Such decisions are 
commonly politically motivated, and municipal authorities often base their decisions on 
whether or not they see the newcomers as potential supporters for their political 
machines. At other times, they may restrict the amount of new construction because, after 
all, massive provision of low-income housing brings deep social changes, high demands 
for services, and the potential for social and economic conflicts. 
Table 5.3 pairs municipalities with similar pattems of urbanization and divides them into 
Table 5.3. Rate of property tax collection and other indicators in selected 
four groups of municipalities that have gone through different urbanization pattems. 
Naucalpan and Tlanepantla became part of the urbanized area of the DF in the 1950s, and 
@ 
since then, they have been hosts to very intense industrial activity, constituting an 
Source: Author, based on data from *INEGI, ** Duhau (2003). 
***The number of arrows represent the intensity of the change, ****less than 0.5%. 
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important part of their tax base. Other municipalities like Ecatepec and Nezahualcoyotl 
became part of the metropolitan area during the 1960s when they began to experience 
rapid levels of urbanization that enormously increased the number of popular dwellings, 
irregular settlements, and low-income housing in their territories. As a result, these two 
municipalities have the highest population densities, and they consist mostly of low- 
income households. Ecatepec is the most populated municipality in the State of Mexico 
with 1,67 1,623 people, followed by the municipality of Nezahualcoyotl with 1,25 1,323 
people. In contrast, municipalities like Huixquilucan and Atizapan, which were annexed 
to the metropolitan area during the 1970s, have a large number of middle- and high- 
income households. During the last decade, these municipalities have built luxurious 
urban complexes to accommodate the increasing number of households that are moving 
out of the DF. Finally, the municipalities of Tultilan and Cuautitlan Izcalli have 
experienced rapid processes of urbanization through both informal settlements and the 
massive expansion of low-income housing projects. 
The differences in the urban configurations of these municipalities are manifested in their 
levels of property tax collection. Of all these municipalities, Naucalpan and Tlanepantla 
make up one-third of absolute tax collection in the ZMEM; but their pattems of tax 
collection are quite different (Table 5.3). While property tax collection in Tlanepantla 
experienced an average annual rate of growth of 7.7%, Naucalpan's rate was 2.3%. 
Interestingly, this is the case despite the fact that Naucalpan experienced a net positive 
immigration of rich households, and experienced an absolute population increase three 
times that of Tlanepantla. There are at least two factors that account for this situation. 
First, during the second half of the 1990s, Tlanepantla began to modernize its cadastre 
and to reassess properties according to market values (Cabrero et al. 2001), and second, 
these municipalities have important industrial tax bases that generate substantive property 
taxes. 
Tultitlan and Cuautitlan are also comparable in that they followed similar urbanization 
pattems and had similar tax-collection rates during the 1990s. However, despite these 
similarities, Cuautitlan experienced a lower population increase and a higher rate of 
departure of high-income households, which suggests that there is no significant 
relationship between population and high-income residential mobility, and tax collection. 
Another comparison is observed between Atizapan and Huixquilucan, which having gone 
through similar types of urbanization patterns during the 1990s, experienced very 
different tax-collection rates. This comparison is illustrative, because, while 
Huixquilucan experienced high increases in tax collection, Atizapan, which registered 
higher population increases and an influx of rich households, experienced a negative 
annual rate of property tax collection during the 1990s. The final comparison is between 
the municipalities of Ecatepec and Nezahualcoyotl, which despite having very different 
population increases during the 1990s registered similar negative tax-collection rates. The 
decline in the levels of tax collection in Nezahualcoyotl is partially explained by its 
position as one of the very few metropolitan municipalities whose population decreased 
during that decade. But the case of Ecatepec is more serious because despite its almost 
half-million increase in population, the rate of tax collection declined. This was mostly 
due to the migration of low-income people into the municipality, and to the fact that its 
pattern of urbanization was characterized by a high degree of informality, especially in 
the incorporation of land into residential uses with the result that large numbers of 
newcomers did not become part of the tax base. 
5.5. Politico-administrative determinants of fiscal disparity 
So far, I have explored the effect of population expansion and household mobility on the 
level of tax collection in the metropolitan area, specifically on the richest and most 
populated municipalities. Despite the explanatory power of these factors, tax collection is 
a complex state function and there are other factors that account for the differences in tax 
collection levels in the ZMVM during the decentralization process of the 1990s. Based on 
the theories of public finance reviewed in previous chapters and on a number of 
interviews, I identify three interrelated factors that account for these differences. These 
factors are the political costs of taxation, the characteristics of tax administration, and the 
local governance structure. In the rest of this section, 1 discuss the first two factors, 
leaving the third factor for the next section. 
5.5.1. Political costs 
Taxing property is a process with high political costs (see section 1.2.1). Although all 
local governments face these costs to a certain extent, in the State of Mexico the political 
costs of taxation have been particularly high. According to Ruiz Duran (2002) although 
many urban municipalities in other states in the country have increased their capacity to 
collect property taxes, the levels of tax collection in the State of Mexico have remained 
low. This is mainly because municipalities have not kept up with the updating of 
cadastral values, which is a politically sensitive exercise. In the words of a long-time 
student of local public finance, "in the State of Mexico municipal cadastres and property 
tax regulations are often obsolete, but authorities do not update them for a simple reason: 
because it is too politically costly" (Interview I). To illustrate his point, this specialist 
emphasized that currently Mexico's National Development Bank (BANOBRAS) has a 
program in place that helps municipalities to self-finance the updating of cadastres, but 
very few municipalities have made use of it. Similarly, a former president of a 
metropolitan municipality made this point even clearer by arguing that "people are 
sensitive to the payment of property taxes and water fees, so if authorities increase taxes, 
they will be forced out of office" (Interview E). 
An additional factor that further increases the political costs of taxation is the fact that 
most households that are settling in the metropolitan municipalities are at low- and 
middle-income levels, and it is socially sensitive to tax the poor. Moreover, since local 
authorities often build strong constituencies out of tax and other concessions to low- and 
middle-income groups, it is politically suicidal to enforce tax collection in these 
constituencies, as they have a high capacity to mobilize against authorities. 
To avoid such confrontations, local authorities often opt for lax enforcement of property 
tax compliance, granting exemptions, and maintaining low tax rates and assessment 
values for these constituencies. 
According to all my interviews, levying property taxes in the metropolitan municipalities 
is politically costly, but it was unclear is whether these costs vary according to the 
political party in office. To determine the effect of local political composition on property 
tax collection levels, I performed a regression analysis that, controlling for municipal 
GDP, did not show any statistically significant association. One interpretation of this 
result is that there is no significant difference between the PRI (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party), the PAN (National Action Party), and the PRD (Democratic 
Revolutionary Party) in their proclivity to increase tax collection. Despite this finding, 
some of my interviewees suggested that the PAN is the political party that faces the 
lowest political costs. This is because the PAN won control of some of the metropolitan 
municipalities about 15 years ago, and therefore does not have the long-standing political 
commitments of the PRI and is not obligated to reward its social mobilizations in the 
same way as the PRD. In sum, the PAN seems to have fewer political commitments than 
the other political parties, so the municipalities under its control may be facing lower 
political costs for taxation. However, this conclusion comes from a limited number of 
interviews and should be verified by additional research. 
5.5.2. Tax administration 
In addition to the political costs of taxation, the weak administrative capacity of most 
metropolitan municipalities is another determinant that accounts for their low property 
tax collection levels. Metropolitan municipalities, with the exception of a few richer 
municipalities adjacent to the DF, face a number of interrelated tax-administration 
problems, particularly in the areas of property registration and tax enforcement. In the 
registration of properties, the problem is that new construction in the State of Mexico is 
not automatically recorded in the public registry of properties. When a real estate 
developer sells a property, the new owner pays the municipality a one-time tax on the 
transfer of property ownership, but this tax does not cover the registration of the property. 
The municipality does not automatically record the deed in the property registry, as this 
registration is left to the discretion of the buyer. New property owners often take 
advantage of the discretion they are given, and delay the registration of the property deed, 
to avoid paying taxes. When new property owners decide to register their deeds to prove 
land tenure or to use the property as collateral, they have to go through an "obscure, 
highly bureaucratic, and corrupt process, that takes an average of two years to complete" 
(Interview H). For tax-collection purposes, this situation is highly problematic because 
the tax obligation is not created until the property is registered. Thus, the rapid expansion 
of new construction together with the inability of the public registry to record these 
properties is creating a situation in which "the population growth is superseding the tax 
base" (Interview H). That is, the tax administration system is not able to incorporate the 
very high number of new properties into the tax base of the metropolitan municipalities, 
which results in a low level of tax collection. 
An additional administrative problem of the property tax system in the metropolitan 
municipalities is that, with few exceptions, the level of tax enforcement is relatively low. 
To put it simply, there is no credible punishment system for non-compliance. The system 
varies from municipality to municipality, but in general when the tax authorities detect a 
case of non-compliance, they send a reminder of payment and if taxpayers do not 
respond, authorities do not force collection any further. Moreover, once taxpayers decide 
to cover their arrears, they often receive tax discounts, reductions, and amnesties. This 
situation has proven deleterious for the municipal tax system because fiom a pure cost- 
benefit perspective, it is actually "irrational" to pay taxes, as a citizen can use public 
services at minimal or no cost. A real estate developer illustrated this point to me with the 
following example: "If I pay my property tax on time, then that money is gone fiom my 
disposable income, but if my neighbor does not pay, he can invest that money and gain 
interest for a couple of years until payment becomes inescapable. Of course, throughout 
that time, interest on the unpaid tax bills accumulates, but since I know in advance that I 
will be paying at a discount rate, then it make sense for me to delay my payment. 
Additionally, in the last thirty years, I have never seen a confiscated property in the State 
of Mexico, so I know that my risk of being punished is very low" (Interview H). 
In comparison with the metropolitan municipalities, the DF has a more efficient property 
tax administration system. In terms of tax regulation, the DF7s fiscal code is more 
detailed and comprehensive than the State of Mexico's code. Concerning the level of tax 
enforcement, all my interviewees agreed that there is no comparison between the DF and 
the State of Mexico. According to a real estate developer: "in the DF, you can be sure 
that the tax bill will come, and if you don't pay you'll accumulate fines that sooner or 
later you will have to pay" (Interview H). Tax rates in the DF are higher than in the State 
of Mexico. A study by Morales (2003) calculates the property tax of two parcels of 
industrial land with very similar characteristics, one located in the State of Mexico and 
the other in the DF. The study shows that the owner of a parcel in the metropolitan 
municipality of Ecatepec (State of Mexico) pays only 25% of the total taxes paid by the 
owner of a similar parcel in the delegation of Gustavo A. Madero in the DF. 
In addition to higher tax rates, the DF also has a wealthier tax base than the metropolitan 
municipalities, which also accounts for their very different levels of tax collection. As I 
explained in Chapter 1, for historical, political and economic reasons the ZMVM7s 
jurisdictions have followed a divergent pattern of urban development, characterized by an 
acute concentration of office and commercial tax bases in the DF. For a tax analysis this 
is crucial because the composition of the tax base is central for the determination of the 
tax yield. Based on data provided by the Treasury of the DF, I calculated that out of the 
total amount of property tax collected in the DF, 72% comes from non-residential tax 
bases, accounting for 11% of the total tax bills. The other 28% of the total tax collection 
comes from residential properties, which account for the remaining 89% of the tax bills. 
Clearly, taxes on non-residential properties are much more important to total revenue 
than those on residential properties. In 2004, the average annual tax bill of a residential 
property was $1,055 pesos (US$l OO), while the tax bill of a non-residential property was 
$14,605 pesos (US$1,400). 
Due to data constraints I could not calculate the composition of the property tax base in 
the metropolitan municipalities, but in examining the State of Mexico's economic 
activity, it became evident that it has a weaker tax base than the DF. In terms of its non- 
residential property tax base, the service and commercial activity in the State of Mexico, 
is respectively one-half and one-third lower than in the DF. Similarly, the DF has a larger 
residential tax base than the State of Mexico. Thus, even though a very important 
component of the ZMVM's economic development is taking place in the metropolitan 
municipalities, there are still notable differences between the tax-base composition of the 
DF and that of the metropolitan municipalities, which partially accounts for the fiscal 
disparity in the ZMVM. 
The aforementioned political, spatial, and administrative differences among the local 
jurisdictions of the ZMVM help explain why the level of fiscal disparity increased during 
the 1990s, even if the system of intergovernmental transfers reduced the gap in total 
spending within the metropolitan area. There is, however, one additional factor that is 
crucial to understanding fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. This factor relates to the different 
governance structures of the ZMVM's jurisdictions and to the system of incentives that 
each of these structures generates towards the collection of property taxes. In the next 
section I turn to this analysis. 
5.6. Governance structures as determinants of fiscal disparity 
The ZMVM is the only metropolitan area in the country that is comprised of two entities 
with different political and administrative structures. While the DF's local governance 
system is centrally structured, the State of Mexico is politically, administratively, and 
fiscally decentralized. This situation provides a unique opportunity to assess the extent to 
which these governance structures generate different incentives for tax collection. 
Particularly, it allows me to explore whether a fiscally centralized or decentralized 
structure generates incentives that are more conducive to increased tax collection. This 
comparison of governance systems is of the highest importance at the present time 
because a proposition for decentralizing property taxes to the delegations has been on the 
political reform agenda of the DF for several years. As part of the debate on this reform, 
academics and political parties have taken positions for and against the measure, but so 
far no one has explored how the level of fiscal disparity of the DF would be in such case? 
Both the PRI and the PRD have taken positions against the decentralization of property 
taxes in the DF. Their arguments include concerns about equity and efficiency. On equity 
grounds, they fear that decentralization may increase the level of fiscal polarization 
To the best of my knowledge, no one has done this exercise. Similarly, Beristain agrees that no exercise 
of this kind has been attempted (Interview B). 
among delegations. Concerning efficiency, they argue that by breaking down the tax 
administration of the DF into 16 smaller tax administrations, the current advantages of 
the DF's tax administration scale will be lost (Interviews B, F, J, and K). The PAN, on 
the other hand, has been more supportive of decentralization. This support comes from a 
political rather than a technical perspective. While the PAN has never won and has no 
real chances of winning control of the government of the DF, it has won control of a few 
important delegations. Therefore, it is in the interest of the party to take power away from 
the central DF government, and decentralize it to the delegations.9 On the academic front, 
the debate about the decentralization of taxes in the DF has not yet caught the attention of 
many researchers. Morales (2001)-one of the few researchers who has carefully looked at 
this proposition-has made a strong theoretical argument for the decentralization of 
property taxes to the delegations. According to his analysis, delegations should have the 
same fiscal functions as the municipalities; that is, they should have control over their 
property taxes. 
So far, neither the political parties nor academics have supported their arguments for or 
against decentralization with empirical evidence. In response, in this part of the study I 
explore the potential effects of property tax decentralization in the DF-especially in terms 
of the potential change in fiscal disparity levels in the ZMVM. Because the consequences 
of having a system of decentralized fiscal institutions go beyond the specific impact on 
local fiscal disparity, I complement this analysis by exploring how decentralization 
affects other public finance variables such as spending assignments and access to local 
credit markets. 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, according to the theory of local public finance there are 
political and economic benefits associated with the decentralization of property taxes. 
These theories draw extensively on the U.S. reality, where local governments have the 
capacity to take responsibility over property taxes, and where states have fiscal powers to 
design equalizing grant systems to compensate for the fiscal disparity generated by 
9 This was the position of the Delegate fiom Miguel Hidalgo in the 2000-2003 administration (Interview 
L). 
decentralized systems. In a developing country like Mexico, however, these two 
conditions are rarely present, so local governments cannot always take full advantage of 
the benefits suggested by this theory. On the contrary, in the absence of these conditions, 
creating a system of decentralized fiscal institutions may change incentives around tax 
behavior and could create unintended consequences, such as an increase in fiscal 
disparity. In the following analysis, I explore how fiscal disparity would look in the 
ZMVM if the DF were to accommodate to the ideology of decentralization. 
Presently, the structures of local taxation in the State of Mexico and in the DF are very 
different. While in the former, tax collection levels are determined by the composition of 
the tax bases and the administrative capacity of the municipalities, in the latter, they are 
the product of a centralized budgetary process that ignores the composition of the 
delegations7 tax bases. Although the DF's fiscal code dictates that the delegations7 
budgets should be allocated according to factors like infrastructure and service needs, 
thus far the DF7s assembly (ALDF) has assigned the budgets mostly based on their 
populations (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2). Table 5.4 compares the delegations' budgets in 
the year 2000 with the property taxes collected in each of the delegations, and shows how 
the tax bases of the delegations do not correspond with the current criteria for 
appropriating their budgets. Instead, budgets are allocated using a redistributive criterion. 
At the extreme, while a person in Milpa Alta who only contributed $1 6 pesos to the DF's 
Treasury received corresponding expenditures of more than $3,500 pesos, a person in 
Miguel Hidalgo received about $500 pesos less than what he or she contributed to the 
DF's budget. 
Table 5.4. Dl?: Property tax and total spending per capita by 
delegation in the year 2000 (constant 2002 pesos) 
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Delegations have different opinions of the current budgetary system, mostly depending 
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on whether they are winners or losers in the current arrangement. On the one hand, 
I I I 
delegations with rich tax bases find the current system unfair and want central authorities 
to return all or part of the tax receipts originating in their jurisdictions. When I asked a 
Delegate from one of the richest jurisdictions about the current budgetary process, he 
argued in favor of changing the budget allocation rules; however, he did not make a 
strong case for the complete devolution of tax autonomy. Most of his recommendations 
consisted of either including a tax-origin (compensatory) parameter in the formulas or 
transferring a proportion of the centrally collected taxes to the delegations of origin 
(Interview L). His answer suggests that Delegates are aware of the political costs of 
taxation. They seem to want to benefit from the rich tax bases in their delegations 
without incumng any of the costs associated with complete fiscal autonomy. 
Conversely, delegates of jurisdictions with poorer tax bases argue in favor of the 
redistributive nature of the current system, and some of them insist that they need even 
more resources to meet their increasing demands. This is the case in delegations like 
Ixtapalapa that are heavily populated and do not have enough resources to meet their 
increasing demands. According to a former Delegate of Ixtapalapa "the budget of the DF 
should make some special provisions for the most populated delegations" (Interview M). 
In general, the main concern of these delegations is that the decentralization of the 
property tax system will reduce or even end the current redistributive budgetary 
appropriations. This potential for tax polarization has also been a main concern of the 
fiscal authorities in the DF. When I asked the former Finance Minister of the DF from the 
last PRI administration why his party did not push to include fiscal decentralization on 
the agenda for political reform of the DF, he answered that "this would have been a very 
unpopular measure because of the (fiscal) divisions that it would have created in the 
city." Similarly, the current PRD government has been skeptical about decentralizing 
taxation because of its potential for tax polarization. According to a high-ranking official 
in the DF's Ministry of Finance: "it would be unfair to have 4 delegations keeping 80% 
of the total property tax yield of the city" (Interview N). 
The concerns of the DF authorities about the potential fiscal-disparity effect of 
decentralizing property taxes are well grounded. As discussed in Chapter 1, local public 
finance theory cautions that decentralization may increase fiscal disparity because it 
grants richer jurisdictions larger tax bases that allow them to lower their tax rates, thus 
attracting businesses and households. This expected fiscal polarization, however, has not 
yet been tested in the DF. Taking advantage of the available data on the property taxes 
originating in each delegation, I calculated the likely level of fiscal disparity between the 
delegations in a scenario of decentralized property taxation in the DF. This exercise is 
intended to show how negative the consequences would really be if the DF were to 
decentralize property taxes to the delegations. Based on the results of Table 5.4, which 
illustrate that the current budgets of the delegations do not take into account their tax 
bases, I compared the budget allocation for the delegations in the year 2000 with an 
allocation based on the proportion of property taxes that originate in each delegation 
(Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5. Total spending per capita in the DP's delegations 
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central delegations, and a steep increase in the level of fiscal disparity among delegations. 
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The two rows at the bottom of Table 5.5 show the coefficients of variation for these two 
Coefficient of variation DF 
Coefficient of variation ZMVM 
different budgetary allocations. The coefficients of variation serve as indicators of the 
1.23 
0.89 
level of fiscal disparity in the DF and the ZMVM as a whole.1° These coefficients show 
that if budgets were assigned according to the delegations' property tax bases, their total 
spending per capita would be more polarized. In the case of the DF, the level of disparity 
would increase three times (0.42 to 1.23), and in the metropolitan area as a whole, the 
coefficient of variation would almost double (0.50 to 0.89). However, in this calculation I 
assume that all spending will be assigned according to the delegations' property tax bases 
10 I calculated the level of fiscal disparity using the coefficient of variation rather than the CC-OCC ratio. 
This is because, in this case, I am calculating the fiscal disparity among the local jurisdictions within a 
single area, rather than comparing two different jurisdictions. The coefficient of variation is a statistical 
measure of dispersion that results fi-om dividing the standard deviation by the mean. 
(using compensatory criteria), which is an extreme assumption as it is likely that the 
process of budget allocation would also take into account other more distributive criteria. 
For this reason, it is more accurate to explore how the levels of fiscal disparity would 
change in the case of property tax collection than in the case of total spending. 
In order to make such a calculation, I begin by recognizing that municipalities in the DF's 
neighboring State of Mexico already operate under a decentralized system. Thus, 
exploring the level of fiscal disparity in the State of Mexico should provide an idea of 
how fiscal disparity levels would change in the DF if property taxes were decentralized. 
The conditions for comparing these two systems are favorable because some 
metropolitan municipalities have similar tax levels to those in the DF's delegations, and 
because in both systems the majority of property tax revenue is concentrated in a few 
local governments. While in the State of Mexico, nine municipalities collect three- 
quarters of the total property tax revenue, in the DF two-thirds of the total property tax 
revenue originates in four delegations (the three central delegations and Alvaro Obregbn). 
In terms of the level of property tax collection per capita, some metropolitan 
municipalities have similar levels of collection as those of certain delegations. Likewise, 
some metropolitan municipalities have similar wealth levels to the DF's delegations. 
Figure 5.5. orders municipalities and delegations according to their wealth levels (from 
left to right) and shows that the municipality of Huixquilucan, for example, generates a 
similar level of property tax collection to rich delegations, like Alvaro Obregon or 
Cuajimlpa. Similarly, municipalities like Ecatepec and Nezahualcoyotl collect about the 
same amount in property taxes per capita as delegations of similar wealth levels, like 
Iztapalapa. 
Figure 5.5. Collection of real property taxes per capita.
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I use this comparison of municipalities and delegations with similar wealth and property
tax collection levels to explore ifthe centralized or decentralized structure of these
jurisdictions affects their levels of tax collection-and therefore their disparity levels. In
the OF's current centralized system, property taxes do not generate fiscal disparity
because they are not related to the delegations' budgets. However, if taxes were to be
decentralized, the level of disparity in property tax collection would be similar to that
currently observed in the metropolitan municipalities. As Table 5.6 shows, from 1989 to
2000 the coefficient of variation for property tax collection in the metropolitan
municipalities was 1.12 and, ifproperty taxes were to be decentralized in the DF, that
coefficient would have a value of 1.21. Also, the coefficient of variation in the
metropolitan municipalities has been growing, which may suggest that, over time, rich
municipalities take advantage of their tax capacity, while the less-developed
municipalities fallbehind.
ionfa e an oe IClents 0 variation In property tax collect
1989 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avg
DF 1.20 1.23 1.23 1.30 1.10 1.10 1.21
ZMEM 0.75 1.02 1.50 1.39 1.26 1.12 1.12 1.39 1.12
T bl 5 6 DF d ZMEM C ffi'
Source: Author, based on data from INEGI and GDF.
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In principle, there is no reason to expect that such a deepening of fiscal disparity would 
be different in the case of the DF." Particularly, it seems plausible to expect that the four 
richest delegations-and perhaps one or two others-would take full advantage of tax 
decentralization. However, it remains unclear if poor delegations would be in a position 
to extract from their existing tax bases more taxes than they receive under the current 
centralized system. Decentralization could result in a higher level of fiscal disparity 
within the DF, and perhaps in a decline in the overall level of tax collection depending on 
whether or not the increases in tax collection in the rich delegations surpass the decline in 
tax collection in the poor delegations. 
The coefficients of variation in Table 5.6 only represent a decentralized allocation of the 
current level of tax collection, without taking into account any variation in the levels of 
tax effort. However, since a full devolution of tax powers generates different tax 
collection incentives in the recipient jurisdictions, it is possible that the process of fiscal 
decentralization would deepen fiscal disparity among the delegations even further. In 
fact, the scenario in Table 5.6 looks more like a situation in which the central authorities 
collect all the delegations' property taxes and redistributes them according to a 
compensatory criterion, rather achieving a true devolution of tax authority. If instead of 
using this scenario, I assume that the decentralization process will also entail returning 
full tax autonomy to the delegations, then in order to gauge the potential effects of this 
process I need to take into account some additional considerations. 
One important consideration relates to the distribution of property tax functions between 
the DF and the delegations. So far, I have ignored any difference in the level of tax 
collection that might originate from having different levels of government in charge of 
administering the system of property taxation. Local public finance theory has made a 
strong case for assigning local jurisdictions control over their property tax bases and rates 
so they can take advantage of the benefits of taxation (see Chapter 1). However, the 
theory on tax assignment does not yet provide a clear normative structure to disentangle 
'' In the last two years of the time series, the coefficients of variation in the DF were smaller than at the 
beginning of the period, but the series includes so few years that no meaningfbl trend can be established 
from these data. 
which level of government should be in charge of which tax function in order to produce 
an efficient system of property taxation. For example, the efficiency implications of 
separating the assessment, collection, and enforcement of property taxes among different 
tiers of government are not yet clear. 
Although a specific analysis of this distribution of tax functions goes beyond the scope of 
this study, I will argue that, when all else is equal, the deeper the devolution of tax 
powers and responsibilities to the delegations, the higher the potential increase in the 
level of fiscal disparity. Alternatively, the centralization of the most involved tax-related 
functions, like the update of the property values and the keeping of cadastral records, can 
minimize the potential reductions in tax collection in the poor delegations, thereby 
reducing the possible increase in fiscal disparity. Therefore, one assignment of tax 
functions that would minimize the potential for fiscal disparity is one in which 
delegations are given full autonomy to set the tax bases and rates, which would cause 
them to be more accountable and responsive. However, since property taxes are not 
necessarily easy or cheap to administer, such assignment must keep the most involved 
functions centralized or, at least, the GDF must provide full and constant technical 
support to the poor delegations. This support could take many forms, from providing 
assistance for very specific functions like cadastral mapping or billing, to almost 
completely contracting out property tax functions to the GDF. In the State of Puebla, for 
example, poor municipalities pay the state govemment a percentage (10%) of their total 
tax collection, and the state remains in control of most property tax functions such as 
assessment, billing, and enforcement. 
Another important consideration in giving back full tax autonomy to the delegations is 
that this exercise reduces the distance between taxpayers and collectors. Unlike the 
metropolitan municipalities where there is a close proximity between local authorities 
and taxpayers, in the DF this relationship is kept at arms-length, which seems to be 
conducive to maintaining high levels of tax collection. Although in this analysis, I did not 
statistically test the association between tax collection levels and the proximity between 
tax authorities and taxpayers, several of my interviewees suggested that the decentralized 
system in the State of Mexico gives more discretion to the authorities, which may reduce 
the level of tax collection. In contrast, in the centralized system of the DF, citizens do not 
interact directly with their local tax authorities in making their tax payments, but with the 
GDF Treasury. From a political economy perspective, this lack of proximity reduces the 
discretion of tax authorities, as it is not in their interest to reduce the tax obligations of 
citizens and voters because they do not directly form part of their political constituencies. 
If this were the case, then tax decentralization in the DF could have a negative impact on 
the levels of tax collection. Note however, that the theoretical and empirical discussion 
about the impact of proximity between government and citizens on corruption and other 
administrative malpractices is far from finished. While some ague that proximity reduces 
corruption by increasing transparency and accountability (von Braun & Grote 2000), 
others argue the opposite (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1997 and Tanzi 2000). 
The previous analysis illustrates the potential of decentralization to increase fiscal 
disparity. However, this analysis represents an extreme case in the sense that it does not 
take into account policy measures that are used by governments to mitigate the 
unintended consequences of decentralization. Specifically, it has not dealt with the use of 
transfers to reduce fiscal disparity. One of the main rationales of intergovernmental 
transfers is that of fiscal equity; according to which the upper tiers of governments can 
make use of their redistributive powers to close the fiscal gaps that may result from 
decentralization. Actually, if the transfer system is properly designed, it can help reduce 
the level of fiscal disparity without endangering the efficiency of local tax collection. It is 
unlikely that the DF would employ a system of transfers without a redistributive 
component, so it is only in an extreme case that the predicted levels of fiscal disparity 
would be observed. However, in the case of the DF, incorporating these kinds of 
redistributive parameters would be difficult because the local transfer system would have 
to be created from scratch, and the drafting of new fiscal pacts is always politically 
sensitive. In fact, some of my interviewees, including the current tax authorities, are 
skeptical about whether it is possible to create a truly equitable transfer system that is 
technically sound and that receives political support from the majority of stakeholders. 
So far, the analysis has dealt with the direct effects of decentralization on fiscal disparity 
and tax collection levels in the DF and the ZMVM. However, a system of decentralized 
fiscal institutions has other more general effects, which have both advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to a more centralized governance structure. There are at least 
two advantages that require consideration: the positive impact of decentralization on 
incentives to increase tax collection, and the operation of a more efficient system of 
subnational borrowing. 
The first advantage relates to incentives for the strongest local governments to increase 
their tax collections in a decentralized system. As things stand today in the DF, 
delegations are only able to keep a very small portion of the taxes generated in their 
territories (such as rent paid on their properties and fees for the use of public sports 
facilities), so that they have no incentive to increase their own revenues. Some 
delegations have substantial local revenue potential, but because they know that these tax 
yields will go to the central Treasury and they will only receive a small fraction of the 
benefits through the annual budget, they have little incentive to bear the full cost of 
taxation. However, this may only be a concern for the richest delegations, as they are the 
only ones that would gain from a system of tax autonomy. Also, because the richest 
delegations benefit more, decentralization may actually increase or reinforce the fiscal 
disparity between the delegations. 
Concerning the second advantage, moving toward a more decentralized structure 
provides favorable conditions for local jurisdictions to access credit markets. As Chapter 
3 shows, metropolitan municipalities like Naucalpan, Ecatepec, and Tlanepantla are 
beginning to access credit markets and, although it is still too soon to assess what their 
overall credit performance will be, so far their experience with the use of credit has been 
positive. This is in part because they are being disciplined by market forces. Conversely, 
in the DF, where the delegations' debt is managed centrally and without any direct role of 
the market system, the experience with the use of credit has not been totally 
satisfactory.12 There are a number of causes for the inefficient use of credit in the 
delegations, but they can be reduced to the absence of market regulations to hold local 
authorities accountable for their debt management. Because the authorized levels of 
indebtedness depend solely on a delegation's capacity to produce technical reports to 
justify its need for credit and are not related to fiscal discipline and performance, 
delegations do not have incentives to use these funds efficiently. Additionally, because 
local authorities do not generate their own revenues to pay back the loans, the link 
between the productive use of credit financing and debt repayment is missing. Therefore, 
when it comes to the local use of credit, fiscal discipline seems to thrive more readily in a 
decentralized system with market mechanisms, than in a centralized structure based on 
hierarchical rationale or other discretionary systems of norms. 
Despite these two potential advantages, there are some general disadvantages associated 
with decentralization. In addition to the specific problem of fiscal disparity, decentralized 
fiscal structures can increase the competition for political power and the complexity of 
allocating expenditure responsibilities. Concerning the first political consideration, 
devolving tax powers to delegations may create very strong Delegates, who may directly 
challenge the political power of the Mayor. This is more likely to happen in the three or 
Four richest delegations, as the series of political confi-ontations from 2000 to 2003 
between the DF's mayor and the former delegate from Miguel Hidalgo illustrate. During 
his administration, Delegate Aus den Ruthen presented three constitutional controversies 
against the mayor: one concerning the jurisdiction over the Park of "Chapultepec," and 
two others related to the delegations' budgetary process. Delegate Aus den Ruthen knew 
that the legal solution to these controversies would take a long time to be settled, so he 
decided to confront the mayor directly by organizing a public demonstration in fi-ont of 
the mayor's office (Interview L). Presently, although delegations have been given semi- 
autonomous political powers, they are still fiscally dependent on the DF's Executive and 
Legislative powers. This situation has kept the delegations relatively in line with the DF's 
12 In some cases, delegations have mismanaged their debt. For example, during the first half of 2004, there 
were various corruption scandals related to the illegal use of funds in various delegations-like in Gustavo 
A. Madero (PRD) where the Delegate was forced to resign. Some of these scandals relate to the illegal use 
of credit funds for procurement and for political campaigns. 
authorities, but if they become financially independent, and thus politically stronger, the 
mayor may have trouble limiting the power of the strongest delegates, and maintaining 
political cohesion in the DF. 
The last problem of decentralized fiscal systems relates to the simultaneity with which 
taxes and expenditures must be transferred to the delegations. In the case of the 
municipalities, the constitutional reform of 1983 dealt with this situation by giving them 
control over property taxes, together with extensive responsibilities for providing basic 
public services. In the case of the DF, however, this is still a pending issue. So far, 
discussions about revenue decentralization have not directly addressed the assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities. Before discussing the decentralization of taxation, those 
involved in the debate should first specify the services for which the delegations would 
be responsible before giving them more taxing powers (Ruiz-Funes 1999) 
Fiscal policy theorists insist on the importance of maintaining congruence between the 
decentralization of revenues and expenditures. However, this may not be an easy task in 
the DF both because of the notable differences in the spending capacities of the 
delegations, and because presently many services are provided concurrently between the 
delegations and the GDF-often without following a congruent scheme of service 
provision. An additional complexity relates to the fact that redesigning the system of 
expenditure functions entails a movement of personnel either across delegations or 
between delegations and the GDF. This movement of personnel would most likely create 
serious conflicts with the DF's workers union, because as things stand today, it is difficult 
to relocate personnel within the DF. According to a former delegate, this is a very serious 
problem because it has a direct effect on the quality of service provision. For example, a 
delegation may have a shortage of street cleaners and an excess of firefighters, but there 
is little delegates can do to shuffle this personnel either to the GDF or to other delegations 
that may have different needs (Interview L). In addition, at present the allocation of 
spending assignments is not clearly regulated, and such regulation would entail both a 
substantial revision of the current norms (mainly the Statute of Government, but also a 
large number of specific laws), and the design of an efficient system of transfer 
equalization to compensate for the differences in spending needs among the delegations. 
The need for this kind of regulation and clarification of fiscal functions has been rapidly 
increasing since the beginning of the political transition in the DF. According to an astute 
observer of the DF, "before the political reform, when all delegates belonged to the same 
political party, the regulation of the revenue and spending functions was not crucial, but 
now in the current context of continuous political struggles, it is urgent to clarify which 
level of government should do what" (Interview 0). 
5.7. Conclusion 
As I originally hypothesized, the level of fiscal disparity of the ZMVM increased during 
the process of fiscal decentralization in the 1990s. This resulted from the combined effect 
of three factors: the impact of transfers on property tax collection, the spatial 
characteristics of the ZMVM, and the coexistence of both a centralized and a 
decentralized governance structure in the ZMVM, each with different tax institutions. 
This shows that the current fiscal condition of the ZMVM is accounted for by multiple 
determinants, and although the federal transfer system has had a redistributive effect as 
shown in Chapter 4, the fiscal, spatial, and structural differences between the jurisdictions 
of the ZMVM are so pronounced that the fiscal disparity of this area still increased during 
the 1990s. 
Concerning the impact of transfers on property tax collection, my calculations showed an 
eightfold increase in the gap of property tax collection in the ZMVM. This gap resulted 
from both an increase in taxes in the DF and a constant pattern of collection in the 
metropolitan municipalities. While the DF's tax reform generated substantial increases in 
tax collection, in the metropolitan municipalities the average level of tax collection 
remained constant despite the massive increase of people and new housing. Another 
factor that contributed to the increase in fiscal disparity is the type of urbanization pattern 
in the ZMVM. This pattern has been characterized by a high degree of informality in the 
incorporation of land into residential uses, which has resulted in large numbers of 
potential taxpayers falling outside of the tax net. In other cases, more structured types of 
urbanization patterns have occurred, but this has mostly produced low-income housing, 
which does not generate a substantial property tax yield.'3 
My analysis also found that the heterogeneous composition of the ZMVM contributes to 
its fiscal fragmentation. Such fragmentation not only results from the jurisdictions' 
differences in revenue capacities and expenditure needs, but also fkom the fact that each 
jurisdiction has a different capacity to respond to the decentralization process. In general, 
resource requirements and public service demands are running counter to each other in 
the current situation. While communities in the DF have an abundance of resources and 
public services, those in the metropolitan municipalities not only have limited access to 
tax bases and resource endowments, but also face a continuous and growing demand for 
services and infrastructure in virtually all areas. In this sense, decentralization is 
contributing to a deepening of the longstanding differences in the levels of services and 
infrastructure between the DF and the metropolitan municipalities. This, in turn, is 
generating a process of urban segregation driven by the real estate market that is 
accentuating the fiscal fragmentation of the ZMVM. 
Concerning the third and last factor, my analysis found that the type of governance 
structure also affects the level of fiscal disparity between the jurisdictions of the ZMVM. 
The study of the ZMVM was ideal for performing this kind of analysis because, while 
some delegations and metropolitan municipalities have very similar characteristics, they 
have different governance structures. Namely, the former are centrally structured and the 
latter have full autonomy over their property taxes. I show that if taxes were given back 
to the delegations according to a purely compensatory criterion, this would increase fiscal 
disparity in the DF and the ZMVM as a whole. Despite this effect, policy measures exist 
that can mitigate fiscal disparities without losing the benefits of a decentralized system of 
local taxation. In the DF, one such measure would be the creation of a compensatory 
transfer system for the GDF. Other measures include a detailed division of the tax 
functions between the GDF and the delegations that would leave the most involved 
13 There are some exceptions of municipalities with either high industrial tax bases (Tlanepantla) or high- 
income residential projects (Huixquilucan) that have been able to increase their tax revenue substantially. 
functions at the central level. At the metropolitan level, there are also policy alternatives 
to mitigate the potential fiscal disparity caused by decentralization. Some of the more 
technically feasible and politically viable alternatives include the creation of metropolitan 
funds, and the formation of special districts for the metropolitan provision of specific 
services. In the final chapter I turn to a close consideration of these two alternatives. 

CHAPTER 6 
MOVING FORWARD: 
ALTERNATIVES TO MITIGATE FISCAL DISPARITY IN THE ZMVM 
6.1. Introduction 
In this study I explored the issue of fiscal disparity within the Metropolitan Zone of the 
Valley of Mexico (ZMVM). According to my analysis, during the 1990s fiscal disparity 
in the ZMVM resulted from the combined effect of two factors: the differing 
characteristics of its jurisdictions and the process of fiscal decentralization. On one level, 
fiscal decentralization mitigated jurisdictional differences through the use of a system of 
redistributive transfers. On another level, in contrast to the equalization effect of 
transfers, decentralization exacerbated the level of fiscal disparity by accentuating the 
difference between the jurisdictions' expenditure needs and their capacities to collect 
local taxes. The combined effect was such that the level of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM 
increased during the 1990s. This result corroborates my original hypothesis that because 
decentralization may give rich jurisdictions larger tax bases and lower tax rates than 
poorer jurisdictions, fiscal disparity between jurisdictions may increase. 
This is consistent with the results of U.S. analysts who have found that in decentralized 
contexts, fiscally independent local governments tend to exclude those individuals who 
require extra expenditures in excess of their marginal contributions to locally-raised 
revenue (Oakland 1979, Chemick and Reschovsky 2001). Both because decentralization 
has a tendency to increase fiscal disparity, and because policies of decentralization are 
likely to continue, solutions are needed to ensure that services are fairly and efficiently 
provided and financed. The current financial and governance arrangements are not 
directly dealing with these unintended consequences of decentralization, so specific 
solutions must be devised. According to M. Jerome-Forget (in P. Hobson and F. St- 
Hilaire, 1994: i) "Local government structures are often unwieldy, tax and 
transfer systems are ill-adapted to the form and function of modem city-region 
economies, and government policies, in general, seldom recognize or address the 
particular needs of cities." Similarly, an OECD report (2001: 95) argues that "there is 
considerable scope for countries to improve the present situation by developing 
national/regional frameworks, which provide more appropriate financial support for a 
more strategic approach to metropolitan governance." 
In response to this situation, countries have devised a number of policy solutions to deal 
with problems of fiscal disparity and more generally, with the financing and governance 
of metropolitan areas. Most of these solutions, however, have been structured for 
developed countries (OECD: 2001), while metropolitan areas in developing countries 
continue to be too fragmented for effective and equitable service financing and provision. 
In Latin America, for example "there appears to be no country that has a government 
structure that adequately encompasses the economically relevant metropolitan region" 
(Bird and Slack 2004: 46). Looking at the available policy options might be a good first 
step in beginning to devise solutions for developing countries. 
In this last chapter, I first discuss the main policy options for dealing with fiscal disparity 
in metropolitan areas and assess their viability for the ZMVM. Second, I focus the 
discussion on the two policy alternatives that I believe to be the most technically and 
politically feasible for the ZMVM. Third, I discuss the obstacles to reducing fiscal 
disparity in the ZMVM and point to some of the conditions that would lead to an 
improvement of the situation. Finally, I conclude by discussing the extent to which my 
results can be generalized, and by underscoring the importance of solving the problem of 
fiscal disparity in other metropolitan areas. 
6.2. General solutions to fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas 
Public finance theorists have identified a number of alternatives to mitigate problems of 
fiscal disparity, especially in the United States where for more than four decades 
disparities have generated locational distortions and intra-metropolitan differences in 
metropolitan areas (Oakland 1979). Before discussing the available altematives, I note 
that there are two factors that policymakers must bear in mind. First, despite the technical 
differences between the altematives, all share the same objective, which is to ensure that 
municipalities with the highest needs-or lowest tax capacities-receive resources in an 
efficient and equitable way, so that they can provide adequate public services at 
reasonable tax rates. In other words, additional resources should target those local 
governments that, usually through no fault of their own, are in the weakest fiscal 
condition either because of relatively high costs, large service responsibilities, or low 
revenue-raising capacity (Green and Reschovsky 1994). Second, an optimal alternative 
does not exist, because, as Bird and Slack (2004: 46) argue, "the precise nature of the 
'best' system for any particular region remains highly context-dependent in both theory 
and practice." 
Policy solutions to fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas are numerous, but I will focus 
on the five main alternatives that either directly address problems of fiscal disparity in 
metropolitan areas or are the most technically and politically feasible for the ZMVM. 
These alternatives are intergovernmental assistance, the centralization of expenditure 
functions, the creation of a metropolitan government, the formation of a compensatory 
metropolitan fund, and the creation of a special purpose authority. In the remainder of 
this section I discuss the first three policy solutions, which directly pertain to the 
problems of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas. In the next section, I discuss the last 
two alternatives, which are the most technically and politically feasible for the ZMVM. 
6.2.1. Intergovernmental assistance 
One way to deal with the problem of fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas is by pursuing 
fiscal equalization through the use of intergovernmental assistance-either in the form of 
transfers or aid. By increasing the flow of financial assistance from higher governmental 
levels and targeting it to the most distressed jurisdictions, intergovernmental assistance 
helps reduce fiscal disparity (Bahl2000). In this way, local jurisdictions increase their 
revenue in order to provide services without increasing the tax burden imposed on their 
residents. Such assistance could come from either the state or the federal government, 
and it could be categorical or completely unrestricted (Oakland 1979). 
In the case of the ZMVM, such an alternative would entail compensating for the 
unattractiveness of the metropolitan municipalities relative to the DF by offsetting their 
lower levels of infrastructure and service quality and coverage. This would be 
accomplished by targeting higher-level government assistance to jurisdictions with low 
per capita income (Rothenberg 1970). Notice that although income would be an 
appropriate criterion to use in determining governmental assistance, the objective of this 
assistance is not per se to raise the income of poor jurisdictions. Instead, the aim is to 
neutralize the locational distortions and distributional inequities brought about by the 
spatial concentration of poor people (See Oakland 1979: 348-349). The assistance from 
higher-level governments in the ZMVM would most likely have to come fiom the federal 
government. This is so because the ZMVM crosses state boundaries and because, unlike 
the United States and other developed countries, state-level finances in Mexico are rather 
weak.' Nevertheless, states are by no means precluded from assigning resources to their 
metropolitan areas. For example, in July 2003 the Congress of the State of Mexico 
approved a constitutional reform to recognize the existence of metropolitan areas in the 
State and to create a fund with state and municipal revenues for the financing of 
metropolitan projects (see Section 6.3.1). 
Although in theory, intergovernmental assistance is a straightforward way to reduce fiscal 
disparity among jurisdictions, in practice this may not be a viable option for the ZMVM. 
This is due to at least two reasons. First, federal assistance to metropolitan areas would 
have to be made in addition to the current transfer programs ofparticipaciones and 
aportaciones. Otherwise, this would mean a reduction in federal transfers going to the 
non-metropolitan areas, a measure that would most likely be opposed by the jurisdictions 
that stand to lose from the creation of such an assistance program. Second, and most 
important, is the problem of selective targeting of federal funds. Mexico is a federal 
republic that does not legally recognize intermediate tiers of government. Therefore, any 
intergovernmental assistance to metropolitan areas would have to be channeled to the 
states and not directly to the metropolitan areas. This problem could perhaps be solved by 
establishing a federal mandate that states must assign such assistance entirely to their 
' In developed countries, state governments rely on the most elastic and productive tax bases (i.e., income 
and sales), so that they can generate funds to relieve the fiscal problems of the most distressed jurisdictions. 
In Mexico, however, state taxes are very low, and in fact during the 1990s the rate of increase of state taxes 
was lower than the rate of municipal taxes. 
metropolitan areas; however, policymakers must acknowledge that the selective targeting 
of jurisdictions is politically sensitive. 
Even if a mechanism is found to target universalistic intergovernmental assistance to 
metropolitan areas, there is an additional problem with this alternative. Mexico's federal 
system does not allow for asymmetric policies. This means that federal assistance to 
metropolitan areas cannot be restricted to the ZMVM, but would have to be directed to all 
other metropolitan areas as well. Although from a national perspective, this might be 
appropriate in equity terms, for the ZMVM this could result in low levels of assistance. 
The amount of assistance would depend on the size and the allocation formulas of the 
federal assistance, but there is reason to believe that such assistance would not be 
sufficient to compensate for fiscal disparities in the ZMVM. For example, previous urban 
development programs have shown that it is commonly not in the interest of the federal 
government to channel substantive resources to such programs. This was the case with 
the "100 Cities Program" (Programa de 100 Ciudades), which was one of the few 
national programs focused on land use and urban infrastructure in Mexico. During the 
1990s-the decade in which the program existed-the 100 Cities Program received twenty 
times fewer resources than PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), which 
was another national development program that was implemented during the 1990s 
(Garza 2003 : 104). Thus, through this alternative the ZMVM would be able to reduce its 
fiscal disparity levels only in the unlikely case that federal assistance is large and is 
targeted to metropolitan areas. 
6.2.2. Centralization of expenditure functions 
Because problems of fiscal disparity arise either from low tax capacity or extensive 
expenditure needs, one additional way to mitigate these problems is to shift the locus of 
responsibility for the financing of certain expenditure needs to higher tiers of 
government-usual1 y to metropolitan or regional governments (Oakland 1979). This 
solution would discharge local jurisdictions fi-om the spending responsibility of the 
centralized service, and therefore fiscal disparity would decline. In the case of the 
ZMVM this would entail shifting the provision of local services fiom the municipalities 
and delegations to either the DF and the State of Mexico or to the federal government. 
State-wide services such as education and health would have to be shifted to the federal 
government. 
Although in theory shifting expenditure functions to higher levels of government would 
reduce the financial pressure on state and local governments and might help reduce fiscal 
disparity, there are various problems associated with this alternative. First, the 
centralization of public services is expected to result in a uniform provision of services. 
In the ZMVM this is particularly critical because the area is comprised of jurisdictions 
with very different levels of service needs. Thus, the uniform provision of services will 
not satisfy these different needs adequately. Second, it is not easy to identify which 
services should be centralized and at what level. In other words, the issue of spending 
assignments in metropolitan regions is not yet resolved. As a matter of general strategy, 
the centralized services should be those in which the poorer jurisdictions (metropolitan 
municipalities) devote substantially more resources to the service than the richer 
jurisdictions (delegations). Additionally, the services should also have the characteristic 
that the efficiency loss fiom centralization should be small. Third, such an alternative 
does not resonate well with the current context of decentralized governance. For the last 
three decades, the centralized provision of services has been identified with a number of 
inefficiencies, so this option may not be attractive to policyrnakers. Some of the problems 
with centralization include the inability to allocate resources efficiently, the lack of 
response to the individualized service needs of the jurisdictions because of the uniform 
provision of services, the inability of central governments to meet an increasing demand 
for public goods and services, and being anti-democratic in the sense that local taxpayers 
do not make their own spending decisions (Bangura, 2000; Smoke, 2001; and Tanzi, 
2001). 
There is one last problem with this alternative that is especially problematic in countries 
with a history of decentralization similar to Mexico's, which is that centralization implies 
a new financial and political balance that the central government may not be willing to 
accept. A very good example of this problem can be found in the inability of a number of 
states to recentralize the provision of education services in 2001. At that time, the states 
of Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Zacatecas, Chiapas, Baja California Sur, and most notably, Tlaxcala 
repudiated their responsibilities for the provision of basic education, which was given to 
them in 1992, and requested that the federal government recentralize their education 
services (Reforma. December 5,200 1 and December 19,200 1 .) Their main complaint 
was that the federal government had not adhered to the decentralization agreement and 
had not transferred enough resources for the financing of basic education. The situation 
became so contentious that in 2003, the states of Tlaxcala and Quintana Roo filed a 
constitutional controversy against the federal government (Reforma. March 2 1,2003 .) 
Despite these demands, the federal government-through the Ministries of Finance and 
Education-opposed the measure to take over the education services and condemned the 
states for failing to assume their responsibility to provide basic education (La Jornada. 
December 5,2001 .) Thus, although technically viable, in practice the centralization of 
services can be so politically sensitive that it is not a feasible solution to the problem of 
fiscal disparity. 
6.2.3. Creation of a metropolitan government 
The third and most comprehensive way to mitigate fiscal disparity is to integrate local 
jurisdictions into an all-encompassing metropolitan government. There are two rationales 
for treating a continuous agglomeration of local jurisdictions as a single entity: 
externalities and redistribution. First, economic theory recommends that to the extent 
possible, users should pay for local services. However, for a local government that finds 
itself embedded in an increasingly built-up area with a constant influx of citizens from 
other jurisdictions, this is not always possible as non-residents consume some of the 
locally provided services. The problem of externalities is particularly visible in the 
provision of infrastructure because spillovers are generated due to the large scale of 
infrastructure that can only be internalized by coordination with, or provision from higher 
tiers of government (Sharpe 1995). The second rationale for creating a single authority 
for the whole metropolitan area has to do with redistribution and social segregation. 
Under a li-agmented scheme of local governance, high-income groups will try to avoid 
the costs of redistributing local services, so they will tend to cluster, separating 
themselves fiom the low-income groups (Sharpe 1995). Under such conditions, forming a 
metropolitan govemment is the most direct way to deal with the problem because it fully 
internalizes the inter-jurisdictional externalities. 
In the case of the ZMVM, such a measure would entail the amalgamation of the 
metropolitan municipalities into the DF. Although the creation of a metropolitan 
govemment in the ZMVM would directly eliminate fiscal disparity and would increase 
the financial capacity of metropolitan municipalities, currently a number of technical, 
political, and legal obstacles render this alternative inoperable. Suffice to say that one of 
the central principles of the federalist Mexican system is that of state sovereignty, with 
which the creation of a metropolitan government in the ZMVM would conflict. In 
addition to this limitation, there are a number of general shortcomings associated with the 
creation of a metropolitan government that would also apply to the ZMVM. Therefore, 
any serious attempt to create a metropolitan government in the ZMVM would have to 
deal with these shortcomings, which include: 
(I)  Resistance of wealthier jurisdictions to redistribution: The more affluent 
jurisdictions resist taking on the severe problems confronting the poorer jurisdictions and 
are convinced that they can escape these problems through physical separation. 
(2) Moving the government away from thepeople: There is a general concern both in the 
poor and the rich jurisdictions that a metropolitan government would be further removed 
from the citizens and would not be as responsive to their needs. 
(3) Lack of good technical rationale on efficiency grounds: The chief gain fiom area- 
wide governance would be equity, but not necessarily efficiency. A metropolitan 
government may improve the provision of services to low-income communities, but it 
may not necessarily increase technical efficiency (i.e., cost-cutting) in the delivery of 
public services. It seems intuitively correct that fragmentation of government leads to 
duplication of services and diseconomies of scale, but there is little evidence that 
consolidation captures economies of scale. 
(4) Vertical inter-jurisdictional tensions: The creation of a metropolitan government 
may introduce tension with both the upper and the lower tiers of government. According 
to Sharpe (1995: 22) "above may be a senior government concerned about a potential 
rival, and below the traditional system of local govemment, which can be resentful of an 
interloper that will limit its authority." Moreover, when the metropolitan area is the 
capital city, tension with the upper tier of government may be more acute, as the central 
government may be reluctant to give up any power on the grounds that a capital is the 
territorial representation of the entire nation. 
(5) Metropolitan boundaries: When creating a metropolitan government, policymakers 
must decide where to draw the boundaries. Based on a pure externality principle, the 
boundaries should encompass the core city's "influence area" which is the area encircling 
the built-up core that is functional to the core in terms of employment and services 
(Sharpe 1995). The problem with such an approach is that it is not easy to keep the level 
of internalization at a reasonable level, as there is tendency to increase the scope of the 
govemment to efficiently perform certain functions. 
(6) Loss of the advantages of fragmented governance: According to the public choice 
tradition, there are a number of advantages associated with having a fragmented 
governance structure that would be lost in a more integrated arrangement. For example, a 
variety of local governments provide greater responsiveness to diverse citizen needs and 
preferences than a more integrated arrangement. Similarly, when services are delivered 
by a variety of governments and private vendors, this provision is more efficient, 
effective, and responsive. This type of governance also prevents the monopolistic 
provision of services and provides more opportunities for citizens to get involved in 
government (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). 
6.3. Specific solutions to fiscal disparity in the ZMVM 
In the previous section I discussed some of the main policy tools that have been proposed 
to ameliorate fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas. I also underscored some of the 
problems that make them unviable solutions for the ZMVM. Public finance and 
metropolitan governance analysts have proposed further policy alternatives that are meant 
to alter the financial and governance arrangements of metropolitan areas in order to 
improve their fiscal condition (see, for example, OECD 2001 and Sharpe 1995). Because 
the utility of any alternative is context-specific, I focus on the two that in my opinion are 
the most viable for the ZMVM, the formation of a compensatory metropolitan fund and 
the creation of a special-purpose authority. 
6.3.1. Compensatory metropolitan fund for the ZMVM 
Under the current legal scheme, the creation of a compensatory metropolitan fund would 
be a feasible alternative that would mitigate fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. The objective 
of such a hnd  would be to create a system of compensation in order to redistribute the 
burdens and benefits among the jurisdictions of the ZMVM. There are three phases to the 
creation of a compensatory metropolitan fund: the integration of the pool of funds, the 
establishment of the distribution criteria, and the development of specific projects. 
Through these three phases, compensatory funds can be designed so as to target those 
areas with lower income levels than the region's average, which would then reduce fiscal 
disparity. 
In the integration of a compensatory fund for the ZMVM, optimally, financing must 
come fkom all three levels of government. State and municipal governments must 
contribute their own resources to the fund. Their contribution could be calculated as a 
function of the aggregate value of their fiscal bases. The financial contributions of the 
states and the municipalities are beneficial to the operation of the fund, both because they 
would increase the size of the fund, and because this would foster ownership and 
engagement in the allocation and management of the fund. However, due to the low fiscal 
capacity of the metropolitan municipalities and the limited revenue autonomy of the 
delegations, the fund's resources would most likely have to come from the upper tiers of 
government. 
In terms of state-level finance, resources would have to come from an increase in the 
DF's andlor State of Mexico's budgets for metropolitan projects. However, judging from 
the low level of resources that the DF and the State of Mexico assign to the financing of 
the existing metropolitan bodies, there is reason to believe that these increases would not 
be substantial. Therefore, most financing would probably have to come from the federal 
government. The federal government could contribute to the financing of the 
metropolitan fund in two main ways. First, it could divert some of the existing federal 
transfers (participaciones and aportaciones) to the metropolitan fund. The problem with 
this alternative is that it requires a reform of the National System of Fiscal Coordination 
that may not be feasible in the near future. In November of 2003 a group a federal 
deputies from the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) presented a bill to Congress 
that would have reformed the Law of Fiscal Coordination precisely to divert resources 
from the aportaciones system to an Earmarked Fund for Metropolitan Development, but 
the bill was rejected. The proposal from the PRD was very well thought of and truly 
captured the need for more resources in metropolitan areas, but it is clear that the 
proposal was not supported by the deputies of those non-metropolitan constituencies that 
would not have gained from such measure. 
A second way in which the federal government could contribute to the financing of the 
metropolitan fund is by expanding the level of resources that the jurisdictions in 
metropolitan areas currently receive. Note that because of the federalist nature of the 
Mexican system, these resources would not be exclusively targeted to the ZMVM but to 
all other metropolitan areas as well (see Section 6.2.1 .). However, in the case of the 
ZMVM this may be the only option that would convince the political actors to agree on 
the creation of a metropolitan fund, as currently jurisdictions do not have incentives to 
share their scarce revenues with their neighbors.2 Nevertheless, due to the current 
political fragmentation of the ZMVM, it should not be assumed that the federal 
government will commit additional resources to this area. 
The Delegate of Miguel Hidalgo and the Ex-delegates of Ixtapalapa and Cuajirnalpa told me that they 
agree that it is crucial that the federal government contribute with additional resources. 
Even if the federal government does not commit additional resources to form a 
compensatory metropolitan fund, there are ways in which the current system could 
generate resources to finance the metropolitan fund. A first option would be to charge an 
additional "metropolitan rate" on some of the existing state and municipal taxes. These 
surcharges would be levied on top of the existing rates and the receipts would go to the 
metropolitan fund. The rationale for establishing a metropolitan rate would be to capture 
the tax base of the better-off jurisdictions of the metropolitan area to finance metropolitan 
services. What this actually means is a system of tax-base sharing in which a percentage 
of the tax base coming from the rich part of the metropolitan area goes into a pool that is 
further redistributed according to certain parameters that ultimately benefit the more 
fiscally distressed jurisdictions. 
In the case of the ZMVM, the idea would be to capture the tax base of the DF to finance 
services in the whole metropolitan area. However, since the metropolitan area does not 
exist as a legal entity, it does not have the political autonomy to impose taxes. Thus, in 
the current situation the only way this would work is through an agreement between the 
DF and the State of Mexico to levy such rates and pool the tax yields that would be 
further distributed to the metropolitan area. 
In principle, such a surcharge could be levied on a number of local taxes, including 
payroll taxes (like in Australia), which are easily administered and relatively productive 
at low rates, and vehicle and fuel taxes (like in the United States and Canada), for which 
there is a strong economic and administrative rationale for their leverage on a 
metropolitan scale. Alternatively, metropolitan surcharges could be levied on property 
taxes, as in the case of the Minneapolis-St. Paul region of Minnesota, where 40% of the 
region's taxes on commercial and industrial property are distributed throughout the 
region according to a formula based on each jurisdictions' population and fiscal capacity. 
Another financing mechanism could be higher rates on development charges, which are a 
"one-time levy imposed on developers to finance growth-related capital costs associated 
with new development" (Bird and Slack 2004). 
For the case of the ZMVM, perhaps the most viable option would be to levy a 
metropolitan surcharge on fuels, as it was levied in the past. From 1995 to 1997 the 
Environmental Trust Fund for the Valley of Mexico (Fideicomiso Ambiental del Valle de 
Mkxico) received money collected from the application of a surcharge of MX$0.02 per 
liter of gasoline sold in the ZMVM. At that time, the surcharge existed exclusively to 
support the projects of the Metropolitan Commission for the Environment (Molina and 
Molina in Molina and Molina eds. 2002),~ so there is no reason why this type of 
surcharge could not be again applied to finance metropolitan projects. The use of 
development charges also appears to be a good financing option, considering the very 
large amount of construction projects that take place in the metropolitan municipalities. 
These charges could at least partially cover some of the high costs of infrastructure and 
service provision that the metropolitan municipalities face as a consequence of their 
dramatic development. 
In addition, the fund's structure should also ensure that it is distributed equitably. Ideally, 
the distribution of a compensatory fund should be carried out according to local needs 
and the differing costs of service provision. In practice, these criteria are not always 
easily quantifiable, so to obtain an equitable distribution, policymakers may have to 
resolve some technical difficulties (Green and Reschovsky 1994.) Although ensuring this 
kind of compensatory distribution may not be an easy task, the creation of a metropolitan 
fund faces fewer challenges than other alternatives. Actually in the last few years this 
option has caught the attention of policymakers in the country. At the national level, for 
example, the 2001 -2006 National Program of Urban Development and Territorial 
Ordering established the creation of a Regional Compensatory Fund as one of the main 
objectives of regional policy in Mexico. Unfortunately, the Plan did not establish when 
and how this fund would operate (Garza 2003), but at least it recognized the fund as a 
strategic objective. Although yet limited, at the level of the ZMVM, steps towards the 
creation of a metropolitan fund have also been taken. 
The adrmnistration of the surcharge had the active participation of the Ministry of Finance, which was 
responsible for its annual renewal. The surcharge ceased to operate in 1998. According to Claudia 
Scheinbaum, head of the DF's Ministry for the Environment, such a decision was "absolutely political." La 
Jornada. June 15,2002, in Davis and Raich (2003). 
First, in September of 2003, the State of Mexico amended its constitution to acknowledge 
the legal existence of metropolitan zones within the State (art. 61/XLIII/b) and to 
facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination within municipalities, between municipalities 
and delegations, and between municipalities and the State of Mexico. That same year, the 
Congress of the State of Mexico created a fund with state and municipal resources to 
handle problems of metropolitan scope in the areas of transportation, environment, 
health, and human settlements, amongst others. Originally, 60% of the fund was to be 
financed with municipal resources and the remaining 40% with funds from the State of 
Mexico. In those cases when municipalities did not have enough resources, they were 
given the legal right to exempt their contributions (La Jornada. July 30,2003.) 
Second, and perhaps more important, in March of 2000 the governments of the State of 
Mexico and the DF signed an agreement requesting the federal government to finance the 
creation of the Fund for Metropolitan Services and Infrastructure (Fondo de Obras y 
Servicios Metropolitanos). According to this agreement, in addition to federal funding, 
the DF and the State of Mexico would also assign resources for the creation of the Fund 
"in a proportional and equitable manner." Similarly, the agreement stated that these 
governments "will make their respective municipalities and delegations contribute to the 
fund when they are directly benefited" (Acuerdo. May 4,2000). 
Although the agreement shows that the DF and the State of Mexico have been able to 
work together to move the metropolitan agenda forward, thus far not much has been 
achieved. According to my interviews with members of the Executive Commission of 
Metropolitan Coordination, this is due to the absence of a clear definition detailing how 
the DF, the State of Mexico, and the Federal government would contribute to the 
financing of the fund (Interview P). An additional limitation of the agreement is that it 
does not specify the way the Fund should be designed. Unlike the proposal introduced to 
Congress in November of 2003 that presented a well-thought design for a metropolitan 
fund, the 2000 agreement did not propose any specific design. In February of 2003 the 
Ministry of Metropolitan Development of the State of Mexico designed a mechanism for 
allocating the Fund, but the mechanism reduced the Fund to a tool for financing big 
infrastructure projects, rather than a true redistributive mechanism. In its proposal, the 
State of Mexico presented a list of 36 metropolitan projects in the areas of transportation, 
roads, highways, environment, water, and sanitation, and suggested that these projects be 
financed according to their priority and the availability of resources. 
Although a truly compensatory fund that redistributes burdens and benefits among 
jurisdictions has not been yet created in the ZMVM, I argue that past attempts to establish 
such a fund reveal the feasibility of such a policy option. More than failures, past 
attempts underscore those issues that must be addressed to make this policy option an 
effective tool for reducing fiscal disparities. The two issues that need to be dealt with are 
the financing of the fund and its allocation. In term of the financing, it is reasonable to 
expect that given the current political fragmentation of the ZMVM, the federal 
government will not readily assign resources to an area of the country that presents a 
direct political challenge. Thus, the fund could more realistically be financed by a 
metropolitan rate on certain local taxes of the ZMVM, rather than with federal assistance. 
The case of the Environmental Trust Fund for the Valley of Mexico is a good illustration 
of the viability of this kind of measure and its ability to generate funds for issues of 
metropolitan scope. Concerning the allocation of the Fund, at least two problems must be 
solved if it is to help mitigate fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. First, the allocation criteria 
must be based on purely technical grounds to avoid the metropolitan financing of projects 
that disproportionately benefit one part of the metropolitan area. Second, the technical 
design must take into consideration the jurisdictions' spending needs and the costs of 
service provision. Often these elements are not easily to calculate, but even rough 
calculations would help in targeting the metropolitan fund to the jurisdictions with the 
highest expenditure needs or the lowest tax capacities. 
6.3.2. Creation of a Special Purpose Government in the ZMVM 
In Section 6.2.3 I argued that the creation of a metropolitan government would solve the 
problem of fiscal disparity in the ZMVM, but I mentioned a number of problems 
associated with such a measure that make it unviable for the ZMVM. There is, however, 
a variant on this metropolitan-wide solution that would require less effort to change 
governmental structures and may constitute a viable alternative for the ZMVM; this is the 
creation of a Special Purpose Government (SPG). An SPG helps reduce fiscal disparity 
by generating allocative gains that would compensate or offset any resulting income 
redistributions (Rothenberg 1970). Note, however, that unlike the creation of a regional 
government that directly solves the problem of fiscal disparity by expanding the city 
boundaries and pursuing redistribution from rich to poor jurisdictions, an SPG is more 
widely used to correct for the under-provision of area-wide public goods (Oakland 1979). 
Because an SPG indirectly solves problems of fiscal disparity by redistributing burdens 
and benefits related to specific services, and because it could become a middle ground in 
the formation of a metropolitan government, I argue that it is a viable alternative for the 
ZMVM. 
An SPG encompasses both special districts and public authorities, which are both 
independent public agencies that deal with specific functions such as fire protection, 
water supply, or transportation, and occasionally are responsible for a limited 
combination of functions. For each function, special district boundaries are designed to 
comprise the operational efficiencies connected with scale and the degree of population 
agglomeration necessary to provide a minimum level of services at a reasonable financial 
burden. This means that, in principle, an SPG may operate within whatever it defines as 
the metropolitan area, depending on the problem to be solved, even if the problem crosses 
state lines. 
The purpose for creating a SPG in a metropolitan area is to provide metropolitan-wide 
functions without having to create any additional jurisdiction that would control all local 
functions. The metropolitan jurisdiction would be a special district, exercising a few 
special functions, side-by-side with the existing jurisdictions, only moderately changed. 
In most cases, these metropolitan entities coexist with the local governments that remain 
in charge of the provision of some local services, but in some cases the metropolitan 
entity attends all the  service^.^ Thus, in comparison to creating a metropolitan 
It is desirable that, at least in the beginning, the creation of any metropolitan agency should be 
supplemental to, and should not substitute for, the functions already performed by local governments. 
government, SPGs have the advantage that they do not require the amalgamation of 
jurisdictions or the creation of an additional tier of government. SPGs have a number of 
other advantages, which include facilitating the financing of investments that go beyond 
jurisdictional limits; allowing policymakers to take advantage of economies of scale; 
fostering the efficient provision of services, both because they help to avoid overlaps, 
duplications, and omissions of functions, and because they use technologies that are not 
commonly available to individual local governments; avoiding the political opposition 
that is commonly waged against proposals for regional government because they deal 
with technical issues; and enjoying considerable fiscal and political independence from 
state and city governments, once they are in operation (ACIR 1964, Foster 1997 and Frug 
20021.~ 
Concerning the structure and operation of SPGs, various international experiences show 
that these agencies can be organized relatively easily, either by the upper tiers of 
government or by the association of several local governments in a metropolitan area. 
SPGs are governed by independent boards whose members can be appointed or elected. 
Board sizes range from a few to several dozen members. An extreme example, the 
governing board of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, has forty- 
seven members representing over 130 constituent municipalities and 26 constituent water 
districts (Foster 1997). In terms of their financing, it is desirable that these metropolitan 
agencies be independent from the constituent governments in order to be technical 
entities isolated from political control. Commonly, their budgets are substantial, and they 
are financed through various means, including transfers, contributions, and subsidies 
from the other tiers of government; credit with commercial and development banks for 
projects where costs can be recovered; their own tax bases; fees and user charges; 
different mixes of public and private capital; and the extraction of profits and the 
redistribution of gains (Morales and Garcia 2002). 
5 These advantages are especially recognized in the literature on metropolitan governance in the United 
States, because in this country SPGs are the most common mechanism to deal with inter-jurisdictional 
service provision. 
The attributes of an SPG make it a desirable mechanism for moving toward a more 
balanced provision of services in the ZMVM. One sector that seems optimal for the 
formation of such an SPG is transportation, which is a sector that in big cities lends itself 
naturally to regional management (Gakenheimer et al. 2002). In the ZMVM, 
transportation is one of the few sectors that already has some experience in metropolitan 
service provision. Additionally, due to the current deficiencies in the system of 
transportation in the ZMVM, it is likely that the demand for integrated metropolitan-wide 
solutions will continue in the future. Therefore, it is useful to explore the viability of 
establishing an SPG-in the form of a special authority-for transportation in the ZMVM. 
In the rest of this section, I reflect upon past experiences of metropolitan transportation in 
the ZMVM, with the objective of exploring what it would take to create a viable 
metropolitan transportation authority for this area. 
One of the most notable experiences with the provision of metropolitan transportation 
services in the ZMVM was the construction of the metro B line. This metro line extends 
from the northern part of the DF to the eastern part of the State of Mexico. It is 23.7 km 
long and has 21 stations, of which 13.5 krn and 13 stations are in the DF, 
and 10.2 km and 8 stations in the State of Mexico. Ever since its initiation (in 1989) 
Mayor M. Camacho in the DF and governor I. Pichardo in the State of Mexico conceived 
of the metro B line as a metropolitan project. It was projected that it would serve 600,000 
users per day, and although it currently serves half that number, it is still the most 
important metropolitan transportation project in the ZMVM.~ Because the metro B line is 
a true metropolitan project in the sense that it crosses state boundaries and was planned to 
meet the transportation demands of the whole metropolitan area, it is a case that reveals 
the current status of metropolitan planning in the ZMVM. In the rest of this section, I 
discuss the main legal, technical, political, and financial aspects of the metro B line and 
then comment on what needs to be done in each one of these areas to create a 
metropolitan transportation authority. 
However, the metro B line was not the first metro line that crossed the boundary between the DF and the 
State of Mexico. Its predecessor is the metro A line-built during the government of Mayor Camacho-that 
stretches 4 krn with 3 stations into the municipality of La Paz in the southeastern part of the State of 
Mexico. Originally, it was planned that the route of the metro A line was going to be run as a suburban rail, 
but at the end the authorities opted for the metro. 
Legally, the metro B line's construction shows that there is a legal framework in place for 
metropolitan projects. Current legislation provides for the establishment of 
intergovernmental agreements and metropolitan commissions that were the legal pillars 
supporting the construction of the metro B line. Specifically, the DF, with the 
participation of the Metro Corporation, and the State of Mexico, with the participation of 
the municipalities of Nezahualcoyotl and Ecatepec, signed an "Agreement of 
Coordination for the Construction of the Metro B Line." This agreement dictated the 
creation of the "Metropolitan Commission for the Construction of the Metro B Line" to 
oversee the construction of the project.7 
From a technical perspective, during the construction of the metro B line the levels of 
communication and cooperation between the DF and the State of Mexico were constant 
throughout the six years of the project. This technical cooperation took place in several 
ways: the State of Mexico had representation on the board of directors of the Metro 
Corporation, so that it was regularly consulted on the technical aspects of the project; 
meetings between the DF and the State of Mexico occurred regularly in metropolitan fora 
such as the "Metropolitan Commission for the Construction of the Metro B Line," and 
the COMETRAVI (Cornisidn Metropolitans de Transporte y Vialidad); and constant 
collaboration took place between the DF's COVITUR (Comisidn de Vialidad y 
Transporte CTrbano) and the State of Mexico's General Direction of Mass Transportation. 
Overall, transportation officials in the DF and the State of Mexico have similar levels of 
technical capacity and understanding of the transportation problems of the whole 
metropolitan region. Technicians fiom the Metro Corporation and the transportation 
sector in the DF and the State of Mexico know each other personally, respect each other 
professionally, collaborate regularly, and even agree on some of the transportation 
solutions for the ZMVM (Interviews C and R). 
The construction of the metro B line was meant to be financed pari passu, whereby for 
each peso contributed by the federal government, the DF and the State of Mexico would 
In addition to these two formal mechanisms, people in the DF and the State of Mexico told me that there 
was an informal agreement between the Mayor of the DF, the Governor of the State of Mexico, and the 
President for expanding the B line fiom the DF to the State of Mexico (Interviews C and Q). 
contribute an additional peso. Apparently, it was also agreed that the federal government 
would cover the State of Mexico's portion of the financing8 Despite the original 
agreement to split the costs of the project, with the 1994 peso crisis the federal 
government was unable to keep up with its financial commitment, so the DF was left on 
its own to cover the total cost of the project. The project cost US$620 million without 
trains, plus an additional US$540 million for 45 new trains that were acquired in 2002 
(GDF-Secretaria de Obras y Servicios 2001). From 1994 to 1997 the DF financed all the 
construction costs with its own operating revenue. In 1997 it changed its financing 
strategy to the use of credit, and that same year the SHCP authorized three lines of credit 
for the DF, using its revenue shares as guarantees of both the capital and the service of 
the debt.9 The financial contribution of the State of Mexico was negligible. During the 
whole project, it disbursed $550 million pesos to cover the confiscation costs of the lands 
where the lines were built and to relocate two water plants. The financial contribution of 
the State of Mexico was so marginal that one official from the State of Mexico told me: 
"the metro B line was a gift from the DF to our State" (Interview C). 
Politically, the single most important factor that enabled the expansion of the metro B 
line into the State of Mexico was political partisanship. When the project was envisioned 
in 1989, the federal, state, and local governments linked to the project were all controlled 
by the PRI. When interviewed about how metropolitan coordination has changed since 
the days when the ZMVM was a PRI enclave, one interviewee in the Ministry of 
Metropolitan Development in the State of Mexico stated: "in the past when everybody 
was from the same party, of course there were differences, but coordination was easier; 
the spirit was different" (Interview T). To illustrate how things changed with the onset of 
political plurality in the ZMVM, one of my contacts in the Metro Corporation shared 
with me two examples in which the municipalities of Nezahualcoyotl (PRD) and 
Ecatepec (PAN) hindered the operation of the metro B line.'' The first took place when 
8 Interviewees in both the Metro Corporation and the DF's Treasury assured me that this agreement was 
made, but none of them have seen written proof of this agreement (Interview Q and S). 
The credit lines were contracted with Development Banks (BANOBRAS) for US$250 million; 
International Banks (Sumitorno-Japan) for US250 million; and Commercial Banks for US$150 million. 
10 The PRD has controlled the municipality of Nezahalcoyotl since 1996. The PRI controlled Ecatepec until 
the year 2000, when the PAN captured it. 
the line began its operation, and the municipality of Ecatepec refused several times to 
supply water to the metro stations. The second occurred when the rails of the metro 
flooded, and the municipal authorities refused to drain them. On that occasion, the DF's 
security forces violated the sovereignty of the State of Mexico and entered into the state 
to clean up the flood (Interview S). 
This review of the main factors that led to the construction of the metro B line provides 
information that leads me to believe that a metropolitan transportation authority for the 
ZMVM is a viable solution. Both legally and technically, the conditions are already in 
place. Legally, the creation of the necessary authority does not require substantial 
institutional engineering. Intergovernmental agencies, such as the Metro Corporation and 
the COMETRAVI already have representatives from the DF, the State of Mexico and the 
federal government. ' ' Actually, the COMETRAVI already has the mandate to propose 
solutions and provide technical assistance to resolve problems of transportation in the 
ZMVM. Technically, these intergovernmental agencies as well as the departments of 
transportation in the DF and the State of Mexico have a shared technical vision and 
understanding of metropolitan problems and possible solutions for the ZMVM. 
Therefore, what is needed is to build on the existing legal fiamework and technical 
capacity to transform the current set of fiagrnented transportation projects into an 
integrated metropolitan transportation authority. 
According to my review of the metro B line, the establishment of a transportation 
authority for the ZMVM, however, would not be simple. There are at least two factors 
that would need to be resolved prior to the establishment of this authority: its financing, 
and its political support. The limited financial contributions of the State of Mexico and 
11  The COMETRAVI is formed by a group of specialists from the DF, the State of Mexico, and the Federal 
Government, all of whom have a voice and a vote. The representatives of these three units of government 
form the plenary of the commission, which is headed by the Minister of Communications and 
Transportation (SCT), the Governor of the State of Mexico, and the Mayor of the DF. The commission has 
eleven working groups, formed of representatives of the Ministries of Transportation and Communication 
(SCT) of the Federal, DF, and the State of Mexico governments. The administrative council of the Metro 
Corporation is headed by the Mayor of the DF, but has representatives from the Ministry of Finance 
(SHCP), Transportation (SCT), Control and Administrative Development (SECODAM), from the National 
Financing Corporation (NAFIN), and from the governments of the State of Mexico and the DF. 
the fact that the DF covers most costs of metropolitan projects with its own revenues 
compromise the viability of a metropolitan authority. The State of Mexico's limited 
financial contribution is a true constraint to metropolitan financing in the sense that its 
finances are not sustainable and will likely not improve in the near future (see Chapter 3). 
Authorities in the State of Mexico recognize this situation, but argue that since their fiscal 
condition is the result of unfair treatment from the DF and the federal government, the 
State on Mexico should be compensated.12 They complain that the State of Mexico is 
unjustly treated by the National System of Fiscal Coordination in the sense that it is the 
state with the second highest GDP, but is only number twenty-nine when it comes to the 
distribution of federal transfers. Another complaint is that the State of Mexico spends half 
its budget on education, while the DF is excluded from such expenditures. According to 
one official from the State of Mexico, "if the State were freed from its education burden, 
of course we would have resources to invest in the transportation sector" (Interview C). 
The other factor that compromises the viability of a metropolitan authority is the fact that 
the DF covers most of the costs of metropolitan projects with its own revenue. From the 
DF's point of view, the financing of the metro B line was inequitable because the DF 
covered all the costs but the benefits were shared with the State of Mexico (Interview Q). 
According to my own back-of-the-envelope calculations, if the total cost of the project's 
construction was US$620 million, then the DF subsidized the State of Mexico with 
US$266 million to cover the construction costs of 10.2 km of rails (US$26.1 million per 
km). Additionally the DF has covered the total costs of the new metro B line trains for a 
total of US$540 million (with $232 million corresponding to the State of Mexico) and is 
subsidizing the operation of the metro B line with about US$2 1 million per year. l 3  All 
l2  Authorities from the State of Mexico argue that such compensation could come in the form of metro 
expansion. According to the transportation authorities of the State of Mexico "it is ridiculous that the 
metropolitan municipalities, with a population of 8 million people, only have 13 km of metro lines. The 
international standard is 20 km of metro line for each million people." (Interview C). 
13 I made this calculation by assuming that 50% of the users live in the State of Mexico. In this case, there 
are 150,000 daily users that pay $2 pesos for each ticket. The real ticket cost is $6.2 pesos as the metro 
subsidizes the price with $4.2 pesos per ticket (See: Sistema de Transporte Colectivo/Gerencia de 
Contabilidad "Indicadores financieros Enero-Diciembre 2003. Resumen del Costo de Programas," March 
2004). A subsidy of $4.2 pesos per ticket for 150,000 users results in a daily subsidy of $630,000 pesos. 
That quantity multiplied by 365 days at an exchange rate of $1 1 pesos per US dollar, results in a total 
subsidy of about US$2 1 million per year. 
this amounts to a total accumulated subsidy from the DF to the State of Mexico of about 
$US600 million for the construction, trains, and operation of the metro B line since the 
year 2000. 
One problem with the current financing situation is that these subsidies are mostly 
financed through the use of credit, so that the repayments will be borne by the future 
residents of the DF. In the past, when the DF was still a Department of the Federal 
Government, on various occasions the federal government indirectly subsidized the 
operation of the metro by taking over DF's debt. However, in the current situation of 
political fragmentation, it is uncertain whether the federal government will be taking over 
the DF's debt, which increased from $1 1 billion pesos in1 997 to $44 billion in 2003, 
most of which went to finance the metro. As I discussed in Chapter 3, when C. Cardenas 
became mayor in 1997 he requested that the federal government assume the DF's debt, 
but the federal government declined the request. Thus, unless some kind of political 
agreement is reached between the DF and the federal government, the residents of the DF 
will have to hear the financial burden of such debts. 
The present financial arrangement is disadvantageous for the DF, as its current and future 
taxpayers must carry the financial burden for the provision of transportation services to 
many users that do not reside in their jurisdiction. As a result, the DF is focusing only on 
the provision of metro services in its jurisdiction, thereby compromising the efficiency of 
the metro service as it is not being responsive to the demands of the whole metropolitan 
area. The mayor's opposition to the construction of four new metropolitan metro lines in 
April of 2004 is a clear illustration of this strategy. At that time, the federal congress 
approved the creation of a fund to finance the construction of four metro lines fi-om the 
DF to the eastern part of the State of Mexico that would have benefited 1 million users 
from the State of Mexico (El Universal. April 22,2004). Right after the congressional 
approval, the Director of the Metro Corporation declared to the ALDF, "that no new 
metro lines will be build, because this would not solve the problems of transportation in 
Mexico City." (El Universal. April 27,2004.) Similarly, Mayor Lopez Obrador declared 
that no new metro lines would be built in his administration, as "the DF already has 
enough rails-200 krn-that just needs good maintenance." (El Universal. April 29,2004.) 
The main reason the mayor gave for his opposition to building new metro lines was 
financial. According to him "the DF would have to invest $600 million pesos per 
kilometer of new rail, so we have to analyze if we have the budget." (El Universal. April 
29,2004.) Such a statement suggests that unless the financial arrangements for the metro 
system change, the DF will not be willing to invest its own resources to generate benefits 
for a larger constituency. There are at least two alternatives that would help reduce the 
metro-related financial pressure on the DF, and therefore would make the financing of 
metropolitan transportation more viable. The first alternative is to build on the existing 
financial mechanism of the metro, and try to increase its revenue. Currently, the metro 
has three main financing mechanisms, its own revenue, which comes from the sale of 
tickets and publicity, and from the rent of space; funding through financial institutions; 
and a Trust Fund for Investments, which has existed since 2003.'~ Out of all these 
financing mechanisms, the one that would most directly contribute to the finances of the 
metro would be to reduce the subsidy for the ticket price, as the current price only covers 
30 percent of metro system costs. Reducing this subsidy would generate huge savings 
that could be used to finance the metropolitan lines. However, this measure is too 
politically sensitive, which explains why the current government of the DF has neglected 
to pursue this option on several  occasion^.'^ 
The second alternative that would allow the further expansion of the metro to the 
metropolitan area is an increase in federal aid. As I already explained, one of the factors 
that led to an agreement between the DF and the State of Mexico about the expansion of 
the metro B line into the metropolitan municipalities was that the federal government 
agreed to cover the metropolitan municipalities' portion of the costs. Therefore, if a 
l 4  2003 was the f ~ s t  year that the states received the FIES (Fideicomiso de Inversidn de 10s Estados), which 
is a fund to finance infrastructure projects. The fund is composed of additional resources coming from 
variations in oil prices. In 2003 the DF received $800 million pesos, and assigned $647 million to the 
metro. 
l5 Noticieros Televisa, "No aumentarhn impuestos, ni el Metro: AMLO." October 22,2004 
(l~ttp:i/www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisaimexico, 2005). 
similar arrangement were to be put in place, perhaps it would provide the DF with 
incentives to plan the metro on a metropolitan-wide scale. Another option would be for 
the federal government to take over some part of DF' s metro-related debt, as in the past. 
However, although federal financing through any of these alternatives may be necessary, 
it is not a sufficient condition to expand the jurisdiction of the metro to the whole 
metropolitan area. A good illustration is the April 2004 proposal to build four new metro 
lines into the State of Mexico, which had federal funding and was still rejected. The 
proposal was approved by 158 federal deputies (mostly from the PRI and some of the 
PAN) and the federal Congress authorized the creation of a special fund to begin studies 
on the technical and financial viability of the four lines (Ccimara de Diputados, LIX 
Legislatura. Ordinary Session April 20,2004), but the mayor opposed the project. The 
reason, as I explain more thoroughly in the next section, was mainly political. Expanding 
the metro into the metropolitan municipalities would be politically irrational for the DF, 
as the costs would be born by the DF's taxpayers and most of the benefits would accrue 
to the political constituency of the State of Mexico. Besides, investing in the metro would 
force the mayor to reduce other 'soft' projects such as scholarships for the young and 
pensions for the elderly that are very popular and generate political payoffs. 
In summary, transportation policy in the ZMVM is formed without a metropolitan vision. 
Particularly, the metro system's current financing causes its planning to be focused on the 
DF, rather than on the ZMVM as a whole. This situation has also precluded the metro 
from becoming a more comprehensive transportation system that would allow it to 
harmonize with other transportation alternatives such as lightweight trains and trolleys. 
This situation has led to the fragmented, unequal and inefficient provision of 
transportation services in the ZMVM. However, this situation could be reversed-at least 
partially-by the creation of a metropolitan transportation authority that would allow for 
the metropolitan-wide planning of transportation, and would help balance the coverage, 
quality, and infrastructure of transportation in the area. The legal and technical conditions 
for the creation of such an authority are already in place. The two factors that are 
currently preventing its creation are financing and political will. In terms of finance, it 
seems that one of the few ways to move forward would be to have the federal 
government cover some of the State of Mexico's transportation costs. Political will, 
unfortunately, is as absent as it has ever been in the ZMVM. However, I would argue that 
devising a fair and efficient financing mechanism-one in which the richer jurisdictions do 
not feel that they are financing a service that is not generating benefits for them-would 
clear the way for establishing such authority. Moreover, once such authority is in place, it 
would be relatively impervious to political control, as it would perform mostly technical 
functions. 
6.4. Conditions for reducing fiscal disparity in the ZMVM 
In the previous section, I argued that there are two viable alternatives that could mitigate 
fiscal disparity in the ZMVM. I also argued, however, that they may not necessarily be 
easy to implement. This is because these are technical solutions to a problem that is 
mainly political. The reduction in fiscal disparity is directly related to a redistribution of 
resources from rich to poor jurisdictions, which will not happen automatically or through 
market forces alone. Instead such redistribution requires policy interventions that must 
count on the political support of the relevant policy actors. In fact, as Frug (2002) 
suggests, solutions must be technically sound and have the appropriate expert advice and 
assistance, however the basic policy decisions are political, not technical. 
In the case of the ZMVM, academics and policymakers have recognized the importance 
of politics in solving the region's metropolitan problems. According to one advisor to 
Mayor L6pez Obrador, the fact that different political factions have been opposing the 
DF's political reform shows how little can be accomplished without political will 
(Interview K). Similarly, one former leader of the ALDF told me that in order to move 
the metropolitan agenda forward "we need financial support, legal provisions, and 
political will" (Interview U). On the academic front, a 2003 report on Metropolitan 
Coordination in the ZMVM found that the main obstacle to coordination in this area is 
politics (Davis and Raich 2003). The main argument is that despite the urgency of 
solving metropolitan problems, the contemporary political and institutional environment 
of Mexico and the ZMVM stands in the way of the available technical solutions. 
Unlike the past, when a single hegemonic party (PRI) made most urban policy decisions 
at both the local and national levels, the ZMVM is now a politically plural area with 
significant political barriers to solving metropolitan problems. The federal government, 
the DF, and the State of Mexico's leaders belong to different political parties, and they 
have become rivals in the control of this key political stronghold that has the highest 
concentration of federal electoral districts in the country (36 in the State of Mexico and 
40 in the DF).16 This current situation of extreme political fragmentation serves many 
powerful local interests, and it is realistic to expect that politicians will focus on their 
political constituencies. Specifically, confronting inequality is not a high priority on 
many legislators' agendas, as that would imply some sort of redistribution that would not 
be politically rewarded. In other words, as Frug (2002) argues, what is missing is a 
"constituency for metropolitan government." 
Finding ways to create this metropolitan constituency for the ZMVM is beyond the scope 
of this study, but according to my research, there are at least three factors that 
policymakers must reflect upon in their attempts to generate political solutions to the 
problems of the ZMVM.'~ The first is the indispensable presence of the federal 
government. With the advent of full democracy in Mexico, the federal government 
abdicated its assistance to the ZMVM, but unless it again assists the ZMVM, fiscal 
disparity is not likely to decline. The national government is in charge of redistributive 
policies, and in its absence, fiscal disparity will continue to increase-as it did in the 
1990s. The DF surely will not take charge of compensating for the tremendous 
differences in income and infrastructure that exist between the metropolitan 
municipalities and the delegations. The federal government must deal with this situation 
16 Political rivalry exists both between the federal government and the DF, and between the DF and the 
State of Mexico. In terms of the DF-federal relationship, suffice it to say that ever since the beginning of 
the current administration of President Fox in the year 2000, he and Mayor Lopez Obrador have fought 
endlessly, to the point that in 2005 the federal government requested that the mayor be stripped of his 
political immunity so as to ban him from running in the 2006 presidential election. Concerning the rivalry 
between the DF and the State of Mexico, this arises from the fact that they are the two strongest economic 
and political jurisdictions in the country. Actually, as things stand today, it is quite likely that the Mayor of 
the DF and the Governor of the State of Mexico will be the respective PRD and PRI candidates who will be 
running against the incumbent PAN government in the presidential election of 2006. 
17 For an interesting discussion on how to create metropolitan constituencies in the United States, see G. 
Frug's (2002) proposal to form regional legislatures. 
directly. Recently, the interim mayor of the DF and the newly elected governor of the 
State of Mexico got together to begin discussing the formation of a metropolitan agenda, 
and they declared to the press that the "first" issue that they would discuss was presenting 
a proposal to the federal government to channel resources to the ZMVM and to the other 
metropolitan areas in the country (El Universal. September 1,2005). 
The second issue for policyrnakers to reflect upon is the idea of creating a metropolitan 
identity. As I argued in Chapter 2, despite the fact that metropolitan areas are politically, 
legally, and administratively fragmented, in practice they are organic temtorial 
continuums whose functional components are interlinked. Theorists who study 
metropolitan formations in the U.S. have suggested that the linkage of these components 
can take either of two forms: a zero-sum game, or a positive-sum game (Haughwout 
1999). The first theory holds that the overall level of metropolitan activity is 
predetermined, so that the distribution of those activities throughout the metropolitan area 
may be a source of competition between the jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. The 
second sustains that the metropolitan area's growth is not a fixed quantity to be 
distributed across jurisdictions, but instead the fortune of the metropolitan area as a whole 
depends on a healthy and positive relationship among its jurisdictions. 
In the case of the ZMVM, politicians from both the DF and the State of Mexico have 
understood the linkage of the functional components of the area as a zero-sum game; 
what is lost by one part of the metropolitan area is gained by the other. Indeed, thus far 
the language of the metropolitan debate has been based on sovereignty, legal rights, and 
externalities, rather than cooperation, understanding, and the common good. However, 
politicians in the ZMVM must begin to understand that the fortune of the metropolitan 
area depends on the healthy and positive relationship between the parts. Problems of 
pollution, security, water provision, etc. accrue to the metropolitan area as a whole, so 
that stakeholders must begin to recognize that if they do not move beyond their narrow 
political views and approach these problems in a collegial way, everybody will lose in the 
long run. 
Third, and last, is the necessity of getting started. Back in 1967 Oldman et al. pioneered a 
study on the financing of urban development in Mexico City which found that 
metropolitan planning in Mexico City was at an embryonic stage and that underscored 
the necessity of finding gradual, rather than comprehensive solutions to the urban 
problems of Mexico City. Since then, many alternatives have been discussed-and some 
even implemented-but metropolitan problems prevail (see Davis and Raich 2003). In this 
study, I suggest what seem to me to be the two policy options that have the best chance of 
succeeding in a political environment so adverse to metropolitan cooperation. Although 
there are many others, these options represent a first step upon which other more 
ambitious solutions could be designed. When I asked Myron Orfield, one of the main 
institutional engineers of the metropolitan solution in Minnesota, what political strategy 
was undertaken to create a metropolitan agenda in that region, he emphasized that a step- 
by-step approach was used. The political status quo serves so many local interests that the 
only way to gain political support is to start small. In Minnesota, they started by forming 
a coalition around the metropolitan problems related to specific services, and then they 
relied on those coalitions to expand the metropolitan agenda to other services (Interview 
V). Thus, the formation of a metropolitan agenda is an organic process that comes into 
being gradually, piece-by-piece, and it needs to start somewhere. In the case of the 
ZMVM, creating a transportation authority for the metropolitan area could be a first step 
upon which other metropolitan coalitions could be formed in the future. 
6.5. Conclusion 
According to theory, fiscal disparity within metropolitan areas arises as a consequence of 
the existence of jurisdictions with significantly different levels of income, public 
resources, and demands. Fiscal decentralization exacerbates these disparities by allowing 
rich jurisdictions a large tax base and lower tax rates than less-rich jurisdictions. As a 
consequence, jurisdictions seek to retain individuals who yield "fiscal surpluses" and 
repel those who create "fiscal losses." This process becomes self-reinforcing as rich 
jurisdictions grow richer and poor jurisdictions grow poorer (Oakland 1979: 352). To 
deal with this situation, countries have come up with a number of models and policy 
solutions to mitigate this unintended consequence of decentralization. However, this 
situation has no easy solutions, as these tools should be tailored to specific contexts and 
must confront strong political opposition. 
In this study, I show how Mexico's process of decentralization increased fiscal disparity 
in the ZMVM during the 1990s. As I explain, this was the result of the interaction of 
multiple factors, in which fiscal decentralization both mitigates and exacerbates 
disparities. On the one hand, federal transfers followed a redistributive pattern that 
mitigated disparity. On the other hand however, decentralization accentuated the differing 
characteristics and capacities of the jurisdictions to collect local taxes. As a result, during 
the 1990s the ZMVM became a more fiscally fragmented area; this is, an area in which 
18 million inhabitants live in communities with very different levels of income, tax 
capacities, and revenue needs. This is a negative situation for the ZMVM as the 
geographical concentration of poor households favors the reproduction of inter- 
generational poverty, social alienation, and informality (Rojas 2002). In this study, I also 
underscore that this situation does not have an easy solution, but I suggest a few policy 
measures that could be pursued to begin the process. But no matter how technically 
viable these policies are, my study emphasizes that in the ZMVM's current condition, 
little will be accomplished without a basic political agreement between the State of 
Mexico, the DF, and the federal government. 
Because of the complexity of analyzing the impact of fiscal decentralization in 
metropolitan areas, I have focused on a single case. However, as I argued in the 
introduction, the reality of the ZMVM is similar to that of other metropolitan capitals in 
Latin America, such as Santiago, the Greater Buenos Aires, or Metropolitan Lima. The 
question is then, to what extent can my results be applied to these other metropolitan 
capitals? Although the results of a single case study cannot be generalized, I would argue 
that there are abundant similarities between the ZMVM and other metropolitan capitals in 
Latin America that cause me to expect similar processes of urban segregation and fiscal 
fragmentation. Not only does the ZMVM share with these other Latin American capitals 
similar past experiences with industrialization and urbanization (see Rojas 2002 and 
Klink 2002), they are also currently going through similar processes of fiscal 
decentralization (see Prud'homme et al. 2004 and Linder 2004). Like the ZMVM, these 
capitals are centers of political and economic power, they have similar legal status, and 
they are characterized by rich central cores surrounded by significantly poorer 
metropolitan areas. ' * 
Although, I am not aware of studies that have sought to directly assess the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on the fiscal disparity of other Latin American capitals, my results 
conform to those of other studies from broader perspectives, which have also found that 
urban segregation and inequalities have increased in the last ten or fifteen years. Pirez, 
(n.d.: 14) for example, argues that "the new metropolitan configuration of the Greater 
Buenos Aires is characterized by high levels of inequality that tend to create 
polarization." According to him, it was precisely due to the decentralization process that 
the Greater Buenos Aires became more heterogeneous in the 1990s, with the 
suburbanization of the upper and middle-income classes and their contiguity with lower 
income groups. Similarly, on a more general level, Rojas (2002), argues that spatial 
segregation is another characteristic of urban poverty in large Latin American cities. 
According to him, decentralization aggravates this situation, as there are no efficient 
mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination and local governments often lack 
resources to finance their newly-assigned responsibilities. Other studies, like Linder's on 
Metropolitan Lima (2004: 7), underscore that "the process of fiscal decentralization that 
is beginning in Peru will have important consequences for metropolitan municipal public 
finances," and mentions that further studies must further investigate this issue. 
As I have shown, my results conform to those of other available studies and to the 
expectation that decentralization may increase fiscal disparity in metropolitan areas. It is 
still too soon, however, to reach any sound conclusions. Only one year ago, Bird and 
Slack, two long-time students of public finance, published a study on the "Fiscal Aspects 
18 The Greater Buenos Aires, for example, has a proportion of poor households three times higher than that 
of the City of Buenos Aires (INDEC). The Greater Buenos Aires (1 1.8 million inhabitants) is comprised by 
the city of Buenos Aires (2.7 million inhabitants) and by 25 municipalities (9.1 million inhabitants) of the 
province of Buenos Aires. 
of Metropolitan Governance" (2004) in which they emphasized the lack of studies on 
metropolitan finances in Latin America. They underscored the necessity of serious 
fieldwork in order to produce regional databases and to conduct meaningful analyses at 
the metropolitan level. I trust that this study is a first step in that direction. 
Appendix 1. Basic characteristics of Mexico's system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations 
The structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Mexico has two main components: 
a system of unconditional revenue-sharing (participaciones) and a system of earmarked 
transfers (aportaciones). The participaciones system was created in 1980 and its funds 
come from Item 28 of the federal budget. The aportaciones system was formed in 1997 
with resources from Item 33 of the federal budget. Both systems are regulated by the 
National System of Fiscal Coordination (SNCF), whose main characteristics I describe 
below. 
I. Unconditional revenue sharing system: Participaciones 
The SNCF guides the distribution of resources between tiers of government in Mexico. 
This system was created in 1980 with the objective' of increasing the total revenue of the 
government, avoiding the use of one tax source by more than one tier of government, and 
improving the regional distribution of resources. In order to do so, the SNCF dictates that 
subnational governments must yield a part of their tax bases to the central government, in 
exchange for an increase in participaciones. 
The SNCF is a contract between the federal government and the states; however, the Law 
of Fiscal Coordination (LCF) incorporates the municipalities in this agreement by 
mandating that states should transfer at least 20 percent of their federal revenue shares to 
their municipalities? Each state's law of fiscal coordination specifies the ways in which it 
must allocate the participaciones to its municipalities, which must be done according to 
the national guidelines set in the LCF. Subnational governments receive their revenue 
shares through various funds that are calculated as a proportion of the Federal Revenue- 
Sharing Pool (Recaudacion Federal Participable, RFP) that is composed of the shared 
taxes collected from the federal income tax, the value-added tax, and fees from the 
Up to 1980, the revenue shares that the subnational governments received from the central government 
came from only two sources: taxes on commercial transactions (ISIM), and "special" taxes. In 1980, with 
the creation of the SNCF, the ISIM was supplemented by a general sales tax (IVA), and it became part of 
the tax base that was further transferred to the subnational governments. 
The LFC is the legal document that regulates the operation of the SNCF. 
extraction of minerals and oil. In 2002, the system ofparticipaciones absorbed 23 percent 
of the RFP (SHCP 2003). 
The characteristics of the revenue-sharing funds as well as their allocation formulas have 
varied greatly over time. Currently, the participaciones are composed of two main funds, 
the General Fund of Revenue-Sharing (Fondo General de Participaciones, FGP) and the 
Fund for Municipal Promotion (Fondo de Fomento Municipal, FFM). The FGP is formed 
(as of 2002) by 2 1.2 percent of the RFP and is distributed according to a formula based 
on the following three criteria: (i) 45.17 percent is distributed to the states on an equal per 
capita basis; (ii) 45.17 percent is allocated according to a coefficient that reflects the 
taxable capacity and the revenue-raising efforts of the states; and (iii) 9.66 percent is 
allocated in inverse proportion to the previous two criteria. The FGP revenue-raising 
coefficient is calculated according to the following formula: 
where 
IA;, = assignable taxes collected in state i in year t-1, 
IA:-, = assignable taxes collected in state i in year t-2, 
TB = B' = total entitlements, 
Cci ,  = revenue-sharing coefficient for state i in year t-1, and 
B' = entitlement to state i. 
This formula takes into account two elements: (1) a fiscal effort indicator, which includes 
"assignable" taxes collected in state i (federal taxes on the ownership of vehicles, on new 
cars and on production excises), and (2) the state's share in total entitlements from the 
preceding year. The former is derived by dividing the "assignable" taxes collected the 
preceding year by those collected the year before. As rightly noted by Amieva-Huerta 
(1997: 579), "this formula generates a pie that must be divided so that one state's loss is 
another's gain." 
'The other important participaciones fund since 2002 is the FFM, which is made up of 1 
percent of the RFP and is directly transferred from the states to the municipalities 
according to the following federal formula, based on the collection of property taxes and 
water fees: 
where 
A' = revenue sharing to state I, 
TA = CA',  
CE;-, = revenue-sharing coefficient for state i in year t-1, 
IPDA~-, =: total property tax and water fee collections of state i in year t-1, and 
IPDA~-, == total property tax and water fee collections of state i in year t-2 
In addition to the FGP and the FFM, the system of participaciones is supported by other 
minor funds such as a contingency reserve (0.2% of RFP) and a proportion of the Special 
Tax on Products and Services (0.4% of RFP). States also receive 2.4 percent of the RFP 
in economic incentives, mostly generated from the taxes on used (1.6% of the RFP) and 
new cars (0.6% of RFP). 
IL Unconditional revenue sharing system: Aportaciones 
In 1997 Congress created the aportaciones, a single system of earmarked transfers for 
states and municipalities. The aportaciones system is comprised of seven funds that 
together amount to 26% of the RFP (as of 2002). The funds are targeted to the 
decentralization of three main areas: health, education and infrastructure. The following 
table presents the funds of the aportaciones system together with the relative weight of 
each one of these funds. 
I - - -  I FASSA- Fund for Health Services 1 11.6 1 3.5 
Table A.1. Aportaciones system by fund. Relative weight and as proportion of RFP 
I FAIS- Fund for Social Infrastructure (Total) 1 9.7 1 2.8 
FAEB- Fund for Basic Education 
% Total 
62.0 
FISE- Fund for Social Infrastructure (State) 
FISM- Fund for Social Infrastructure (Municipal) 
FORTAMUN- Fund for Municipal Strengthening 
FAM- Multiple Fund 
% RFP 
17.9 
I I I 
I FAETA- Fund for technolorrical education and for the elderlv 1 1.5 1 0.4 I 
12.1 
87.9 
9.2 
3.2 
Infrastructure in basic education 
Infrastructure in higher education 
Social assistance 
0.3 
2.5 
2.8 
0.9 
n.a. 1 n.a. 
1 Fund for education of the elderly n.a. n. a. 
n. a. 
n.a. 
Fund for technological education 
I FASP- Fund for Public Security I 2.8 1 0.4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1 TOTAL 1 100.0 1 28.7 1 
n.a. 
Source: Author, based on SHCP (2003) and www.inafed.gob.mx (2004). 
n.a. 
FAEB and FASSA are by far the most important funds, but they are targeted only to the 
State level. States use these funds to finance the decentralized systems of health and 
education. At the municipal level, the most important funds are the "Fund for Municipal 
Social Infrastructure" (Fondo para la Infraestructura Social Municipal, FISM) and the 
"Fund for Municipal Strengthening" (Fondo para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios, 
FORTAMUN). The FORTAMUN is composed of approximately 2.8 percent of the RFP, 
and is automatically distributed on a monthly basis from the states to the municipalities. 
This fund is distributed on a per capita basis. The FISM is composed of approximately 
2.5 percent of the RFP, and these resources are distributed from both the federal 
government to the states, and the states to the municipalities according to a poverty 
formula. Most states allocate the FISM to their municipalities according to a simple 
formula that adds the following four variables, assigning an equal weight to each? 
The SEDESOL distributes the FISM to the states according to an elaborate poverty formula based on the 
calculation of a Global Poverty Index. Originally, states were expected to distribute the FISM to their 
municipalities according to this formula, but because of the complexity of the formula and the lack of data 
to make the calculations, only six states have been able to use it. The rest of the states distribute the FISM 
to their municipalities according to the simple average formula. 
1) Employed population earning more than two times the minimum wage. 
2) Illiterate population fifteen years of age or older. 
3) Drainage availability 
4) Electricity availability 
The Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) distributes the FISM to the states, 
and the local legislatures determine the allocation of this fund among the municipalities. 
Once they receive the FISM, each municipality, together with the local population, 
decides upon the allocation of these resources amongst the following infrastructure 
projects: water, sewers, drainage, urbanization, electricity in rural areas and poor 
neighborhoods, basic health and education, roads, housing improvements, and productive 
rural infrastructure. The FISM transfers are earmarked to these projects and 
municipalities may only use up to 2 percent of the FAISM for "institutional programs" 
(Scott 2000). 
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Table A2.1. Cont. 
Source: Author, based on INEGI and UNDP data. 
* Expressed in per capita adjusted $USD. 
** UNDP Human Development Index 
* * * National ranking according to UNDP's Human Development Index 
Metropolitan municipalities 
Temascalapa 
Tenango Del Aire 
Teoloyucan 
Teotihuacan 
Tepetlaoxtoc 
Tepetlixpa 
Tepotzotlan 
Tequixquiac 
Texcoco 
Tezoyuca 
Tlalmanalco 
Tlalnepantla De Baz 
Tultepec 
Tultitlan 
Valle De Chalco Solidaridad 
Villa Del Carbon 
Zumpango 
Average 
Delegations (DF) 
Alvaro Obregon 
Azcapotzalco 
Benito Juarez 
Co yoacan 
Cuajimalpa de Morelos 
Cuauhtkmoc 
Gustavo A. Madero 
Iztacalco 
Iztapalapa 
Magdalena Contreras, La 
Miguel Hidalgo 
Milpa Alta 
Tlahuac 
Tlalpan 
Venustiano Carranza 
Xochirnilco 
Average 
Population 
29,307 
8,486 
66,556 
44,653 
22,729 
16,863 
62,280 
28,067 
204,102 
18,852 
42,507 
721,415 
93,277 
432,14 1 
323,46 1 
37,993 
99,774 
168,019 
687,020 
44 1,008 
360,478 
640,423 
151,222 
5 16,255 
1,235,542 
41 1,321 
1,773,343 
222,050 
352,640 
96,773 
302,790 
581,781 
462,806 
369,787 
537,827 
Extension 
145 
61 
35 
69 
235 
104 
209 
127 
504 
17 
162 
82 
22 
56 
45 
94 
209 
105 
97 
33 
27 
54 
70 
33 
88 
22 
113 
63 
46 
286 
100 
308 
33 
118 
93 
Density 
202 
139 
1,902 
647 
97 
162 
298 
221 
405 
1,109 
262 
8,798 
4,240 
7,717 
7,188 
404 
477 
2,230 
7,094 
13,455 
13,442 
11,940 
2,160 
15,751 
14,056 
18,405 
15,662 
3,549 
7,635 
338 
3,033 
1,886 
14,120 
3,142 
9,104 
GDP* 
3,091 
3,378 
4,234 
4,321 
3,419 
2,828 
5,345 
3,767 
5,706 
4,125 
4,572 
6,812 
4,838 
4,855 
4,890 
2,113 
4,167 
4,548 
21,315 
16,203 
35,594 
24,943 
21,927 
20,018 
14,556 
15,027 
12,184 
18,356 
27,819 
8,206 
11,582 
20,015 
15,032 
14,806 
18,599 
Index** 
0.74 
0.76 
0.78 
0.78 
0.75 
0.74 
0.80 
0.76 
0.80 
0.78 
0.79 
0.82 
0.79 
0.80 
0.78 
0.68 
0.77 
0.88 
0.87 
0.93 
0.90 
0.87 
0.89 
0.86 
0.87 
0.85 
0.87 
0.90 
0.82 
0.84 
0.88 
0.87 
0.86 
Rank*** 
833 
5 85 
362 
3 87 
656 
809 
240 
540 
203 
3 10 
264 
116 
262 
193 
363 
1,495 
456 
7 
9 
1 
4 
8 
5 
17 
14 
32 
10 
3 
127 
36 
6 
12 
16 
Table A2.2. Presidents, Mayors, and Governors from 1946 to the present. 
President 
M. Aleman Valdez (1 946- 1952) 
A. Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) 
A. Lopez Mateos (1 958-1964) 
G. Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) 
L. Echeverria ~ l v a r e z  (1970- 
1976) 
J. Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) 
M. De la Madrid Hurtado (1982- 
1988) 
C. Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) 
E. Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994- 
2000) 
Source: Author, based on data from ~ a v i s  (1994), 1racheta (2002), and othdrs. 
I 
Mayor (DF) 
E. Casas A l e d n  (1 946- 1952) 
E. P Uruchurto (1952-1958) 
E. P Uruchurto (1958-1964) 
E. P Uruchurto (1 964- 1966) 
A. Corona del Rosa1 (1 966- 1970) 
A. Martinez Dominguez (1 970- 
197 1) 
0. Senties (1971-1976) 
C. Hank Gonzalez (1976-1982) 
R. Aguirre Velazquez (1 982-1 988) 
M. Carnacho Solis (1988-1993) 
V. Fox Quesada (2000-2006) 
Governor (State of Mexico) 
A. del Mazo VClez (1 945-195 1) 
S. Sanchez Colin (195 1-1957) 
Gustavo Baz Prada (1957-1963) 
J. Fernandez Albarran (1963-1 969) 
C. Hank Gonzalez (1 969- 1975) 
J. Jimenez Canhi (1975-198 1) 
A. del Mazo Gonzalez (1 98 1 - 
1986) 
A. Baranda Garcia* (1986-1987) 
M. Ramon Beteta (1 987- 1989) 
I. Pichardo Pa~aza* (1989- 1993) 
0. Espinoza Villareal 
R. Robles Verlanga 
u \ / 
E. Chuayffet Chemor (1 993- 1995) 
C. Camacho Quiroz* (1 995-1999) 
C. Cardenas Solorzano 
A.M. Lopez Obrador (2000-2005) 
A. Encinas (2005-2006) 
A. Montiel Rojas (1999-2005) 
E. Peiia Nieto (2005-20 10) 
Appendix 3. The ZMVM, the DF, and the State of Mexico: Several calculations 
Section 3.1. Basic characteristics of the municipal structure 
In Mexican municipalities the executive power is vested in the municipal president or 
mayor, and the legislative branch is composed of two groups of representatives, the legal 
trustees (sindicos) and the councilors (regidores). The sindicos are the legal 
representatives of the ayuntamiento and serve as liaisons with the control agency of the 
state legislature (Contaduria General de Glosa), which oversees the financial 
management of the municipalities. The regidores govern the regular activities of the 
municipality. The sindicos and the regidores, together with the mayor form the cabildo, 
the highest authority in the municipality. The cabildo is a sort of local legislative branch 
but it has a deliberative rather than a normative nature. Its legislative capacity is restricted 
to the authorization of ordinances and administrative regulations. Due to this limited 
legislative capacity, the state legislature passes legislation on behalf of the municipalities. 
The state legislatures have a vast amount of power over municipal life. State legislatures 
not only have the power to suspend or remove from office the ayuntamiento as a whole or 
any of its members, but are also in charge of delimiting the territories of the 
municipalities and of creating and abolishing them. 
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Table A3.2: State of Mexico (all municipalities). Relative weight of revenue accounts 
(~ercent of total and subtotal) 
-
1995 
Own-source 
Taxes 
Property tax 
Other taxes 
I 1 I I I I I I 
1996 
Fees 
58.7 
32.0 
63.5 
36.5 
Products 
1997 
I I I I I I I 1 I 23.8 
3.7 1 6.3 ( 7.4 1 6.1 1 6.4 1 6.3 ( 4.5 ( 6.4 
Fines 
43.5 
57.7 
85.2 
14.8 
Betterment levies1 - 
Source: Author's calculations, based on INEGI (2003) 
1998 
18.6 
40.5 
Participaciones 
Aportaciones 
Other 
Table A3.3: State of Mexico (all municipalities). Municipal revenues per capita 
~2002=100~ 
39.8 
56.9 
87.4 
12.6 
4.0 
1989 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Annual rate 
1999 
25.8 
13.4 
30.7 
10.5 
Total revenue 592.3 546.6 597.1 587.9 755.2 898.2 921.4 5.1 
Own-source 347.9 237.6 237.7 210.0 235.8 222.5 208.9 (4.01) 
Taxes 111.3 137.2 135.2 126.0 118.1 108.5 1 18.0 2.1 
Pro ert tax 70.7 116.8 1 18.2 76.9 71.1 73.0 71.2 1.5 
82.8 44.1 61.4 42.8 71.4 72.0 51.2 (0.1) 
Products 12.9 14.9 17.6 12.8 15.1 14.0 9.5 8.8 
35.7 
60.0 
61.0 
39.0 
3.2 
Source: Author's calculations, based on INEGI (2003) 
2000 
20.4 
6.8 
40.1 
9.3 
7.2 
Average 
31.2 
50.1 
60.2 
39.8 
2.5 
30.3 
11.1 
45.4 
4.6 
10.2 
Currentspending 
Capital spending 
Other spending 
24.8 
48.7 
67.3 
32.7 
3.8 
32.3 
9.4 
53.0 
1.6 
9.7 
Author's calculations, based on INEGI (2003). 
321.4 
175.2 
95.7 
22.7 
56.5 
60.3 
39.7 
3.7 
41.9 
51.8 
62.0 
37.9 
24.5 
8.9 
42.7 
16.6 
9.4 
336.7 
87.8 
122.1 
25.2 
4.2 
10.2 
1.7 
43.9 
20.2 
11.1 
356.9 
122.7 
117.5 
14.6 
41.6 
27.4 
8.3 
373.1 
106.2 
108.6 
38.9 
6.6 
12.4 
429.7 
159.7 
165.8 
481.9 
234.1 
182.3 
498.1 
194.8 
228.5 
54.3 
29.6 
16.2 
61.6 
16.1 
22.3 
59.8 
20.6 
19.7 
63.5 
18.1 
18.5 
56.9 
21.1 
21.9 
53.6 
26.1 
20.3 
54.1 
21.1 
24.8 
58.9 
21.5 
19.6 
Table A3.5: DF. Allocation of FORTAMUN by delegation (pesos) 
2001 
Alvaro Obregon 
Azcapotzalco 
Benito Juarez 
Coyoacan 
2002 
129,250,328 
82,967,641 
Cuajimalpa 
Cuauhtkmoc 
67,8 17,385 
120,483,949 
Gustavo A. Madero 
Iztacalco 
2003 
147,690,297 
94.804.522 
28,449,67 1 
97,123,997 
Iztapalapa 
Magdalena Contreras 
Miguel Hidalgo 
Milpa Alta 
l~enustiano Carranza 87,068,538 1 99,490,489 ( 101,996,854 1 107,381,362 1 
2004 
77,492,799 
137,673,23 1 
232,444,774 
77,382,57 1 
Tlahuac 
Tlalpan 
l~istrito Federal (DF) 1 1,618,919,338 11,849,888,363 11,896,490,761 1 1,996,608,257 1 
15 1,410,912 
97.192.838 
32,508,547 
1 10,980,545 
333,622,259 
4 1,774,672 
66,342,808 
18,206,08 1 
159,404,033 
102.323.737 
79,444,998 
141,141,496 
265,607,355 
88,422,638 
56,964,436 
109,45 1,523 
Table A3.6: DF. Allocation of FGP 
I Julv to 
83,638,973 
148,592,485 
33,327,503 
1 13,776,368 
381,219,694 
47,734,608 
75,807,846 
20,803,s 18 
1 ~ e a l  per capita allocation I 193.24 208.91 205.97 
and FFM by delegation (in thousands of pesos) 
December of 2003 1 2004 
35,086,892 
1 19.782.727 
-272,298,537- 
90,650,18 1 
65,091,475 
125,066,823 
213.51 
I FGP 
286,673,428 
95,435.688 
390,823,383 
48,937,139 
77,717,598 
2 1,327,601 
Source: GDF, Ministry of Finance. 
Cuauhtemoc 
41 1,455,3 10 
5 1,520,575 
8 1,820,38 1 
22,453,504 
66,73 1,260 
128,217,507 
kztapalapa 256,142 
Magdalena Contreras 67,96C 
Miguel Hidalgo 158,307 
Milpa Alta 60,997 
Tlahuac 81.138 
70,254,064- 
134,986,227 
Tlalpan 123,964 
benust iano Carranza 182.838 
Xochimilco 87,056 
I 
TOTAL 1 2,242,488 
Source: Author, based on data from the "Ga 
3.88 I 7,2401 3.88 
100 186,497 100 
:eta Oficial del Distritc 
- - 
147,992 3.52 13,088 3.52 161,080 
284,352 6.76 25,147 6.76 309,500 
226,202 5.38 20,005 5.38 246,207 
180,738 4.3 15,984 4.3 196,722 
4,205,914 100 371,961 100 4,577,875 
Federal," April 22, 2004 and January 
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Table A3.9: Mexico's expenditure assignments I Expenditure I Federal I State governments I Municipal 
I I Foreign Affairs and I . '00 percent I I 
function 
Defense 
Economic Relations 
Labor policies 
government 
100 percent 
Monetary and 
Financial policy 
Post and 
governments 
telecommunications 
Education 
Health 
security 
100 percent 
100 percent 
Government and private 
providers 
Setting policies and norms 
(SEP) 
High schools and colleges 
(concurrent) 
Federal technological 
institutes of higher education 
Evaluation and audit of 
subnational performance 
Labor relations and wage- 
setting 
School construction 
supervision 
All education in the Federal 
District 
Approximately half of the 
technical schools 
Most production of 
textbooks 
Most teacher training 
Setting policies and norms 
(social security administration) 
Evaluation and audit of 
subnational performance 
Secondary and tertiary 
hospitals 
Labor relations and wage 
determination 
Most capital infrastructure 
Financing, implementation, 
maintenance and equipment 
(concurrent) 
.High schools and state 
universities 
Administration of programs 
and self-evaluation 
Half of the technical schools 
School construction 
(concurrent) 
Adult education programs 
Primary care for the rural 
population and the urban poor 
Partly responsible for 
financing 
Administration of programs 
Epidemiology and 
preventive care 
Reproductive health 
decisions 
Federal transfers to the states 
Special police (concurrent) 
Coordination of state and 
Special police (concurrent) 
to strengthen state police 
Federal and border police 
Minimal role, school 
maintenance, and some school 
construction (concurrent) 
State public order and safety 
Local public order and safety 
National irrigation programs 
and funding research 
Rural development, rural 
roads and forestry 
Agriculture and 
irrigation 
Some research 
municipal public safety 
Funding for state programs 
in irrigation, water supply, and 
hydroelectric exploration 
Public 
transportation 
Rural development 
Extension services 
Drilling 
Parks and recreation 
Most railways and airport 
operations have been 
privatized 
Seaport operations being 
~rivatized 
Some airports 
Funding for research 
. 
National monuments 
National narks (concurrent) 
I Local transportation and 
transit 
National parks (concurrent) Local parks 
- 
Roads 
National Water Commission, 
the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Industry 
Federal highway 
construction and maintenance 
.Financing of rural road 
development 
Land use permits National standards 
Approval of National 
Institute of Environment, 
States can adopt their own 
standards 
Construction and 
maintenance of state roads 
Implementation of rural road 
development 
Maintenance of secondary 
federal roads (with federal 
Local streets 
National programs for 
housing development 
Market intervention 
programs (mostly phased out) 
National programs 
concurrent) 
funds) 
Some states have housing 
agencies 
State programs (concurrent) 
Industrial policy 
Social assistance 
and social security 
been privatized, but 
municipalities retain debt 
Other infrastructure 
Culture and libraries 
Water, sewerage 
and sanitation 
I liability (concurrent) 
Source: Cabrero and Martinez-Vazquez (in Giugale and Webb eds. 2000). 
Concurrent 
Concurrent 
Social infrastructure for the 
poor 
Concurrent 
Implementation of school- 
lunch programs 
F O O ~  assistance to the poor 
Implementing of social 
infrastructure programs 
Other programs in 
coordination with the Ministry 
of Social Development 
"State infrastructure" 
Public libraries 
Water supply and sewage 
(concurrent) 
Cemeteries 
Abattoirs 
Public markets 
Street lights 
Garbage collection 
Water supply and sewage. 
Many water systems have 
Appendix 4. List of Interviews4 
Interview A: Josk Angel Gurria. SHCP (Ministry of Finance). Former Minister. March 
2004. 
Interview B: Javier Beristain. GDF (Ministry of Finance). Former Minister. March 2004. 
Interview C: Jorge Mondragon. GEM (Ministry of Communications). Director of 
Construction. March 2004. 
Interview D: Emilio Barriga. GDF (Ministry of Finance). Director of Fiscal Policy. June 
2003. 
Interview E: Horacio Duarte Olivares. Municipality of Texcoco. Former Municipal 
President. Querktaro Mexico, April 2001. 
Interview P: Manuel Camacho Solis. GDF. Former Mayor. January 2003. 
Interview G: Gabriel Yorio Gonzalez. GDF (Ministry of Finance) Director of Public 
Debt. March 2004. 
Interview H: Grupo Immobiliario HIR. September 2004. 
Interview I: Raul Martinez Almazan. Municipality of Naucalpan. Former Chief of Staff. 
E-mail correspondence. July 7,2004. 
Interview J: Maria de 10s Angeles Moreno. ALDF. Former Deputy. January 2003. 
Interview K: Ignacio Marvan. GDF. Advisor to the Mayor. January 2003. 
Interview L: Arne aus den Ruthen Haag. Delegation of Miguel Hidalgo. Former 
Delegate. January 2003. 
Interview M: Marco Antonio Michel. Delegation of Iztapalapa. Former Delegate. March 
2004. 
Interview N: Antonio Garcia Carrefio. GDF (Ministry of Finance). Under-Treasurer of 
Cadastre and Territorial Registries. June 2003. 
Interview 0: Alfonso Valencia. ALDF. Advisor to Former Deputy Maria de 10s h g e l e s  
Moreno. March 2004. 
Interview P: Rubkn Ramirez Rivera. GDF. General Coordinator of Metropolitan 
Programs. January 2003. 
-- 
Unless indicated these were personal interviews and were conducted in Mexico City. 
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Interview Q: Jorge Fernandez Mere. GDF (Ministry of Finance), Assistant Director of 
Financial Administration. March 2004. 
Interview R: Mario Curzio Rivera. METRO, Assistant Director of Construction. March 
2004. 
Interview S: Arturo Blancas y Calderon. METRO. Assistant Director of Budgeting. 
March 2004. 
Interview T: Miguel h g e l  Cerb6n Navarrete. GEM (Ministry of Metropolitan 
Coordination). Director of Transportation and Urban Development. March 2004. 
Interview U: Maria de 10s h g e l e s  Moreno. Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs. Cambridge MA. February 2004. 
Interview V: Myron Orfield. The Brookings Institution. Senior Fellow. In-class personal 
conversation. Harvard Law School Cambridge MA. November 2002. 
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